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Abstract  
 
All people rely upon water for life. Indigenous peoples are especially vulnerable to water 
conflicts and yet lack recognition in international water law. This thesis adopts Critical 
Race Theory to examine the intersection between transboundary water law, the doctrine 
of sovereignty and the international law of Indigenous peoples.  The methodology 
adopted in this thesis includes: (i) a deconstruction of the UN Watercourse Convention 
and the doctrine of sovereignty; (ii) a review of Indigenous perspectives on sovereignty; 
and (iii) a proposal for the reconstruction of transboundary water law in a manner that 
recognizes the internationally affirmed rights of Indigenous peoples. 
A deconstruction of the UN Watercourse Convention and related discourse reveals that 
state-centric approaches to transboundary water law fail to recognize Indigenous peoples’ 
international rights or the pivotal role that Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge 
might play in transcending conflict. Case examples are provided (Columbia River and 
Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River) that illustrate the vulnerability of Indigenous peoples in the 
face of state development agreements. The inequities that exist in international water law 
are rooted in the historical doctrine of sovereignty which has evolved to subordinate 
Indigenous peoples’ interests to state interests.   
Indigenous perspectives regarding sovereignty provide a counter-point to the dominant 
legal discourse and weave an alternate narrative that challenges the myth of objectivity 
and neutrality that surrounds the doctrine of sovereignty and international law generally.  
Once we recognize that sovereignty is a social construct, we can recognize our collective 
ability to reconstruct international laws in a manner that transcends the sovereign 
discourse and recognizes the rights of Indigenous peoples.  Endorsement of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is indicative of 
states’ commitment to recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights throughout the international 
legal system.  
This thesis concludes by offering a proposal for reconstructing transboundary water law 
through a return to ethics and coalition building. Future reform should be directed 
towards (a) articulating an international water ethic with the critical engagement of 
Indigenous peoples; and (b) ensuring that river basin organizations are established on 
every transboundary river in a manner consistent with this shared international water 
ethic.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Water is life's mater and matrix, mother and medium.  
There is no life without water.1 
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi 
 
Fierce national competition over water resources has prompted fears that 
water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict. If all the world's peoples 
work together, a secure and sustainable water future can be ours.2 
 
Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General 
1.1 Anticipating Water Conflict 
Water is the world’s most precious resource.  Water is life. All living beings 
depend upon water for survival.  As a growing global population relies upon dwindling 
supplies of fresh potable water, conflict over how water is governed appears inevitable. 
However, there is also an unprecedented opportunity for cooperation and reconciliation 
as we come to terms with our interdependence and the fragility of our existence on this 
planet.3   Given the paramount importance of water to our survival and the inevitability of 
conflict over limited water resources, thoughtful governance strategies are required to 
guide ethical human relationships regarding shared water.   The need for effective 
international water laws is especially pressing within the context of transboundary rivers: 
rivers that flow through two or more sovereign states. 
                                                 
1
 Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, Biochemist, Nobel Prize Winner, cited in Saskatchewan Watershed Authority, 
“Celebrating and Conserving Water”, online: Saskatchewan Watershed Authority 
<http://www.swa.ca/WaterConservation/default.asp?type=CelebratingWater>.  
2
 Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, cited in UN-Water, Transboundary Waters” UN International 
Decade of Action, Water for Life 2005-2015, online: UN 
<http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_waters.shtml> [UN-Water]. 
3
 Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis 
(Penguin Group: New York, 2009). 
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By their very nature, transboundary watercourses offer the potential to become 
flashpoints for conflict or cooperation.4  International river basins are not constrained by 
political boundaries and as such are potent reminders of the interconnectedness of our 
global ecosystem as well as the inherent limitations of sovereignty as an organizing 
principle of international water law.5    States and local communities can either compete 
for limited resources or work together to optimize use.   There are approximately 260 
transboundary river basins that cover 45% of the land surface of our planet.6  At least 145 
nations have territory within an international drainage basin.7  Transboundary river basins 
currently support nearly half our global population and yet the availability of fresh water 
is declining rapidly.8   Brown & Odeh observe that population growth alone over the last 
100 years has led to an almost “80 percent drop in per capita water availability”.9  
Increasingly, stress on the natural environment due to water scarcity, pollution, resource 
development and climate change have magnified the growing need for facilitated 
                                                 
4
 Heather L Beach et al. Transboundary freshwater dispute resolution: Theory, practice and annotated 
references (New York: United Nations University Press, 2000) at 39 [Beach et al].  
5
 Stephen C McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd ed  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) at 68 [McCaffrey (2007)]. 
6
 Alex Grzybowski, Stephen C McCaffrey & Richard K Paisley, “Beyond International Water Law: 
Successfully Negotiating Mutual Gains Agreements for International Watercourses” (2010) 22 Global Bus 
& Dev’t LJ 139 at 139-140 [Grzybowski et al]. 
7
 R Paisley & G Hearns, “Some Observations from Recent Experiences with the Governance of 
International Drainage Basins” in AC Corréa and Gabriel Eckstein, eds, Precious, Worthless or 
Immeasurable: the Value and Ethics of Water, (Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University, 2006) online: 
Governance-IWLearn <http://governance-iwlearn.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Texas-Tech.pdf> 1 at 4 
[Paisley & Hearns].  The authors define an “international drainage basin” as referring to “fresh water 
resources that are shared by two or more sovereign states”.  Thorson defines an “international drainage 
basin” as “more than simply a transboundary river, it is the entire geographic area of a watershed.” See 
Erica J Thorson, “Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role of Territorial Sovereignty” (2009) 19 
Duke J Comp & Int’l L 487, online: Duke University School of Law 
<http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?19+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int'l+L.+487+pdf> at 506 [Thorson]. 
8
 Paisley & Hearns, ibid at 4. 
9
 Anna Brown & Nancy Odeh, "Towards a Global Transboundary Watercourse and Aquifer Agreement 
(GTWAA) in William R. Moomaw & Lawrence E. Susskind, eds, Papers on International Environmental 
Negotiation, Volume 15 Ensuring a Sustainable Future (Boston: MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, 
2006) online: Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School <http://www.pon.harvard.edu/shop/papers-on-
international-environmental-negotiation-series/> 1 at 2 [Brown & Odeh]. 
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transboundary cooperation and dispute resolution.   The potential for conflict is immense; 
the opportunity and need for peace building around transboundary rivers is equally great.  
This thesis considers the international law of transboundary rivers from the perspective of 
Indigenous peoples who rely upon these resources for their survival and whose sacred 
responsibilities to water are central to their culture.10 
1.2 Transboundary Water Law, Indigenous Peoples and Sovereignty 
My thesis has evolved over time.  I initially approached international water law 
from the question of how to increase public participation in the governance of 
transboundary rivers.  However, early in my studies, I was given the opportunity to attend 
several formative meetings of the Canadian Columbia River Basin Forum comprised of 
dozens of federal and provincial department bureaucrats as well as representatives from 
                                                 
10
 Throughout this paper, I have used the word “Indigenous” in the spirit of the sentiments of preeminent 
international legal scholar, S James Anaya: 
… the term indigenous refers broadly to the living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants 
of lands now dominated by others. … They are indigenous because their ancestral roots are 
embedded in the lands in which they live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the 
roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the same lands or in close proximity.  
Furthermore, they are peoples to the extent they comprise distinct communities with a 
continuity of existence and identity that links them to the communities, tribes, or nations of 
their ancestral past.  
See James S Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) at 3 [Anaya (2004)]. Corntassel & Primeau note that “indigenous” is the designation that “is most 
widely used among native populations themselves, by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the 
United Nations, as well as by many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). See Jeff J Corntassel & 
Tomas Hopkins Primeau, “Indigenous ‘Sovereignty’ and International Law: Revised Strategies for 
Pursuing Self-Determination” (1995) 17:2 Hum Rts Q as reprinted in (2006) 2 Hawaiian Journal of Law & 
Politics 53 at 55 [Corntassel & Primeau].  However, I also acknowledge that any definition of Indigenous 
may include inherent limitations.   The UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights affirms, “no 
formal universal definition is necessary for the recognition and protection of their rights”.  See UN 
Development Group, Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues, (2008) online: Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/docs/guidelines.pdf> at 
8. Other scholars expressly reject the term “aboriginal” and the term “Indian”.  See Taiaiake Alfred & Jeff 
Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialsm” (2005) 40:4 Government 
and Opposition 597 [Alfred & Corntassel]; Akwesasne Notes, “Indigenous Peoples, Self-Determination 
and the Unfounded Fear of Secession” (1995) as reprinted in Robert Odawi Porter, ed, Sovereignty, 
Colonialism and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader (Durham, North Carolina: California Academic Press, 
2005) 713 [Akwesasne Notes] [RO Porter].   I have adopted the term “Indigenous” throughout this paper 
except when quoting scholars that have used different terminology.  Within the Canadian context, however, 
I have used the term “First Nations” where appropriate to indicate the Indigenous peoples that reside within 
Canada. The term “First Nations” does not include Métis or Inuit. 
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several First Nations Bands that reside within the Canadian Columbia Basin.11   The 
experience was a transformative one for me personally.  One observation in particular has 
had a lasting and profound impact upon my research. The communication gulf between 
government officials and the Indigenous representatives was staggering.   
When the Indigenous representatives spoke about the pressing issues confronting 
the Columbia River, they spoke passionately of spirit, salmon and grandchildren. They 
called for a basin-wide approach to governance and emphasized the interconnectedness 
of all living things within the river basin. The bureaucrats smiled politely and spoke 
pragmatically of limited mandates, budget constraints, and overlapping political 
jurisdictions while simultaneously strategizing towards potential press releases.  The gulf 
in understanding and intentions was palpable.  At the core of the disconnection was a 
conflict of core values and different assumptions about the nature of our relationship with 
the river and its ecosystem. The Indigenous representatives stopped coming to the 
meetings.12  I became uncomfortable participating in the discussions between government 
departments and disengaged from the process. 
Upon reflection, it became clear to me that the first step on the long road to 
participatory decision-making must begin by bridging the communication gap between 
the state governments and Indigenous peoples, and ensuring that the latter are truly 
                                                 
11
 Participants in these meetings included representatives from the following: British Columbia (BC) 
Ministry of Environment BC Hydro, BC Crown Agencies Secretariat, BC Intergovernmental Relations 
Office, BC Ministry of Energy, Mines & Petroleum Resources, Canadian Columbia River Inter-tribal 
Fisheries Commission, Canadian Consulate – Seattle (DFAIT), Canadian Ministry of Indian & Northern 
Affairs, Columbia Basin Trust, Environment Canada, Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Natural Resources 
Canada, Okanagan Nation Alliance, Shuswap Nation Tribal Council, & Ktunaxa Nation Council.  
12
 First Nations did participate in subsequent meetings.  In 2007, seventeen Canadian federal, provincial, 
regional and First Nation agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding and have committed to 
collaborating on transboundary water management issues through the Canadian Columbia River Forum. 
See Canadian Columbia River Forum.  “Canadian Columbia River Forum Memorandum of 
Understanding”, online: Canadian Columbia River Forum, 
<http://www.ccrf.ca/assets/docs/pdf/MOU_Eng_17.pdf>. 
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engaged in the governance of transboundary rivers.  I began to research the rights of 
Indigenous peoples in transboundary water law and found that, because they lacked 
recognition of power akin to sovereign status, they were excluded from the discourse on 
the law of transboundary rivers.  Indigenous interests were summarily relegated to a 
matter of domestic concern, a common state practice of colonization.  This struck me as 
contrary to the international status of Indigenous peoples as affirmed by the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP or the Declaration].13  
In 2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that one of the five objectives of the 
Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples is: 
Promoting the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples in 
decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lifestyles, their 
traditional lands and territories, their cultural integrity as indigenous 
peoples with collective rights or any other aspect of their lives… 
… 
… participation in intergovernmental work is a core element … 
of the Second Decade and a fundamental human rights norm in 
international law, firmly enshrined in international human rights 
instruments.  The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples reconfirms this norm and analyses of its meaning as 
it pertains to indigenous peoples.14 
                                                 
13
 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN GAOR Doc.A/RES/61/295 (13 
September 2007) online: UN <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html> [UNDRIP]. 
14
 Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General (2010), Report on the Midterm assessment of the progress made in 
the achievement of the goal and objectives of the Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous 
People, cited in Ellen Gabriel (Speaker), “Joint Statement of Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee); 
Inuit Circumpolar Council; Assembly of First Nations: International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples of Tropical Forests/Alianza Internacional de los Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales de los Bosques 
Tropicales; International Indian Treaty Council (IITC); Na Koa Ikaika KaLahui Hawaii; First Nations 
Summit; Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs; Network of the Indigenous Peoples-Solomons (NIPS); 
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations; Treaty 4 Chiefs; Innu Council of Nitassinan; Kus Kura S.C.; 
Haudenosaunee of Kanehsatà:ke; Kakisiwew Treaty Council; Ochapowace Cree First Nation; Cowessess 
Cree First Nation; First Peoples Human Rights Coalition; Canadian Friends Service Committee (Quakers); 
Center for World Indigenous Studies; KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives”  (Statement 
presented to the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Fourth session, Geneva 11-15 July 
2011) [unpublished], online: Canadian Friends Service Committee < http://quakerservice.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Expert-MECHANISM-Study-re-IPs-Rt-to-Participate-ORAL-Statement-GCC-et-
al-July-12-11.pdf> at 2, paras 10 & 11[Gabriel] [emphasis added]. 
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This recognition of Indigenous peoples’ international rights to fully participate in 
environmental decision-making is absent from the law of transboundary rivers. 
This observation was further reinforced by my research regarding the Tsangpo-
Brahmaputra River Basin that runs through the Himalayan Mountains of the Tibet 
Autonomous Region in China and flows through India, Bhutan and Bangladesh.   
Governance of this transboundary river is complicated by the complexity and magnitude 
of the issues confronting the Indigenous peoples of Tibet, as well as the ongoing dispute 
between China and India over portions of Arunchal Pradesh, all of which centre around 
conflicting claims of sovereignty.   In this context, the requirement of unambiguous 
sovereign status in order to access the international law of transboundary rivers may 
actually exacerbate violent conflicts in the area and undermine the status of Indigenous 
peoples’ who have never ceded their sovereignty over these regions. 
Together, the case examples of the Columbia and the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra 
Rivers prompted me to critically examine the intersection between the international law 
of transboundary watercourses, the doctrine of sovereignty, and the international rights of 
Indigenous peoples.  The issues surrounding these two rivers brought into focus the effect 
that the doctrine of sovereignty has had in transboundary water law in excluding 
Indigenous peoples from participating in international transboundary negotiations.   
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses [UN Watercourse Convention] is intended as a mechanism to 
govern the economic and political relationships and agreements between sovereign states 
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only and does not recognize the rights of non-state actors.15  While at first glance this may 
seem standard for an international convention, it is problematic for two reasons: 
i) it does not acknowledge and integrate the rights of Indigenous peoples as 
ratified in a myriad of other international instruments; and 
ii) it does not provide any mechanism for dispute resolution for conflicts 
regarding transboundary waters that are outside of a well-defined and clearly 
delineated state-to-state relationship.  
Rather than help reduce conflict over these rivers, the state-centric focus of the UN 
Watercourse Convention may actually serve to further entrench competition and conflict 
over territories in order to obtain or preserve the entitlements that come with sovereign 
status.  
 The UN Watercourse Convention is a particularly unique subject matter for an 
analysis of the doctrine of sovereignty in that it is directed at transboundary waters, 
which by their very nature defy claims of sovereign entitlement.  Stephen C. 
McCaffrey16, author of The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd ed. (2007), considers 
the challenges that arise when attempting to apply the doctrine of territorial sovereignty 
to transboundary waters and observes that transboundary water defies ownership in that it 
is “more akin to clouds, winds and migratory birds than to land”.17  In his role as special 
rapporteur to the United Nations International Law Commission during the drafting of the 
                                                 
15
 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, opened for 
signature 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997) (not yet in force) at Art 2 [UN Watercourse Convention]. 
16
 Professor McCaffrey is one of the world’s foremost authorities on international water law.  He was a 
member of the United Nations International Law Commission from 1982-91 and served as its chair during 
the 1987-88 session. He served as special rapporteur for the commission’s draft articles on the law of the 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses, which formed the basis of the UN Watercourse 
Convention. See full biography online: Pacific McGeorge School of Law 
<http://www.mcgeorge.edu/x7296.xml>. 
17
 McCaffrey (2007), supra note 5 at 68. 
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UN Watercourse Convention, McCaffrey made firsthand observations regarding the 
negotiation of the Convention.  He perceives the equitable principles set out in the UN 
Watercourse Convention as constituting a radical departure from the traditional notions 
of absolute territorial sovereignty.  In 2008, McCaffrey stated that the UN Watercourse 
Convention “thoroughly rejects any notion that sovereignty over shared water resources 
is part of international law. … A right to share in a common resource is difficult, at best, 
to reconcile with the notion of ‘sovereignty’ over that resource.”18  He further asserts that 
“[t]he notion of sovereignty over shared water is unsupported both in state practice and in 
the work of expert groups.”19 McCaffrey also emphasizes the inclusive nature of UN 
Watercourse Convention negotiations to emphasize its universal applicability.  He states: 
… the Convention will be of value whether or not it enters into force 
because it was negotiated in a forum in which virtually any interested state 
could participate, and therefore reflects the views of the international 
community on the subject.20  
When viewed from a state perspective, the UN Watercourse Convention is perceived by 
supporters and detractors alike as representing a landmark departure from the historical 
doctrine of sovereignty.    
When viewed from the perspective of Indigenous peoples, however, sovereign 
status continues to be a barrier to accessing transboundary water law.  As non-state 
actors, Indigenous peoples have no rights under the UN Watercourse Convention and are 
                                                 
18
 Stephen C McCaffrey “Introduction: Politics and Sovereignty over Transboundary Groundwater” (Paper 
presented to Proceedings of the Annual Meeting American Society of International Law Panel Discussion 
entitled “If Water Respects No Political Boundaries, Does Politics Respect Transboundary Waters?” (2008) 
102 American Society of Int’l L Proc 353, online: JSTOR <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25660314> at 354 
[McCaffrey (2008)].  
19
 Ibid at 355. 
20
 McCaffrey (2007), supra note 5 at 376 [emphasis added]. Also at 359, McCaffrey observes that the 
Working Group, which drafted the UN Watercourse Convention, was open to participation by all member 
states within the United Nations as well as states that were only members of specialized agencies of the 
United Nations.  This had the effect of allowing states such as Switzerland to participate in the drafting of 
the Convention even though they were not members of the United Nations. 
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rarely mentioned in the legal discourse regarding transboundary rivers despite the 
overwhelming affirmation of international Indigenous rights by the majority of states.   In 
this respect, the doctrine of sovereignty continues to dictate who may participate in the 
international law of transboundary rivers and which peoples are deemed to be members 
of the “international community” that are entitled to share in the transboundary water 
resources.21 
The UN Watercourse Convention was opened for signature on 21 May 1997 and 
has been endorsed by 24 countries.22  It has not yet come into force because it lacks the 
35 signatories required for ratification.  Notably, UNDRIP was initially adopted on 13 
September 2007 by 144 countries and as of January 2012 has been endorsed by 150 
countries.23  Numerous provisions of UNDRIP affirm an indirect right to water as 
incidental to Indigenous peoples’ rights to cultural integrity and economic development.  
Articles 25 and 32(2) expressly affirm Indigenous peoples’ rights to water and require 
states to obtain Indigenous peoples’ “free and informed consent” prior to any 
development that impacts water in their territories.24  Given the overwhelming state 
support for UNDRIP, does the UN Watercourse Convention truly reflect the views of the 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 UN Treaty Collections, “Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses New York, 21 May 1997” (Status as at 2 January 2012), online: UN Treaty Collections 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&lang=en#Participants>.   
23
 UNDRIP, supra note 13.  UNDRIP was originally endorsed by 144 countries in favour, four countries 
voting against and 11 countries abstaining. The four countries that voted against UNDRIP were Canada, the 
United States, Australia and New Zealand.  All four have since endorsed UNDRIP.  The countries 
abstaining were: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian 
Federation, Samoa and Ukraine.  Columbia and Samoa have since expressed their support of the 
Declaration.  See UN Bibliographic Information System, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, online: UN 
<http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=.VM&term=ares61295>.   Also see 
UN PFII, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Adopted by the General 
Assembly 13 September 2007”, online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html>.    
24
 UNDRIP, supra note 13. 
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international community on the subject of international water law?  If international values 
have changed, then the UN Watercourse Convention also needs to be updated to reflect 
the international rights of Indigenous peoples. 
In this thesis, I contend that state-centric approaches to transboundary water law 
fail to recognize Indigenous peoples’ international rights or the potentially pivotal role 
that Indigenous legal theory and Indigenous peoples’ knowledge might play in 
transcending conflict.  The international community can transcend the conflict inherent in 
sovereign discourse by developing international water law in a manner that recognizes 
Indigenous peoples’ rights to participate in decision-making regarding transboundary 
rivers and to gain access to regional dispute resolution mechanisms.  This can be 
achieved on a ‘without prejudice’ basis such that the laws concerning shared water 
resources can evolve without adversely impacting any peoples’ claim to sovereignty.25  If 
sovereign status remains a precondition to accessing and participating in transboundary 
water law, then the UN Watercourse Convention effectively perpetuates imperialist 
values and the historical exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the international 
community. 
While overcoming references to state sovereignty in international water law is a 
daunting task, a review of the history of Indigenous peoples’ international rights in can 
provide us with insights about how to navigate the doctrine of sovereignty in 
international law.  Hammer contends that international laws and norms regarding 
Indigenous peoples’ status and position can provide an important bridge between 
questions regarding the human right to water and control over water as a resource, as well 
as issues relating to the environment. He states: 
                                                 
25
 Personal conversation with June McCue (2011).   
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By considering indigenous peoples and their approaches to the land, we can 
begin to conceive of a holistic approach to water that goes beyond the 
sovereign dialogue pertaining to states and their territories.26 
The primary objective of this thesis is to reconcile international water law with the 
international law of Indigenous peoples.  In the next section, I set out my methodology 
for undertaking this research project and introduce critical race theory as the theoretical 
framework for this thesis. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
The primary focus of this thesis is to deconstruct, decolonize and offer directions 
for reconstruction of the international law of transboundary rivers from Indigenous 
perspectives.  Throughout this research, I have been guided by the question: What would 
an international law of transboundary rivers look like if it were drafted from the 
perspective of international Indigenous law and theory?  To answer this question, I have 
adopted Critical Race Theory as my theoretical framework to critically examine the 
impact of the UN Watercourse Convention, its related discourse and the role of the 
doctrine of sovereignty upon Indigenous peoples. 
1.3.1  Critical Race Theory 
 
Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing Justice and …  
when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams 
that block the flow of social progress.27 
 
Martin Luther King Jr. (1963) 
 
                                                 
26
 Leonard Hammer, “Indigenous People as a Catalyst for Applying the Human Right to Water” (2004) 10 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 131 at 150. 
27
  Martin Luther King in Carol Aylward, Canadian Critical Race Theory (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing 
1999) at 14 [Aylward]. 
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In this thesis, I apply critical race theory as it applies to Indigenous peoples in 
international water law [Critical Race Theory].  At the core of Critical Race Theory is the 
goal of achieving social justice for historically oppressed groups.28   Mutua describes 
Critical Race Theory as “ … a project of outsider jurisprudence” as it is primarily 
directed at “social justice for ‘outsider’ groups”.29  While Critical Race Theory originally 
emerged within the context of the struggle of African-American peoples in the United 
States, it has emerged as a theoretical framework that is relevant for examining the 
experience of other oppressed minorities and Indigenous peoples.30 
In Canadian Critical Race Theory (1999), Carol Aylward identifies the primary 
themes of the theoretical framework as follows: 
… a contextual analysis which positions the experiences of oppressed 
peoples at its center, a deconstruction which asks the question, How does 
this legal doctrine rule, principle, policy or practice subordinate the interests 
of Black people and other people of colour? And ultimately, a 
reconstruction which understands the “duality” of law, recognizing both its 
contribution to the subordination of Blacks and other people of colour and 
its transformative power.31 
 
An accompanying methodology has emerged that is comprised of a deconstruction of the 
law, a presentation of alternatives and a reconstruction of the law in a manner that 
remedies the injustice.32    Applied to this thesis, the methodology involves: 
                                                 
28
 Christopher Dunbar Jr, “Critical Race Theory and Indigenous Methodologies” in Norman K Denzin, 
Yvonna S Lincoln, & Linda Tuhiwai Smith, eds, Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies  
(Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2008) 85 at 93 [Smith (2008)]. 
29
 Makau W Mutua, “Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider” (2000) 
45 Vill L Rev 841, online: Social Science Research Network  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525526> at 848 
[Mutua]. 
30
 Ibid at 841-842. 
31
 Aylward, supra note 27 at 34-35. 
32
 Ibid.  Aylward offers the following methodology: “Critical Race methodology requires a deconstruction  
of legal rules, principles and policies and it challenges the so-called “neutrality” and “objectivity” of laws 
that oppress Blacks and other people of colour. Deconstruction is designed to confront subtle forms of 
discrimination perpetuated by law. Critical Race Theory attempts to expose the ordinariness of racism and 
to validate the experiences of people of colour, which are important for understanding laws that perpetuate 
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(i) a deconstruction of the law of transboundary rivers by confronting the 
role of the legal doctrine of sovereignty within international water law 
and demonstrating how it operates to subordinate Indigenous peoples;  
 
(ii) a presentation of alternate narratives regarding Indigenous peoples’ 
relationships to sovereignty which together  “tell the story” 33 of the 
racial antagonism that is at the center of the legal principle in question; 
and  
 
(iii) a reconstruction of the international law of transboundary rivers 
through a return to ethics and coalition building.   
 
International law is not beyond the reach of Critical Race Theory.  Andrews 
emphasizes the ability of Critical Race Theory “to unmask the veneer of equality and 
neutrality of international law and to expose international law’s colonial trappings.”34 
Mutua identifies the role that Critical Race Theory can play in challenging the supposed 
“universality” 35 of international law.  Proponents of international law tend to present it as 
a universal system of laws that is premised on equality and neutrality.   Mutua asserts that 
international law by its very nature is “Eurocentric in that it issues from European 
thought, culture and experiences.  This specificity denies international law 
universality.”36  Critical Race Theory provides a framework for deconstructing how 
colonialism and cultural bias have infiltrated international legal systems and institutions 
and challenges the supposed universality of international laws.  Mutua contends that the 
application of Critical Race Theory to international law reveals that: 
                                                                                                                                                 
their disenfranchisement. … Critical Race Theory also employs “narrative,” or storytelling. Narrative 
functions in a number of ways.  It can allow lawyers and others to “tell the story” of their clients and the 
Black experience of racism and subordination. … Narrative can debunk the myths of neutrality and 
objectivity by placing emphasis upon the confrontational nature of an encounter … in its social and 
historical context of racial discrimination.  … The final stage in Critical Race methodology is 
reconstruction.  What are the alternatives (if any) to the existing doctrine, legal rule, principle or practice 
that will advance the cause of Black people?” 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Penelope Andrews, “Making Room for Critical Race Theory in International Law: Some Practical 
Pointers” (2000) 45 Vill L Rev 855 at 858. 
35
 Mutua, supra note 29 at 844-845. 
36
 Ibid at 841. 
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… international law has largely been developed and deployed as a vehicle 
for advancing particular interests, for the benefit of specific peoples, 
cultures and regions and, as a consequence, for the detriment of particular 
interests, peoples, cultures and regions.37 
 
Beyond deconstruction, Critical Race Theory also holds the promise of reconstructing 
international law in a manner that reflects true universality and social justice.  Mutua 
asserts that, “international law need not be an instrument for exclusion and exploitation” 
and that “it can and should speak to more noble ideals”.38   Critical Race Theory therefore 
brings with it an “emancipatory potential … that can be tapped and deployed as part of 
the project for the reconstruction of international law.”39  
I have adopted Critical Race Theory and methodology from the perspective of 
Indigenous peoples recognizing that they have been historically oppressed and 
disenfranchised.  Specifically, my research challenges the tendency of international water 
law and the mainstream discourse associated with transboundary water law to 
subordinate and marginalize the rights and interests of Indigenous peoples.    This thesis 
demonstrates how ongoing colonial presumptions about the primacy of state sovereignty 
in the international law of transboundary rivers have operated to exclude Indigenous 
peoples’ from the social contract that forms the basis of international water law.  Critical 
Race Theory provides a lens through which to critique transboundary water law from the 
perspective of Indigenous peoples and to envision how international water law could be 
reconstructed if it were founded upon post-imperial values such as mutual respect.40   
                                                 
37
 Ibid at 845. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Alfred identifies “three post-imperial values: consent, mutual recognition, and cultural continuity.” See 
Taiaiake Alfred, “Sovereignty” in Joanne Barker, ed, Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and 
Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determinism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 33 
at 38 [Alfred (2005)] [J Barker]. 
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Respect is a key theme in Indigenous scholarship.  In her well received book 
Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (2002), Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith writes:  
The term ‘respect’ is consistently used by indigenous peoples to underscore 
the significance of our relationships and humanity.  Through respect the 
place of everyone and everything in the universe is kept in balance and 
harmony.  Respect is a reciprocal, shared, constantly interchanging principle 
which is expressed through all aspects of social conduct.  Haig-Brown and 
Archibald write that, “to be in harmony with oneself, other members of the 
animal kingdom, and other elements of nature requires that First Nations 
people respect the gift of each entity and establish and maintain respectful, 
reciprocal relations with each’.  The denial by the West of humanity to 
indigenous peoples, the denial of citizenship and human rights, the denial of 
the right to self-determination – all these demonstrate palpably the 
enormous lack of respect which has marked the relations of indigenous and 
non-indigenous peoples.”41 
 
To restore dignity overall, reconstruction of international water law must accord with 
respect for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.42 
The current chapter outlines the methodology and theoretical framework of this 
thesis.   Chapter 2 sets out to deconstruct international water law.  This chapter introduces 
the UN Watercourse Convention and related mainstream discourse and demonstrates how 
the doctrine of sovereignty operates to exclude Indigenous peoples from participating in 
international water law and discourse.  Chapter 2 also provides two case examples that 
locate Indigenous peoples and interests within the complex geopolitics of two 
transboundary rivers: the Columbia River and the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River.  The first 
case example demonstrates how Indigenous peoples have been adversely impacted by 
past transboundary developments and how their ongoing legal claims and future interests 
                                                 
41
 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (New Zealand: 
University of Otago Press, 2002) at 120 [Smith (2002)].  Also see Alfred (2005), supra note 40 at 46 where 
he observes that, “Indigenous perspectives offer alternatives, beginning with the restoration of a regime of 
respect.”  
42
 Personal conversation with D. Anthony Knox (2011). 
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are routinely relegated to a secondary domestic concern. The second case example 
illustrates the extreme vulnerability of Indigenous peoples and the geopolitical tensions 
that are exacerbated by linking rights regarding transboundary water with sovereign 
status.  This chapter will demonstrate how the entrenchment of the doctrine of 
sovereignty in international water law undermines the internationally protected rights of 
Indigenous peoples and potentially fuels conflict in regions where sovereignty is disputed 
or unresolved.43    
Chapter 3 provides alternative narratives and perspectives regarding sovereignty.  
This chapter offers a brief history of the concept of sovereignty in classical Western legal 
discourse to show how it has been manipulated as a tool of Western lawmakers to 
dominate Indigenous peoples and exploit resources.  Chapter 3 then undertakes a 
literature review of Indigenous experiences and perspectives of sovereignty.  This chapter 
will show that the concept of sovereignty is not a fixed absolute but rather is a socially 
and culturally derived concept that has been shaped by lawmakers for specific political 
purposes. Once we acknowledge sovereignty as a social construct, we can imagine the 
reconstruction of new laws grounded in mutual respect. 
Chapter 4 offers proposals for the reconstruction of international water law in a 
manner that is inclusive of Indigenous perspectives. This chapter considers how 
Indigenous peoples have successfully asserted their rights within international law and 
                                                 
43
 The deconstruction that follows in the next chapter involves a critical examination of the UN 
Watercourse Convention and related discourse.  While I do make passing reference to the International 
Law Commission’s draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers, I do not critique those draft articles 
in this thesis. (See International Law Commission, Draft articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 
(2008) UN GAOR Sixty-third Session, Supp No. 10, UN Doc A/63/10, online: UN 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/8_5_2008.pdf> [Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers].) Likewise, I have not undertaken a critical analysis of general water governance 
theories such as Integrated Resource Water Management (IRWM) theories or Integrated Water Initiatives 
(IWI), although I do make reference to them in some instances.  Finally, this thesis is concerned solely with 
international law of transboundary rivers and does not attempt to analyze the national laws of any one state.    
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reviews several international instruments that recognize and affirm Indigenous peoples’ 
rights. I then consider several proposals for the reconstruction of international water law.   
In my view, simply amending the UN Watercourse Convention to reference UNDRIP and 
other Indigenous rights will not achieve genuine reconciliation.  I conclude by proposing 
a vision for a new and radically inclusive international convention, which encompasses 
and integrates international Indigenous laws and values through a return to ethics and 
coalition building.  I contend that the international law of Indigenous peoples’ rights 
together with the human right to water must form the pillars of international water law 
reform, effectively displacing the doctrine of sovereignty currently governing 
transboundary water conflict.  In the next section, I reflect upon my own role as a non-
Indigenous person seeking social justice for Indigenous peoples.   
 
1.4  Deconstructing My Settler Self: On Becoming an Ally in Water Law 
Given that I have adopted Critical Race (Indigenous) Theory as my theoretical 
framework of my thesis, it is relevant to acknowledge that I am not Indigenous.  I am a 
second-generation Canadian of European-settler heritage. Several members of my family 
have dedicated their professional and personal lives to working in close partnership and 
friendship with Indigenous peoples.  My father, also of European descent, has been a 
band manager and consultant to British Columbian First Nations for the last 10 years 
until his retirement.  My mother, a lifelong educator, earned her doctorate at the age of 65 
researching and documenting the strength and resilience of First Nations women as 
community leaders in education.  Other family members work in the field of First 
Nations issues in counseling as well as refugee advocacy for Indigenous peoples arriving 
in Canada.  Others have lived or continue to live on First Nations reserves.  As a young 
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child, I took annual vacations to visit family on a remote coastal reserve.  I am shaped by 
my settler heritage and I have also been raised to think deeply about the ongoing social 
and legal reconciliation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples’ traditions.   
Increasingly, non-Indigenous scholars are exploring the issues that arise as a non-
Indigenous person committed to pursuing social justice for Indigenous peoples.  In 
Unsettling the Settler Within, Paulette Regan challenges non-Indigenous peoples to 
confront their privileged status as settlers: 
The significant challenge that lies before us is to turn the mirror back upon 
ourselves and to answer the provocative question posed by historian Roger 
Epp regarding reconciliation in Canada: How do we solve the settler 
problem?44 
 
In “Ethical Space of Engagement”, Cree ethicist, Willie Ermine shares a similar 
perspective on the need for non-Indigenous peoples to internalize the observable 
injustices: 
Currently, the situation, and very often the plight of Indigenous peoples, 
should act as a mirror to mainstream Canada.  The conditions that 
Indigenous peoples find themselves in are a reflection of the governance and 
legal structures imposed by the dominant society.  Indeed, what the mirror 
can teach is that it is not really about the situation of Indigenous peoples in 
this country, but it is about the character and honor of a nation to have 
created such conditions of inequity.  It is about the mindset of a human 
community refusing to honor the rights of other human communities.45  
 
Barker observes that, to the extent that Indigenous peoples are confronted with the 
imperative to overcome historic injustices, settler peoples are equally confronted with the 
                                                 
44
 Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) at 11 [Regan]. 
45
 Willie Ermine, “The Ethical Space of Engagement” in (2007) 6 Indigenous L J 193 at 200 [Ermine 
(2007)]. 
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imperative to overcome the adverse impacts of colonization in order to realize freedom 
and dignity.46   
Regan contemplates what it means to become a “settler-ally” and concludes that it 
requires her to “continuously confront the colonizer-perpetrator in myself, interrogating 
my own position as a beneficiary of colonial injustice.”47  Regan notes that this 
commitment to being an ally is necessarily an uncomfortable and difficult journey.  
Those settlers who think that no reconciliation is necessary or that a cheap 
reconciliation is enough may never aspire to change the socio-political 
relationships, structures and institutions of colonialism.  Taiaiake Alfred 
reminds us that, “from the perspective of the Onkwehonwe struggle, the 
enemy is not the white man in racial terms, it is a way of thinking with an 
imperialist’s mind.” Thus it is possible and necessary for those settlers who 
would be Indigenous allies to reject the imperialist’s mind in favour of 
living in truth, accepting that we will struggle and be discomforted and 
unsettled.48 
 
Relying upon Regan’s framework, Barker states that to become a meaningful ally, a 
Settler must resist the temptation to “re-establish comfort” and instead continue to ask 
“What do we do?” from a “profoundly uncomfortable place”.49 This inquiry must 
continue to be guided by “an honest inquiry into the causes and effects of colonialism, 
and our individual responsibility for colonization”.50  Barker concludes that being a 
settler-ally involves recognizing the place of privilege and power that one holds due to 
one’s settler status and then placing those resources at the disposal of Indigenous peoples. 
                                                 
46
 Adam Barker, “From Adversaries to Allies: Forging Respectful Alliances between Indigenous and Settler 
Peoples” in Lynn Davis, ed, Alliances: Re/Envisioning Indigenous-Non-Indigenous Relationships (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010) 316 at 318 [A Barker]. 
47
 Regan, supra note 44 at 236 
48
 Ibid at 233 
49
 A Barker, supra note 46 at 323. 
50
 Ibid. 
  
20
It also requires allies to give up their need to control Indigenous peoples’ actions or 
goals.51 
 From an academic perspective, research that involves Indigenous perspectives 
should set out to make a positive difference for Indigenous peoples.52  Regan concludes 
that:  
…. we must also work in respectful and humble partnership with Indigenous 
people to generate critical hope – vision that is neither cynical nor utopian 
but rooted in truth as an ethical quality in the struggle for human dignity and 
freedom.53  
 
As a settler, I acknowledge that I inevitably carry my cultural biases with me even while I 
try to overcome historical and ongoing prejudices.  While I am aware of the possibility 
that I could misinterpret or misunderstand the words of Indigenous scholars, I have also 
been raised to believe that it is important to find the courage to cross these bridges of 
understanding in an effort to initiate dialogue on issues that are vital to humanity.54  My 
research is my attempt to actively listen to what Indigenous scholars have said on these 
issues while acknowledging the limitations of my own understanding.55 While 
Indigenous lawyers and advocates are bound to bring a clearer perspective on this 
subject, I embark on this project with Robert B. Porter’s encouragement that “the bigger 
issue is commitment to bridging the cultural chasm and serving the needs of the client”56. 
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 Ibid at 324 
52
 Smith (2002), supra note 41 at 191. 
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 Regan, supra note 44 at 237. 
54
 Sandra Lynne Umpleby, Crossing Bridges: The Educational Leadership of First Nations Women (PhD 
Thesis, Education, University of Victoria, 2007) [Umpleby]. 
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 Robert B Porter, “Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American 
Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies” (1997) 28 Colum Hum Rts L Rev. 235, reprinted in RO 
Porter, supra note 10, 557 at 570 [RB Porter “Peacemaking”]. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
 
The United Nations cautions that governance of our limited freshwater resources 
in the face of escalating global demand is one of the most pressing issues facing the 
world in coming decades.57 Yet, international water law “remains remarkably weak to 
remedy problems involving international rivers”.58  Moreover, international law of 
transboundary rivers and related mainstream discourse is out of step with post-imperialist 
values that have been affirmed in other international instruments. This thesis critically 
examines the intersecting relationship between international water law, the doctrine of 
sovereignty and Indigenous peoples.  By adopting Critical Race Theory as my theoretical 
framework, I deconstruct the UN Watercourse Convention and demonstrate how the 
requirement of sovereign status operates to systemically exclude Indigenous peoples from 
participating in the application and development of transboundary water law at the 
international level.  I then offer alternatives to our traditional understanding of 
sovereignty by considering Indigenous peoples’ relationship with sovereign status in 
order to demonstrate that sovereignty is nothing more than a man-made construct that has 
been designed and manipulated for political and economic purposes.  Finally, I consider 
how Indigenous laws, wisdom and values might be accessed to inform a reconstruction of 
international water law that supports the mutual respect and dignity of all peoples in the 
governance of transboundary water. 
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 See generally, “UN-Water Documents”, online: UN-Water <http://www.unwater.org/>. 
58
 Paisley & Hearns, supra note 7 at 7.  
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Chapter 2:  International Water Law: A Deconstruction 
 
The first step in a Critical Race Theory analysis is to deconstruct the law or legal 
principle in question from the perspective of the oppressed group to demonstrate how it 
has operated to “subordinate the interests” 59 of that group.  The first part of this chapter 
reviews the international law of transboundary watercourses and examines the central 
role that the doctrine of sovereignty has played in the formation of international 
guidelines regarding transboundary rivers.  From a state perspective, the UN Watercourse 
Convention is perceived as progressive in its departure from the strict application of 
absolute territorial sovereignty and codification of a form of “sovereign equality” 60 vis-à-
vis shared watercourses.  However, from an Indigenous perspective, the emphasis upon 
sovereignty in international water law operates to prevent the application of established 
water ethics to Indigenous peoples. Because they are not recognized by states as 
possessing sovereign status within international law, Indigenous peoples are excluded 
from membership in the international community that is guiding the evolution of 
international water law principles.  This chapter locates Indigenous peoples within 
international water law and within the context of two transboundary rivers: the Columbia 
and the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. The chapter concludes by considering how the emphasis 
on sovereignty in international water law not only fails to acknowledge and protect 
Indigenous peoples’ affirmed international rights but may also exacerbate conflict in 
areas where disputed or unresolved claims over territory fuel ongoing geopolitical 
conflict.   
                                                 
59
 Aylward, supra note 27 at 34-35.  
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 UN Watercourse Convention, supra note 15.  Article 8.1 states that “Watercourse States shall cooperate 
on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain 
optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.” 
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2.1 International Water Law and the Doctrine of Sovereignty 
  
By their very nature, transboundary rivers are focal points for conflict.61  All 
peoples require water to survive and yet demands over limited supplies of freshwater are 
increasing as a result of population growth, climate change.  McIntyre considers the 
potential for conflict in terms of increasing population growth and anticipated demand 
upon transboundary rivers: 
Taking population growth alone, the United Nations has issued startling 
predictions for several major international river systems.  For example, 
along the Tigris and Euphrates, the populations of Iraq and Syria are 
predicted to more than double, and that of Jordan to nearly triple, between 
1955 and 2025. On the Nile, the population of Egypt is predicted to rise 
from 60-90 million and that of Sudan to more than double from 24-56 
million in the same period.  Similarly on the Ganges, the population of 
Bangladesh is expected to nearly double and that of India to increase by 50 
percent.  More recently, the WCD has estimated that world population will 
reach a peak of between 7.3 billion and 10.7 billion around 2050 before total 
population begins to stabilize or fall and, further, that by 2025 there will be 
approximately 3.5 billion people living in water-stressed countries.62 
 
Sufficient water flows are required for irrigation, hydroelectricity, fish populations and 
ecosystem health all of which will be further impacted by the demands of population 
growth. In addition to increased demand, transboundary rivers are subject to competing 
state development projects, the adverse impacts of pollution, and reduced flows due to 
melting glaciers and climate change.   
Beach et al. (2000) analyzed dozens of transboundary rivers to identify patterns of 
possible water conflict with the purpose of helping to anticipate emerging conflict.  The 
authors describe the typical pattern of emerging conflict as follows:  
                                                 
61
 Owen McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under International Law 
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…riparians of an international basin implement water development projects 
unilaterally first on water within their own territory, in attempts to avoid the 
political intricacies of the shared resources. At some point, as water demand 
approaches supply, one of the riparians, generally the regional power, will 
implement a project that impacts on at least one of its neighbours. … In the 
absence of relations or institutions conducive to conflict resolution, the 
project that impacts on one’s neighbours can become a flashpoint, and 
conflict among various parties is imminent.63  
Despite the critical importance of fresh water, international water law is ill equipped to 
address or remedy conflicts over transboundary rivers.64    
The UN Watercourse Convention is the only international treaty directed at 
transboundary rivers.65   The Convention outlines procedural and substantive guidelines 
for riparian member states to establish agreements for the optimal and sustainable 
utilization of transboundary watercourses.  Developed over 27 years by the United 
Nations International Law Commission, it has not yet entered into force due to a lack of 
signatories.66   
Despite its failure to be ratified, the Convention is accepted as setting out the 
customary international law of transboundary rivers and codifying “the fundamental 
principles and rules governing the rights and duties of watercourse states.” 67  While 
bilateral and multilateral agreements between states remain the primary source of 
customary international law, the UN Watercourse Convention is considered a guiding 
document and establishes “a basis for future international treaties”.68   
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2.1.1  UN Watercourse Convention 
 
The customary international law of transboundary watercourses, as reflected in the 
UN Watercourse Convention, is limited in its scope to the rights and obligations of 
sovereign states vis-à-vis other sovereign states.  Article 2 of the Convention defines the 
following terms: 
“Watercourse” means a system of surface waters and groundwaters 
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and 
normally flowing into a common terminus; 
“International watercourse” means a watercourse, parts of which are situated 
in different States; 
“Watercourse State” means a State Party to the present Convention in whose 
territory part of an international watercourse is situated, or a Party that is a 
regional economic integration organization, in the territory of one or more 
of whose Member States part of an international watercourse is situated; 
“Regional economic integration organization” means an organization 
constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its Member 
States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by the 
present Convention and which has been duly authorized in accordance with 
its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it.”69 
Article 4(1) states that, “[e]very Watercourse State is entitled to participate in the 
negotiation of and to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the 
entire international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations.”70   
Several provisions of the Convention set out procedural guidelines for cooperation, 
information sharing, notification of possible adverse effects, consultation, protection of 
ecosystems and responses to emergency conditions.  Article 33 sets out a dispute 
resolution procedure whereby Member Watercourse States agree to submit disputes to the 
International Court of Justice or submit to the arbitration procedures set out in the 
Appendix to the Convention.  The above definitions and provisions serve to limit the 
scope of the UN Watercourse Convention to the relationships between states. It does not 
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provide any recourse or mechanisms for dispute resolution for non-state actors such as 
Indigenous peoples. Nor are the equitable principles contained in the Convention 
intended to have any application to non-state actors. 
In addition to the procedural guidelines, the UN Watercourse Convention codifies 
two key substantive principles: (1) the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, 
and (2) the obligation not to cause significant harm to any party.71    Article 5 and Article 
7 state: 
Article 5 Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 
Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an 
international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse 
States, with a view of attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof 
and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse 
States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.   
Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection 
of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such 
participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty 
to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the 
present Convention.  
 
Article 7 Obligation not to cause significant harm 
Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant 
harm to other watercourse States. 
Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, 
the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to 
such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provision 
of article 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or 
mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of 
compensation. 
The equitable utilization and no-harm principles are perceived as an attempt to provide a 
“dynamic process” for equitably balancing the rights and duties of upstream and 
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downstream riparian states.72  These principles have evolved as a reflection of states’ 
competing perspectives on the proper duties and obligations that should attach to the 
doctrine of sovereignty.73     Together, they reflect recognition by states that, within the 
context of transboundary waters, the limitation upon absolute territorial sovereignty is 
justified on principles of fairness and equity.74 
2.1.2 The Doctrine of Sovereignty 
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty in international law provides that 
sovereign nations have the exclusive right to the use and control of the land and resources 
within their borders.75  However, the strict application of the doctrine of sovereignty to 
shared water resources, while tempting, gives rise to “obvious difficulties”.76 Competing 
theories regarding the rights and duties which should exist between states in international 
water law have given rise to debate about the appropriate degree of sovereignty that 
should apply to shared water resources, whether that is conceived of as absolute territorial 
sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, limited territorial sovereignty or community of 
interests.77  
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty provides that each sovereign state 
has exclusive jurisdiction over the land and resources within its borders, “regardless of 
any transboundary consequences”.78 While absolute territorial sovereignty is not upheld 
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in customary international water law, it remains an important and influential underlying 
principle of international law.79  It is typically adopted as the initial negotiating position 
of powerful upstream states.     
On the other end of the spectrum, the principle of absolute territorial integrity 
supports the argument that a state may not impact “the natural flow of water to the 
downstream State.”80 Downstream states tend to adopt the principle of absolute territorial 
integrity as their opening negotiating position.   McCaffrey contrasts the two competing 
theories as follows: 
While the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty insists upon the 
complete freedom of action of the upstream state, that of absolute 
territorial integrity maintains the opposite: that the upstream state may do 
nothing that might affect the natural flow of the water into the downstream 
state.81 
The “middle ground” approach is the principle of limited territorial sovereignty, a 
generally accepted principle of international water law that acknowledges both rights and 
duties.82  It is “substantively interpreted as the right to territorial sovereignty and the 
corollary duty not to cause significant harm to the sovereign rights of other States.”83  
 A fourth theoretical perspective is that international watercourses are the common 
property of the states that share the watercourse.84  The concept is derived from the 
notion “that a community of interest in the water is created by the natural, physical unity 
of a watercourse.”85  Grotius promoted the concept of a river as a common public 
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property in the early 17th century.86  McCaffrey cites Henry Farnham’s work [1904] as 
follows: 
A river which flows through the territory of several states or nations is their 
common property … It is a great natural highway conferring, besides the 
facilities of navigation, certain incidental advantages, such as fishery and the 
right to use the water for power or irrigation. Neither nation can do any act 
which will deprive the other of the benefits of those rights and advantages. 
… The gifts of nature are for the benefit of mankind, and no aggregation of 
men can assert and exercise such right and ownership of them as will 
deprive others having equal rights, and means of enjoyment. … [T]he 
common right to enjoy the bountiful provision of Providence must be 
preserved. … 87 
In the Oder River decision (1929), the Permanent Court of International Justice 
recognized the “community of interests” in the river shared by the riparian states:   
[the] community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a 
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality 
of all riparian States in the use of the whole course of the river and the 
exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to 
the others….88 
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case (1997), the International Court of Justice confirmed 
that a community of interests applies to non-navigational uses as well as navigational 
uses of a river.89  McCaffrey observes that while there is little ambiguity about the 
meaning and application of concepts such as absolute territorial sovereignty, absolute 
territorial integrity and limited territorial sovereignty, the notion of “community of 
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interests” is still somewhat ambiguous in international water law.90  Further attention is 
required to define and understand “community” and “interests”.91  The notion of 
community may simply be an acknowledgement of the interdependence of states 
however, it is not simply a matter of “co-ownership” of a river.  Rather it evokes the 
concepts of “shared governance” and “joint action”.92 McCaffrey notes that the 
community of interests approach does not inform international water law as much as it 
may provide insights to how states should work towards processes of community 
management.93  McCaffrey states, 
… the legal obligations governing the relations between riparian states 
reinforce the existence of a community among them, even if they do not 
spring from that community. It will be seen later that these obligations 
include the duty to cooperate with other riparian states in the use, 
development and protection of an international watercourse system. … the 
essence of cooperation is working together.  In the context of international 
watercourses, this suggests a relationship between the co-riparians based 
upon respect for each other’s interests.  Respect would be manifested 
through observance of such principles as prior notification, consultation, and 
negotiation concerning changes in uses of the watercourse, and use of the 
watercourse in a manner that is equitable and reasonable vis-à-vis other 
riparian states.  These are, in turn, all fundamental obligations of states 
sharing international fresh water resources.94   
 
At its core, the principles of international water law reinforce mutual respect between 
sovereign members of the international community.   
The UN Watercourse Convention is recognized for its departure from traditionally 
restrictive applications of absolute territorial sovereignty.  Thorson characterizes the 
“equitable utilization” and “no-harm” principles adopted in the UN Watercourse 
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Convention as a codification of “limited territorial sovereignty” as it attempts to balance 
both the rights and duties that accompany sovereignty.   Some scholars have suggested 
that the principle of limited territorial sovereignty codified in the UN Watercourse 
Convention demonstrates a radical departure from the principle of absolute territorial 
sovereignty. McCaffrey takes the position that the UN Water Convention: 
… thoroughly rejects any notion that sovereignty over shared water 
resources is part of international law.  Moreover, the International Court of 
Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case also rejected such an idea. 
The Court referred to a state’s “basic right to an equitable and reasonable 
sharing of the resources of an international watercourse.”  A right to share in 
a common resource is difficult, at best, to reconcile with the notion of 
“sovereignty” over that resource.95 
While the UN Watercourse Convention received considerable support in the drafting 
stage,96 its failure to come into force may be attributed to its attempt to codify a departure 
from absolute territorial sovereignty.  China in particular voted against the Convention as 
an unacceptable rejection of absolute territorial sovereignty.97 Others argue that the 
Convention does not depart significantly from the traditional doctrine of sovereignty. 
Thorson argues that, in practice, the principle of limited territorial sovereignty merely 
attempts to “juxtapose” rights and duties rather than significantly amend or diminish 
rights associated with territorial sovereignty.  Arguably, duties have not been accorded 
equal weight to rights.  The duty not to cause “appreciable” harm is perceived by some as 
subservient to the rights of territorial sovereignty.98  
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Furthermore, Thorson notes that state reaction to the UN Watercourse Convention 
is evidence that the entrenchment of territorial sovereignty continues to dominate state 
objectives and dictate state actions regarding international watercourses. 
… that the responses to the 1997 UN Convention, as well as the State treaty 
practice [in the Himalayas], split so clearly along lower riparian versus 
upper riparian lines is meaningful. It evinces a strong underlying current of 
territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. No State that has within it 
valuable natural resources wants to subsume its liberty to act according to its 
best interest of any other State that may be affected. … and, in this way, 
territorial sovereignty remains the dominant limiting factor in defining the 
scope of international water law.99  
 
Thorson concludes that while international watercourse law provides for limited 
territorial sovereignty, “the core concept of territorial sovereignty remains influential and 
dominant in defining the parameters of international water law.”100   
Moreover, the doctrine of sovereignty remains paramount to the extent that 
sovereign status is required in order to access international water law.  Indigenous 
peoples who lack sovereign status cannot access the equitable principles codified in the 
Convention.  While McCaffrey has suggested that the UN Watercourse Convention and 
state practice do not support the notion of sovereignty over shared water, from an 
Indigenous perspective, the doctrine of sovereignty continues to dictate who may make a 
claim to a legitimate interest or right to the shared water in international negotiations. 
2.1.3  State Agreements and The Mutual Gains Approach 
 
The UN Watercourse Convention has never been ratified. The legal discourse 
regarding international custom centres on the analysis of existing bilateral and 
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multilateral state agreements regarding transboundary watercourses.101  Legal scholars 
participating in the GEF Global Transboundary International Waters Research 
Initiative102 observe that the growing number of transboundary river agreements is 
indicative of a growing trend towards cooperation among states.103   Regardless of any 
sense of legal obligation, states are increasingly recognizing the mutual benefits that can 
be derived through collaboration. The discourse regarding state negotiations emphasizes 
a  “mutual gains approach” which focuses on the "reciprocal sharing of benefits" and 
"mutual gain through cooperative development of water resources."104  Grzybowski et al. 
notes that the documented trend towards collaborative approaches to river agreements 
may constitute “a shift away from [the] limiting impacts on sovereignty”.105   
Paisley identifies “the principle of equitable sharing of downstream benefits”106 as 
signaling a new era of cooperation and reciprocity in transboundary law.  According to 
Paisley,  
There are a growing number of international agreements which provide for 
the return, either in kind or in monetary form, of a share of the benefits 
received in a state or states as a result of acts done in another state or 
states.107  
Similarly Grzybowski et al. advocate a "mutual gains approach" to negotiating 
international watercourse agreements:   
Beyond customary international legal obligations lie treaties and other 
agreements that are negotiated between states in an effort to address 
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particular watercourse management issues, to clarify how customary 
obligations will be met, and in some cases to jointly develop opportunities 
that neither state could fully capitalize on if acting independently.108  
Grzybowski et al. argue that the opportunities presented through a mutual gains approach 
provide powerful incentives for cooperation over transboundary watercourses.109  The 
authors assert that, “[t]he focus of negotiation can shift away from limiting impacts on 
sovereignty, to planning and devising ways and means of maximizing benefits.”110  States 
are willing to consider joint investments and cooperation on development projects that 
will provide benefits that neither state could achieve acting alone.  Incentives help 
counteract the strong tendency states have towards protecting their independence and 
sovereignty.111   
However, from an Indigenous perspective, this perceived tendency by states to 
move away from the entrenchment of the doctrine of sovereignty is largely illusory.  The 
primacy of state interests remains central to the legal discourse and the principles that 
guide transboundary water law continue to be derived from the agreements between 
sovereigns.  Indigenous peoples, as non-state actors, are excluded from these sovereign 
contracts.  As a result, they are also excluded from contributing to the development of 
customary international water law. 
2.1.4 The Sovereign Contract in Transboundary Water Law112 
 
The UN Watercourse Convention is intended as a mechanism to govern the 
economic and political relationships between sovereign states. Likewise, customary 
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international water law has developed as a reflection of the principles that have emerged 
from state agreements and presumes that sovereign states, existing as a ‘community of 
sovereigns’, are the rightful owners and beneficiaries of transboundary watercourses.  
The doctrine of sovereignty is firmly entrenched in the legal discourse.  While the trend 
towards cooperation through “mutual sharing of benefits” has been characterized as “a 
shift away from limiting impacts on sovereignty”113, this is misleading given that 
sovereign interests dictate the content of regional agreements.  The “mutual benefits” 
gained through cooperation reflect the maximization and preservation of primarily 
economic state-interests with little regard paid to the impact of such developments upon 
Indigenous peoples. State interests such as economic development, optimal utilization 
and the preservation of state sovereignty continue to dominate the discourse of 
international water law.  The reliance upon state bilateral and multilateral agreements as 
the sole source of international water law principles perpetuates the dominance of state 
interests over Indigenous people’s interests.   
From a Critical Race Theory analysis, it is not transboundary water law that is 
unjust but rather the injustice lies in the fact that it is limited in its application to a 
community of sovereigns.  The equitable utilization and the no-harm principles, as well 
as the notion of equitable sharing of benefits, appeal to equity, reciprocity, cooperation, 
fairness and reasonableness. Together they represent an attempt to strike a reasonable 
middle ground to guide sovereign relations and resonate with the notion of “sovereign 
equality.”114  McCaffrey considers Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes comments regarding 
the philosophical underpinnings of the equitable utilization rule and states: 
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A river is a “treasure” that “offers a necessity of life.” Therefore, when it 
flows through more than one jurisdiction, it “must be rationed among those 
who have power over it.”  It would be intolerable for the upstream state to 
cut off all the power from the downstream state, or for the latter to require 
the former to “give up its power altogether.” Thus Holmes effectively 
rejects both the absolute territorial sovereignty and the absolute territorial 
integrity theories.  He recognizes that “both states have real and substantial 
interests” and that these interests “must be reconciled as best they may,” 
rather than simply declaring one state the absolute winner and the other the 
absolute loser. The object of this process of reconciliation “always is to 
secure an equitable apportionment”.115 
An appeal to ethics is at the heart of international water law.  Yet, the UN Watercourse 
Convention fails to apply equity beyond the dominant social contract of state-to-state 
relations.116  If it were “intolerable” for an upstream state to cut off a downstream state, 
why is it not equally unjust for an upstream “peoples” to cut off a downstream “peoples”?  
The equity aspired to within international water law remains constrained by the sovereign 
contract.   
It is misleading to engage in the discourse regarding equitable utilization, no harm 
rule and benefits sharing without also acknowledging that Indigenous peoples are 
excluded from the international community of sovereigns to which they apply.  For 
Indigenous peoples, transboundary water law remains inaccessible because of the 
enduring impacts of their unilateral exclusion from the sovereign community during the 
height of colonialism.   The marginalization of Indigenous interests in transboundary 
rivers cannot be justified simply by asserting that Indigenous peoples’ interests should be 
subordinate to state interests and addressed as domestic or local issues. Any suggestion 
that states will or do represent Indigenous peoples’ interests in the governance of 
transboundary rivers fails to fully appreciate the oppressive reality of colonialism 
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throughout the world. Furthermore, Indigenous peoples’ rights have been repeatedly 
affirmed within international law and can no longer be dismissed as a purely domestic 
issue.  Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Beverley McLachlin noted in 2002 
shortly after being appointed to her position as head of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
“Whether we like it or not, aboriginal rights are an international matter.”117  
The above section has examined the relationship between international water law 
and sovereignty.  The remainder of this chapter locates Indigenous peoples within the 
legal discourse regarding the international law of transboundary watercourses and within 
the context of two transboundary rivers.   
2.2 Locating Indigenous Peoples in International Water Law 
Despite the prominence of Indigenous rights in international law, a review of 
international water law and discourse reveals that there are few references to Indigenous 
peoples in any context.  For example, there are no references to Indigenous issues in the 
index of McCaffrey’s, The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd ed. (2007), the pre-
eminent textbook on international water law.118   Indigenous peoples and issues are also 
absent from the Working Group that negotiated the UN Watercourse Convention as well 
as from state agreements concerning transboundary rivers.119  In this section, I adopt a 
critical Indigenous lens to deconstruct the UN Watercourse Convention and the related 
legal discourse and consider the limitations of relying upon sovereignty to define rights 
and duties in a transboundary context. 
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2.2.1 UN Watercourse Convention 
 
The UN Watercourse Convention makes no express reference to Indigenous 
peoples or issues although a few sections do encourage states to consider adverse impacts 
on human populations and human needs.  For examples, Article 6 lists several factors that 
are relevant to the determination of what constitutes “equitable and reasonable 
utilization” of transboundary watercourse.   
 Article 6 Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization 
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and 
reasonable manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into 
account all relevant factors and circumstances, including: 
a. Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and 
other factors of a natural character; 
b. The social and economic needs of the watercourse States 
concerned; 
c. The population dependent on the watercourse in each 
watercourse State; 
d. The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one 
watercourse State on other watercourse States; 
e. Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
f. Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of 
the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measure 
taken to that effect; 
g. The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a 
particular planned or existing use. 
 
… 
 
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its 
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In 
determining what is reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors 
are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of 
the whole.120 
Presumably, Indigenous interests are subsumed by subsection (c) and are weighed 
equally against all other factors including state interests.   However, McIntyre notes that 
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the International Law Commission’s commentary on the draft articles states that “the 
concept of dependence referred to in Article 6(1)(c) encompasses the size of the 
population dependent on the water course, as well as the degree of its dependence.”121  It 
is unclear how this provision would apply in regions where Indigenous populations are 
minority populations or how much weight would be accorded to Indigenous peoples’ 
interests in the face of other enumerated factors such as the needs of the states concerned.  
McIntyre does note that state practice indicates that the use of water for certain basic 
needs like drinking, domestic purposes, and sanitation are generally accorded priority.122  
However, it is not clear how this applies to resolve conflicts between Indigenous peoples 
needs for drinking water versus states’ needs for drinking water. 
Article 10 makes reference to “vital human needs” as deserving of “special 
regard”. 
 Article 10 Relationship between different kinds of uses 
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an 
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses. 
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it 
shall be resolved with reference to article 5 and 7, with special regard 
being given to the requirements of vital human needs.123 
 
Notably, this recognition of “vital human needs” is not triggered unless there is a conflict 
regarding the uses of a watercourse.  In other words, human rights are not an issue in 
those circumstances where states agree on the development plans. 
As set out above, Article 5 refers to the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization while Article 7 refers to the no-harm rule.  Article 7 expressly provides that 
there are some circumstances where it would be appropriate for harm to be addressed 
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through compensation.  While never expressly mentioning Indigenous peoples, the 
Convention guidelines may be interpreted as stating that (i) “harm” suffered by 
Indigenous peoples under a transboundary agreement should be weighed against several 
factors including state economic needs; and (ii) that there may be situations where 
transboundary harm suffered by Indigenous peoples could be reasonably addressed by 
having the state which caused the harm pay compensation to the state in which the 
Indigenous peoples live. Only member states can access the dispute resolution process set 
out under Article 33.   Presumably, it is up to states to seek compensation from other 
states for transboundary harm caused to Indigenous populations, either through 
agreement or through the dispute resolution process.   
Non-state actors are entitled to seek compensation from another state for 
transboundary harm under Article 32.   
Article 32 Non-discrimination 
Unless, the watercourse States concerned have agreed otherwise for the 
protection of the interests of persons, natural or juridical, who have suffered 
or are under a serious threat of suffering significant transboundary harm as a 
result of activities related to an international watercourse, a watercourse 
State shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place 
where the injury occurred, in granting to such persons, in accordance with 
its legal system, access to judicial or other procedures, or a right to claim 
compensation or other relief in respect of significant harm caused by such 
activities carried on in its territory.124 
Under this provision, states are prohibited from discriminating against individuals from 
neighbouring states in allowing them access to the domestic legal system to assert their 
rights “to claim compensation or other relief” with respect to the transboundary harm.   
However, Bourquain observes that the effect of this provision is to create a procedural 
right only to access courts that may or may not recognize the individual or collective 
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rights of Indigenous peoples. It does not provide for any substantive rights for non-state 
actors.125  
 The Convention does not expressly mention Indigenous peoples or interests and 
does not ensure water security for non-state actors.  This is not surprising given that the 
Convention reflects the international custom found in bilateral and multilateral state 
agreements.  
2.2.2 State Agreements and The Mutual Gains Approach 
 
 The mutual gains approach to transboundary agreements holds that two or more 
states can achieve greater benefit through cooperation and joint development of shared 
water than by further entrenchment of absolute territorial sovereignty.  However, the 
mutual gains approach is largely premised upon maximizing economic interests through 
state agreements and offers no protection to Indigenous peoples. Grzybowski et al., note 
only one example of states’ voluntarily invoking the human right to access to water.  
Upon reviewing the case example of the Senegal River Basin, Grzybowski et al. note:  
It also contains the following innovative provision, one of a number of 
progressive features of the agreement:  “The guiding principles of any 
distribution of the River’s water will guarantee to the populations of the 
riparian States the full enjoyment of the resources, with respect for the 
safety of the people and the works, as well as the basic human right to water, 
in the perspective of sustainable development.” 126 
 
According to the authors, this is the sole example of states voluntarily recognizing human 
rights in transboundary water governance.  Even if human rights or Indigenous peoples 
were voluntarily added to a bilateral agreement, states remain the sole parties to such 
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agreements and would be required to implement and enforce such provisions on behalf of 
Indigenous peoples. 
The mutual gains approach to transboundary negotiations illustrates the bias 
towards states’ economic interests. It is dominated by the assumption that economic gain 
and collaborative resource development are the best incentives for state cooperation.  
However, in this framework, Indigenous peoples interests are marginalized as costs of 
development.  For example, Grzybowski et al. cites Sanderson’s analysis of the inherent 
success of the Columbia River Treaty between Canada and the United States which 
allows for a sharing of downstream benefits in return for upstream development:  
The great attraction of this approach was and is that it focuses on the 
gross benefits and eliminates the need for each country to calculate net 
benefits. It recognizes that determining what the net benefits and costs 
of a particular project might be in a way that is acceptable to both 
countries will often be impossible. The wisdom of finessing the need 
for the parties to agree on valuing intangible attributes such as species 
at risk or reconciliation with First Nations is amply demonstrated by 
the difficulty the entities had in agreeing to the quantification of the 
CE [Canadian Entitlement] spelled out in the Treaty.  By allowing 
each party to assess its own benefits and costs, the Treaty provides a 
solution which recognizes this limitation and leaves both countries to 
seize opportunities that make them better off than they would have 
otherwise been according to their own values and thus in a position to 
enthusiastically support whatever initiative is being undertaken.127 
 
Indigenous peoples are mentioned solely within the context of states' inability to quantify 
a “reconciliation with First Nations”; such reconciliation is presumably necessitated by 
development projects that adversely impact Indigenous peoples’ territories. In this 
context, "reconciliation with First Nations" is listed as a potential cost of resource 
development (along with "species at risk"), which is a challenging cost to quantify. 
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However, the mutual gains approach encourages states to overcome these costs by 
sharing benefits that they would not be able to achieve if acting independently, to 
maximize profits and to "reap benefits from the development".  In this context, 
Indigenous peoples are referenced solely in terms of a cost of development to be included 
in the overall cost-benefits analysis. It further suggests that the costs of the 
“reconciliation with First Nations”, while difficult to quantify, can be successfully 
managed if states work together to maximize profits.    
Taking the UN Watercourse Convention and state agreements together, one must 
ask whether, under current international water law principles, it would be acceptable for 
one state to receive a portion of downstream benefits as compensation for action that 
constitutes a violation of the internationally affirmed rights of Indigenous peoples?  
While presumably the answer must be no, the current Convention and discourse do not 
acknowledge the internationally protected status of Indigenous rights and do not provide 
any mechanism for ensuring that States are not complicit in undermining UNDRIP or 
international human rights law generally. Even more progressive river governance 
approaches aimed at integrated basin-wide participatory processes have a tendency to 
marginalize the rights of Indigenous peoples by placing their interests on equal footing 
with industry and other non-governmental stakeholders. 
2.2.3 Integrated Watershed Approach 
 
In stark contrast to international water law, emerging global water governance 
strategies promote a participatory approach to decision-making.  Distilled from principles 
first articulated in the Rio Declaration, international agencies such as the World Bank, 
Global Environmental Facility, Global Water Partnership, Environmental NGOs, 
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international water practitioners and scholars advocate multi-stakeholder, cross-sector 
governance and participatory decision-making.128   One of the most popular approaches is 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), which is defined by the Global Water 
Partnership as follows: 
[It] is a process which promotes the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising 
the sustainability of vital ecosystems and the environment.129 
This approach to governance recognizes “the fundamentally interconnected nature of 
hydrological resources” 130 and promotes holistic management of water.  Most notably, 
the cornerstone of this approach is multi-stakeholder governance and public participation. 
These principles of governance are in stark contrast to international water law’s emphasis 
on sovereign authority and centralized decision-making.  However, even within this 
framework, practitioners often neglect to recognize the international rights of Indigenous 
peoples.  Indigenous peoples are often characterized as having equal footing with “other 
stakeholders” such as non-profit organizations or industry thereby undermining their 
collective rights in international law.    
 For example, the International Joint Commission, which manages transboundary 
water issues between Canada and the United States, has embraced the International 
Watersheds Initiative (IWI) which, “promotes an integrated, ecosystem approach to 
issues arising in transboundary waters through enhanced local participation and 
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strengthened local capacity.”131  However, a review of the IJC’s Third Report to 
Governments entitled, The International Watersheds Initiative: Implementing a New 
Paradigm for Transboundary Basins (2009), reveals that Indigenous peoples are granted 
only a peripheral status within this governance model.132  The only reference to 
Indigenous peoples in the Report is found in the IJC’s Key Findings: 
The watershed approach is changing the way the IJC does business. 
Implementing a watershed approach along the international border entails 
more than just a change in emphasis and tone. It is a paradigm shift that has 
the potential to transform how our two countries view and manage 
transboundary waters.  The IWI experience has reinforced a recognition of 
the complex interplay of economic, sociological and environmental factors 
that affect the quantity and quality of our shared waters.  Dealing effectively 
with these complex interrationships will require new ways of sharing 
information and data, new technologies, and a renewed commitment to 
involve and engage local citizens, Native Americans, First Nations, private 
sector, academia, provinces, states, and federal agencies for a truly 
integrated watershed approach. 133 
The IJC makes only passing reference to Indigenous peoples as participants in 
transboundary river governance and only in the same context as other ‘stakeholders’ such 
as the private sector and academia.   The effect is to marginalize and undermine the 
affirmed rights of Indigenous peoples in international law. 
Furthermore, the Global Water Partnership neglects to even mention Indigenous 
peoples as stakeholders in its Strategy 2009-2013:   
It is well understood that managing water resources in an integrated way is 
everybody’s business and that a range of ‘social actors’ from different 
sectors of society and with different economic interests must be involved.  
As a multi-stakeholder partnership that includes government agencies, 
private companies, non-governmental agencies, professional organizations, 
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gender and youth groups, and bi- and mulit-level development agencies 
among others, the GWP network is uniquely placed to draw everyone 
together for dialogue and action.134   
Given the GWP’s stated mandate to ‘empower, convene and connect stakeholders’ by 
establishing inclusive platforms for dialogue, the failure to expressly acknowledge 
Indigenous peoples in this context is striking.135  While these initiatives towards 
integrated, participatory and decentralized decision-making are important milestones in 
transboundary governance, Indigenous peoples’ rights are marginalized within the 
discourse.   
 Despite an almost complete absence of representation of Indigenous interests in 
international water law, Indigenous peoples are the most vulnerable to state decision-
making regarding transboundary rivers and may also be a formidable source of 
opposition and conflict with respect to state-initiated development.  The next section 
considers some of the geopolitical complexities surrounding transboundary rivers and 
locates Indigenous peoples’ interests within the context of two transboundary rivers. 
2.3 Case Studies: Indigenous Peoples’ Interests in Two Transboundary Rivers 
This section considers Indigenous peoples’ interests in two transboundary rivers: 
the Columbia River shared by Canada and the United States, and the Tsangpo-
Brahmaputra River, originating in the Tibet Autonomous Region and traveling through 
China, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh.  The former represents an example of successful 
mutual cooperation and stable bilateral relations between states and involves relatively 
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empowered Indigenous peoples with established legal rights. The latter is the site of 
geopolitical instability involving two rising regional superpowers and politically 
vulnerable Indigenous populations.  Both regions demonstrate the urgent need for a new 
international water law framework that acknowledges and integrates international 
Indigenous peoples’ rights and offers mechanisms for protecting those rights.  
 These two case studies have been included for two purposes: (1) to locate 
Indigenous peoples and interests within transboundary rivers, and (2) to demonstrate how 
the requirement of sovereign status in international water law not only fails to protect 
Indigenous rights but may undermine peace in the region by exacerbating tensions 
between states and Indigenous peoples where sovereign jurisdiction is in dispute. 
 
2.3.1 Columbia River (North America) 
   
… the Columbia River does not flow, it is operated.136 
The 2,000 kilometre long Columbia River travels from the Columbia Lake in the 
East Kootenay region of British Columbia (BC), Canada, crosses the border into the 
United States (US), and passes through Washington and Oregon before flowing into the 
Pacific Ocean.137 (See map of Columbia River Basin at Figure 1.) With over 400 dams 
throughout the Columbia, including 13 on its main stem, it is the most hydroelectrically 
developed river system in the world.138   The Grand Coulee Dam in particular is the 
                                                 
136
 Blaine Harden, A River Lost: The Life and Death of the Columbia (New York: WW Norton & 
Company, 1996) as cited in Don Gayton, “Ghost River: The Columbia” (2001) 1:2 BC Journal of 
Ecosystems and Management 1 at 3 [Gayton].  
137
 Alice Cohen, Leah Malkinson  & Jennifer Archer, “The Columbia River Treaty: A Look at Evolving 
Rights & Interests in the Negotiation of a Transboundary River Treaty” (2005)  [unpublished paper, UBC 
Faculty of Law] at 2.  
138
 Ibid at 3.  
  
48
largest dam in the United States and one of the largest in the world.139  The US Pacific 
Northwest obtains roughly 65% of its power needs from Columbia River dams,140 while 
BC obtains approximately 50% of its power from dams located in the Canadian portion 
of the Columbia River.141   
The Columbia River was once the greatest salmon producer in the world,142 
supporting between 7 and 30 million salmon, and upwards of 500,000 salmon in the 
Canadian portion of the basin alone.143  Failure to construct fish passage facilities on the 
Grand Coulee Dam and the Chief Joseph Dam have resulted in the complete elimination 
of anadromous salmon from the Canadian Columbia River Basin.144  In the Columbia 
River Basin overall, some 55% of the original extent of salmon and steelhead habitat has 
been lost due to dam construction.145  Despite these losses, the Columbia River is often 
cited as a success story as it is the subject of a progressive bilateral state agreement. 
a)  The Columbia River Treaty  
The Columbia River Treaty  (“CRT”) signed by the US and Canada in 1961 is often 
cited as a model of cooperative transboundary water management, in which the interests 
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of both parties are successfully incorporated into a complex bilateral agreement.146  The 
US benefited from increased protection from flooding as well as increased power 
production.  Canada was entitled to receive 50% of the financial benefits that were 
realized by the US in return for building three dams on the Columbia main stem.147  In 
1964, BC received a one-time payment of US $64 million in return for the projected 
flood control benefits of Canadian storage over the 60-year lifetime of the CRT.  In 1964, 
BC, as owner of the benefits, opted to sell the first 30 years of benefits for a lump sum 
payment of US $254 million in order to finance the construction of the Canadian dams.148  
While there is no official expiry date for the CRT, the power part of the agreement can be 
terminated or renegotiated beginning in 2024, if either party serves notice of the intent to 
negotiate ten years prior (in 2014).  
The Columbia River Treaty is repeatedly held up as a model of successful 
cooperation and “mutual gains” in the governance of an international watercourse.149  
However, the CRT dams and previous hydroelectric developments along the Columbia 
have had devastating impacts upon the Indigenous peoples in the region.150  
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b)  Indigenous Peoples in the Columbia River Basin 
Indigenous peoples have lived within the Columbia River Basin for more than 
10,000 years.151  Within the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin, the Ktunaxa, 
Okanagan and Secwepmec (Shuswap) Nations are the three main tribal groups whose 
traditional territories extend throughout the watershed.152  Within the US portion of the 
Columbia River Basin, 14 tribal groups are recognized today:153  
Burns Paiute Tribe 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation 
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation 
Confederated Tribes of the Coliville Reservation 
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon 
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation 
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Orgegon 
Kalispel Tribe of Indians 
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho 
Nez Perce Tribe 
Shoshone Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation 
Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation 
Spokane Tribe of Indians 
 
Some of the US tribal groups were historically united with and related to Canadian tribes 
prior to the establishment of an international border between Canada and the US.154 
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For thousands of years, Indigenous peoples in the Columbia Basin have lived in a 
close interrelationship with the land, obtaining their food, medicines and material needs 
largely through hunting, fishing and gathering. Salmon played an especially important 
role in the culture of many First Nations, both as a food source and for spiritual and 
ceremonial reasons. As noted by members of the Columbia River Treaty tribes:  
Salmon and the rivers they use are part of our sense of place.  The Creator 
put us here where the salmon return. We are obliged to remain and to protect 
this place. Without salmon returning to our rivers and streams, we would 
cease to be Indian people.155 
Arguably, it was the construction of the Grand Coulee Dam in 1941 that had the most 
significant and widespread impact on First Nations in the Columbia River Basin. 
Downstream of the dam the fishery was largely destroyed, and upstream it was 
completely eliminated, as fish passage facilities were not constructed at the dam site.156  
Thousands of Indigenous peoples were forced to relocate as the loss of salmon meant the 
loss of an integral part of their diet and culture.157   
In Canada, First Nations were not even notified of the plans to build the Grand 
Coulee Dam and the impending loss of their fishery, nor were they compensated for it.158 
With the closing of the gates at Grand Coulee, Sinixt Nation people who were dependent 
on Columbia River salmon stocks migrated to live with the Colville and Kootenay tribes 
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in the US.159  The Ktunaxa note that the Federal Government promised to provide them 
with canned salmon as compensation, but never did.160  Indigenous peoples were 
“disproportionately affected by the loss of the salmon from one of the world’s largest 
salmon producing river systems.”161   
First Nations communities suffered the most devastating impacts of hydroelectric 
development prior to the CRT agreement. However, the CRT exacted further impacts, 
with the loss of numerous archaeological and burial sites under newly created 
reservoirs,162 and the decline of resident fish populations of importance to First Nations 
due to dam construction.163  First Nations rights and interests were not recognized during 
the negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty.  The dominant values considered in the 
Treaty negotiations were state interests involving power and flood control, with only 
cursory consideration to other values.164   
Indigenous peoples have expressed an enduring and persistent interest in 
protecting and restoring their Indigenous rights, and in seeing salmon return to the waters 
of the Columbia River.165  In 1993, members of the Ktunaxa, Okanagan and Secwepmec 
Nations formed the Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission 
(“CCRIFC”), for the purpose of considering their options in relation to the loss of the 
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traditional anadromous fishery, as well as the significant damage inflicted on the resident 
fishery by power operations.166  For over a decade the CCRIFC has been working on a 
strategy to persuade the US to restore salmon runs.167 This work culminated in a 
submission to the International Joint Commission (IJC)168 in 2003 in which they 
requested, 
…an Order convening a panel of experts and initiating a public process to 
identify and assess the damage caused by the Grand Coulee dam and to 
investigate options for mitigation and compensation and for restoring 
salmon to the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin.169 
CCRIFC argued that the IJC has the jurisdiction to request such an Order, since there is 
evidence that the conditions of their 1941 Order related to the approval of the Grand 
Coulee Dam were never met, especially those which required “the protection and 
indemnification of interests in British Columbia by reason of damage to the salmon 
fisheries, culture and economy of First Nations resulting from the construction and 
operation of the Grand Coulee Dam”.170  
In March and June 2006 the US and Canada governments responded to the IJC’s 
request for comment with letters from the Office of Canadian Affairs of the U.S. State 
Department and the U.S. Relations Division of Foreign Affairs Canada, respectively.  
Both governments advised that the IJC did not have jurisdiction to consider the 
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CCRIFC’s claim.  A few months later, the IJC confirmed by letter that the CCRIFC 
should discuss the issue with Foreign Affairs Canada, as that was the “appropriate” 
avenue for their claim.171 
In 2006, the Secwepmec Nation, Okanagan Nation and Ktunaxa Nation formed 
the Upper Columbian Aquatic Management Partnership with the stated goal: “to conserve 
and enhance healthy aquatic ecosystems, wild indigenous fish communities, and 
aboriginal fisheries in the Columbia Basin.”172   The Partnership is based on the 
following principles from each Nation. 
• Secwepemc: Tknémentem Secwepemcúlecw “Respect the earth and do not waste 
natural resources in our traditional territory.” 
• Okanagan: Tel kqoolentsooten swhitzetzxtet ee toomtemtet, ksnpee-eelsmentem, 
kstxetdentim oothl kskgethlkchiwhentem. The creator has given us our mother, to 
enjoy, to manage and to protect. Loot penkin koo tdeks ntzespoolawhax. Peentk 
kstxtdiplantem ee tel toomtem an hchastantet koo kgel yayart, tel arpna oothl 
tdeswhoois. We will survive and continue to govern our mother and her resources 
for the good of all for all time.  
• Ktunaxa: The universal laws that guide us in our society, particularly in 
relationship to the land: …173 
 
In the United States, the Columbia River Inter-tribal Fisheries Commission (“CRIFC”) 
represents the Nez Perce Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and 
the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation.174  The Upper 
Columbia United Tribes (“UCUT”) was formed by the Coeur d’Alene, Kalispel, 
Kootenai, Spokane and Colville Tribes for the purpose of uniting their resources to 
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protect the tribes on issues regarding the treaty rights, sovereignty, fish, wildlife, habitat, 
education and ecological development.  Indigenous peoples in the US have been active in 
protecting the Columbia River Basin from transboundary pollution by Canadian industry. 
In Pakootas v Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,175 members of the Colville Tribe initiated 
litigation against Canadian mining company in a successful attempt to apply United 
States environmental legislation against a Canadian company.  Justice Gould concluded: 
Teck owns and operates a lead-zinc smelter ("Trail Smelter") in Trail, 
British Columbia.[5] Between 1906 and 1995, Teck generated and 
disposed of hazardous materials, in both liquid and solid form, into the 
Columbia River. These wastes, known as "slag," include the heavy 
metals arsenic, cadmium, copper, mercury, lead, and zinc, as well as 
other unspecified hazardous materials. Before mid-1995, the Trail 
Smelter discharged up to 145,000 tons of slag annually into the 
Columbia River. 176  
In considering the extraterritorial application of the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the court held that,  “applying 
CERCLA here to the release of hazardous substances at the Site is a domestic, rather than 
an extraterritorial application of CERCLA, even though the original source of the 
hazardous substances is located in a foreign country.”177 
The examples of the CCRIFC’s application to the IJC and the Colville tribes 
litigation against Teck Cominco are illustrative of the sophisticated efforts that 
Indigenous peoples on both sides of the US-Canada border are bringing to bear in an 
effort to address and mitigate the transboundary impacts of development upon their rights 
in the Columbia basin.  It is notable however that Indigenous rights and interests within 
this transboundary basin continue to be framed in terms of domestic issues. 
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c)  Discussion 
 
In future negotiations over the Columbia River, Canada and the United States are 
likely to be aligned with respect to hydropower, flood control and the maximization of 
financial benefits from development through cooperation.  While negotiations are likely 
to be complex given the financial interests involved and the complicating factors of 
climate change and growing domestic demands, their positions will likely be 
ideologically aligned.  At issue is how to integrate Indigenous peoples’ interests, rights 
and values into the negotiations regarding transboundary development. Davidson & 
Paisely summarize Indigenous peoples’ interest in future negotiations as follows: 
First Nations also seek to minimize the erosion impacts of water and wind 
on potential archaeological zones; maintain the cultural, aesthetic and 
ecological context of important cultural resources and spiritual sites; 
minimize the impact of destructive human behaviour (eg. Traffic) on 
potential archeological zones, and maximize abundance and diversity of fish 
and wildlife populations to support First Nations harvesting and associated 
activities.178 
 
Not surprisingly, Indigenous peoples seek to apply Indigenous principles to the 
governance of the Columbia River basin.  Davidson & Paisely observe, that the Ktunaxa 
hope that “three values, in particular, will inform water governance in the post-treaty 
environment: (i) the sacred, life sustaining value of water; (ii) a holistic, ecoystemic 
view; and (iii) a long-term perspective.”179  
From the perspective of current international water law discourse, the cooperation 
between Canada and the United States regarding development of the Columbia Basin is 
illustrative of successful state negotiations.  The peaceful commitment to mutual gains 
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through cooperative development is held up as a successful model for transboundary river 
governance.  It is a story of cooperation, reciprocity and mutual gains.180   
The impact upon Indigenous peoples is downplayed within the context of 
international law and discourse. While the emergence of domestic legal rights for First 
Nations peoples in both Canada and the United States will dramatically impact the nature 
of future negotiations over the Columbia Basin, Indigenous peoples have no recourse 
within international water law.181  The UN Watercourse Convention fails to situate 
Indigenous peoples, interests and principles within transboundary governance or provide 
an effective avenue for the assertion of their internationally recognized legal rights. 
Indigenous peoples’ efforts to assert their rights and status within transboundary river 
development remains defined by domestic policies, domestic laws and is treated as a 
domestic issue, albeit an extremely complex one.    
Moreover, Indigenous rights and interests in the Columbia Basin continue to be 
characterized as part of the cost of development that is weighed against the benefits of 
cooperative state development.  Historically, Canada and the US have addressed claims 
by resident Indigenous peoples by considering or providing compensation for past 
infringements.182  The existing ethos of  “mutual gains” and “optimal utilization” within 
the Columbia River Basin begs the question of whether the adverse impacts of future 
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developments on Indigenous peoples can be simply quantified and characterized as a cost 
of development.183 
Indigenous peoples within the Columbia River Basin tell a very different story 
about the Columbia River.  Their livelihoods and culture have been irreparably harmed 
by past development, with little compensation, and their interests regarding future 
development are constrained by national policies that subordinate their claims to state 
interests.  While the rights of Indigenous peoples have been affirmed under UNDRIP and 
other instruments, they currently have no recourse to protect those rights under 
international water law.  
 Notwithstanding outstanding aboriginal title and traditional territorial claims, 
Indigenous peoples within the Columbia River Basin are relatively empowered through 
the Canadian and American legal systems to pursue their rights to consultation and 
participatory decision-making.  However, Indigenous peoples in other regions of the 
world are even more vulnerable to state development of transboundary rivers in those 
regions where they have no recourse to either national or international law.  
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2.3.2 Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River (Asia) 
 
The mighty Brahmaputra, holy site of the great synthesis, has for untold 
centuries been propagating the message of unity and harmony . . . 184 
 
Bhupen Hazarika, PhD 
Assamese singer and lyricist 
 
The Brahmaputra, the river normally neglected by most writers,  
is probably the most significant in the present day geopolitical context. 
 
Dr. S.D. Mishra185 
The largest river in Tibet, the Yarlung Tsangpo (Tsangpo) River emerges from 
the sacred Kailash mountain range in the Himalayas of western Tibet at an elevation of 
5300 meters and flows east across the heights of the Tibetan Plateau.186  Deep within the 
jungles and gorges of eastern Tibet, the river arches in a great horseshoe bend (the “Great 
Bend”) and travels north, northeast and then south and southwest into the Indian province 
of Arunachal Pradesh where it is known as the Dihang or Siang.187  (See map of the 
Tsangpo-Brahmaputra Basin at Figure 2). It then joins the flow of two other Trans-
Himalayan rivers, the Dibang and the Lohit, where it becomes known as the 
Brahmaputra.  The Brahmaputra then passes through the Indian state of Assam before 
winding south to Bangladesh as the Jamuna River where it joins with the Ganges and the 
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Mengha and forms part of the world’s largest river delta in the Bay of Bengal.188 In total, 
the Basin drains an area of approximately 651,000 square kilometres and the entire 
journey is 2880 kilometres.189  
The Tsangpo-Brahmaputra holds many distinctions within the natural world. The 
Brahmaputra basin is one of the most ecologically diverse areas in the world.  Within 
Assam alone, there are 51 different forest types and subtypes occurring in the region.190   
It also holds the distinction of traversing one of the most earthquake-prone regions in the 
world.191  Scientists have concluded that the region around the Brahmaputra crosses the 
Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates.  It is the convergence of these two plates that has 
resulted in the formation of the Himalayan mountain range.192    
The Tsangpo is also the highest river in the world as it passes through the Greater 
Himalayas, averaging 6000m, before emerging as the Brahmaputra on the plains of 
Arunachal Pradesh.  Only recently surveyed in its entirety, in 1999, the Tsangpo flows 
through the world’s deepest gorge (the “Great Canyon”), estimated to be eight times as 
steep and three times as deep as the Grand Canyon in Colorado.193  At the eastern most 
point of the river in Tibet, the river flows through the Great Bend before plummeting 
over 3000 km in approximately 200km.  Its hydropower potential is unprecedented.  The 
river is also unique in the world for never having been developed. Recently, however, it 
has become the focus of proposed mega-development projects by two global super 
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powers.  Both China and India have plans to harness the river to support their burgeoning 
populations. 
Transboundary management of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River poses unique 
challenges to the political actors involved and the world at large.  First, the geopolitical 
relations between China, the Tibetan Government in Exile, and India is rife with 
unresolved conflict regarding sovereignty, political boundaries and uncooperative water 
management.  In addition, the power dynamics are unique in that there exist not one but 
two regional powers that are also quickly emerging as the highest consumers of energy 
and resources in the world.194   
a)  State Interests in the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River Basin 
There are four states that share the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra Basin: China, India, 
Bangladesh and Bhutan.  While the interests and issues confronting Bangladesh and 
Bhutan are formidable as vulnerable downstream states, this case study is limited to a 
consideration of the interests and agendas of the two regional superpowers, China and 
India as they may impact upon Indigenous peoples in the Basin. 
i) China 
All of China’s water resources are under stress.195  China’s river basins are 
plagued by numerous environmental problems, including unregulated toxic dumping, 
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flooding caused by deforestation, severe water shortages, unsustainable river basin 
management, and aggressive big dam development.196  The country currently holds 22% 
of the world’s population but only 8% of the global freshwater resources.197  In addition, 
42% of China’s farmland is located in the semi-arid north that contains only 8% of the 
country’s freshwater runoff.198   
China’s population is expanding at an extraordinary rate and its growing 
consumption of resources and demand for energy to fuel economic development is 
exacting a high toll on the global environment.199  Increasingly, China has turned to 
hydropower to meet this demand. Since 1949, China has built approximately 22,000 of 
the world’s 45,000 large dams.200   
China continues to demonstrate a “paradigmatic faith” 201 in large-scale water 
development projects. The World Commission on Dams published a report in 2000 in 
which it questioned the utility and desirability of large dams, however China dismissed 
those findings as biased and impinging on its absolute territorial sovereignty.202  China’s 
ethos of big dam development is most aptly exemplified by its construction of the Three 
Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, which has displaced millions of people, making it the 
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“largest human relocation effort in world history”.203  Critics of the project have also 
raised concerns regarding the adverse impact of the dam on local communities, 
archaeological sites, cultural relics and the environment. 
China has recently expressed interest in developing the Great Canyon of the 
Tsangpo River in the Tibet Autonomous Region to satisfy the nation’s demands for water 
and hydropower.204  The power potential available from a hydroelectric plant at the Great 
Bend would generate 40,000 megawatts, more than twice the electricity produced by the 
Three Gorges Dam.205  There are also reports that China intends to divert water 
northward to China’s arid northwestern provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu (Gobi Desert). 
There are now reports that China is considering the development of a 38 gigawatt 
hydropower plant at the Great Bend “ that would be more than half as big again as the 
Three Gorges dam, with a capacity nearly half as large as the UK's national grid.”206 
Tsering reports that China is also considering another 28 along the Tsangpo.  The 
construction of a mega dams along the Tsangpo represents a direct threat to the 
Indigenous peoples of eastern Tibet and Arunchal Pradesh as well as the water security of 
millions of people living downstream in India, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Aside from the 
                                                 
203
 Tsering (2005), supra note 186 at 34.   
204
 The Economist, “Unquenchable Thirst: A growing rivalry between India, Pakistan and China over the 
region’s great rivers may be threatening South Asia’s peace” The Economist (19 November 2011), online: 
The Economist <http://www.economist.com/node/21538687> [The Economist]; Tsering, (2005) supra note 
186; Claude Arpi, “Dams on the Brahmaputra,” (1 May 2010), online: Claude Arpi Blogspot 
<http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2010/05/dams-on-brahmaputra.html> [Arpi (2010)]; Claude Arpi, 
“Diverting the Brahmaputra: Declaration of War?” Rediff (23 October 2003), online: Rediff 
<www.rediff.com///news/2003/oct/27spec.html> [Arpi (2003)]; Danielle Mitterand, “Tibet Set to Become 
Next Flashpoint” TibetNet (14 June 2004), online: Students for a Free Tibet 
<www.studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?id=271> [Mitterand]. 
205
 The Economist, ibid; Tsering (2005), supra note 186; Claude Arpi, “Himalayan Rivers: Geopolitics and 
Strategic Perspectives” Indian Defence Review (17 February 2011), online: Indian Defence Review 
<http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/Himalayan-Rivers-Geopolitics-and-Strategic-
Perspectives.html> [Arpi (2011)]. 
206
 Jonathan Watts, “Chinese engineers propose world's biggest hydro-electric project in Tibet” The 
Guardian (24 May 2010), online: The Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/24/chinese-hydroengineers-propose-tibet-dam>. 
  
64
spiritual significance of the region to local Indigenous peoples, Arpi notes that the 
construction of the project will bring immense hardship to the Indigenous people living in 
the canyon, as they will “be forced to leave their ancestral lands.”207  Given that China 
has typically not acknowledged the rights of Indigenous peoples or consulted with 
downstream states with respect to engineering projects on transboundary watercourses, 
there is legitimate cause for concern.208 
Historically, China has exhibited a pattern of non-cooperation with respect to 
transboundary rivers and has emphasized its absolute sovereign right to exploit rivers in 
its territory.  China was one of only three countries to vote against the UN Watercourse 
Convention on the basis that the text did not reflect the absolute territorial sovereignty of 
a riparian state over the watercourse that flowed through its territory.209   China’s non-
compliance with international norms is illustrated by China’s diversion of the Black 
Irtysh River away from Kazakhstan, which Sievers characterized as a violation of 
customary international law both “in its conception and in China’s dealings with co-
riparians”.210  In addition, China’s failure to become a member of the Mekong River 
Commission is often perceived as indicative of China’s “isolation policy”.211  
China, as a powerful upstream riparian, is likely to maintain its position regarding 
absolute territorial sovereignty and this, in turn, may undermine transboundary 
cooperation and regional environmental protection in the region. 
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ii)  India 
In India, rivers are sacred.  The Brahmaputra received its name as the son of Lord 
Brahma and it is unique in being the only ‘male’ river in India.212 In addition to its 
cultural and spiritual significance, India’s primary interests in the Brahmaputra include 
hydropower, flood control, irrigation, navigation and water quality.213  Irrigation is 
currently the dominant use of water in India with 92% of present usage devoted to 
agriculture.214   The Brahmaputra holds the distinction as holding the greatest potential 
for India and also being the least developed.215  As of 2004, only about 3% of the river’s 
potential had been harnessed.  India’s central challenge is to utilise the hydropower 
potential of the river and transfer that power to other regions.216  In addition, population 
growth is greater in northeast India than in the rest of the country and will be home to an 
estimated 80 million people by 2050.217 The development of the Brahmaputra is 
particularly important given that these northeastern provinces have suffered from lack of 
development and social unrest. 218   It is generally believed that tapping the 
Brahmaputra’s potential holds the greatest potential for invigorating and sustaining these 
depressed regions of India.  
The Northeastern regions of India are particularly vulnerable to China’s water 
projects. A controversial breach of a dam in Tibet in 2000 resulted in devastating floods 
                                                 
212
 Sarma, supra note 187 at 73. 
213
 Ojha & Singh, supra note 186 at 11-13. 
214
 ANH Akhtar Hossain, People’s Initiative for Transboundary River Basin Management  (Paper presented 
to the International Conference on Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Rivers: Impact of the Indian 
River linking Project, Dhaka, 2004) at 341. 
215
 Ojha & Singh, supra note 186 at 2. 
216
  Upreti, supra note 186 at 83. 
217
 AD Mobile, “Brahmaputra: Issues in Development” ” in Asit K Biswas & Juha I Uitto, eds, Sustainable 
development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basins (New York: United Nations University Press, 
2001) at 62. 
218
 See generally, Dutta, supra note 184. 
  
66
in Arunachal Pradesh.219  There is also concern that China will withhold water for power 
generation and irrigation during the dry season while releasing water during the flood 
season.  In addition, India is currently engaged in a project to transfer water from surplus 
regions to deficit basins by linking 30 rivers by 2020 (the “River-linking Project”).220  
However, China’s threatened diversion of the Brahmaputra would render India’s River 
Linking Project redundant and would severely jeopardize India’s water security. 
According to one media source, “[i]f Beijing goes ahead with the Brahmaputra project, it 
would practically mean a declaration of war against India.”221 . 
Despite the potential for conflict, Ojha & Singh conclude that there exists a good 
possibility of cooperation between India and China.222  Specifically, the authors note that 
the river drops from 3,350m in the Tibetan Plateau to 800m in India, such that the ability 
to efficiently harness the river’s greatest hydropower potential requires cooperation of 
both countries:   
The valley characteristics are such that the river at the point of diversion is 
in China, and the site of the powerhouse is in India. Therefore it requires 
the cooperative effort of both countries to generate energy from the 
colossal ‘Power Store House’.223  
A Sino-Indian bilateral agreement may appeal to both regional powers. 224  
However, the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River Basin is located in a hypersensitive 
political zone. Arunachal Pradesh was also the location of the 1962 Border War between 
China & India. China continues to regard India’s control of Arunachal Pradesh as an 
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illegal occupation and refers to the area as South Tibet.  While the parties tentatively 
observe a Line of Actual Control,225 the conflict over Arunachal Pradesh remains the 
greatest potential source of conflict between China and India. 226  Recently, China’s 
developments on the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra dangerously close to the Sino-Indian border 
have renewed concern for the threat that China poses to India.227 
b) Indigenous Peoples’ Interests in the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River Basin 
According to Tibetan legend, the Great Bend of the Tsangpo is the heart of the 
mythical Shangri-La.  In the sacred texts of Tibetan Buddhism, this mysterious land holds 
the promise of an existence without “poverty, hatred, hypocrisy, cheating or death”.228 
Tibetans believe the Great Bend to be the home of the Goddess Dorje Pagmo, Tibet’s 
Protecting Diety.229  Tibetan scholar, Tashi Tsering, describes the significance of the 
Tsangpo:  
To the Tibetans, the Great Bend region is known as Pema Koe, the most 
sacred beyul blessed by Guru Rinpoche, Padmasambhava, the Indian 
Buddhist yogin credited with firmly establishing Buddhism in Tibet. 
Generations of visionary Tibetan Buddhist masters have revealed "hidden 
treasures" … and made journeys through the different layers of spiritual 
doors of beyul Pema Koe.230 
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For many, the question of Tibet’s status within China has never been adequately 
resolved. China has enjoyed de facto control over the Indigenous peoples of Tibet since 
the invasion by the People’s Liberation Army of China in 1949.231  China bases its claim 
to Tibet on historical events dating back to the height of the Mongol imperial expansion 
and the influence of Manchu Emperors in the 18th century.  However, the Government of 
Tibet in Exile and its supporters, assert that at the time of China’s invasion, Tibet was an 
independent state recognized under international law.232  While Tibet sent an urgent 
appeal for help to the United Nations, the General Assembly did not take any action for 
fear of provoking a full-scale attack by China.  However, in the years following China’s 
military occupation of Tibet, many countries continued to recognize Tibet’s 
independence during full debates on the issue in the United Nations General Assembly in 
1959, 1960, 1961, and 1965.  Further, in 1959, 1961 and 1965, the UN issued Resolutions 
condemning the violation of Tibetan peoples’ fundamental rights and freedoms.233  Since 
that time however, the United Nations has failed to adequately address the issue of 
Tibet’s statehood. The lack of international resolve regarding the issue of Tibetan 
peoples’ rights to self-determination and China’s human rights violations in that region 
must be viewed within the context of China’s current initiatives to exploit Tibet’s natural 
resources.  The United Nations cannot easily facilitate negotiations towards a regional 
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transboundary agreement in this watershed without also addressing the rights of the 
Indigenous peoples of Tibet.234   
The issue of Tibetan peoples’ self-determination has implications beyond those 
raised by the Tsangpo Project. The Tibetan Plateau is the principal watershed in Asia and 
the source of its 10 major rivers.235  According to Claude Arpi, “Tibet’s waters flow 
down to eleven countries and are said to bring fresh water to over 85 percent of Asia’s 
population, approximately 50 percent of the world’s population.”236  Environmental 
governance in Tibet is therefore of paramount concern in Asia and throughout the world.  
The international importance of Tibet’s resources prompted the spiritual leader of 
Tibetans, the Dalai Lama, to propose a 5 Point Peace Plan to turn Tibet into a zone of 
“Ahimsa”, a Sanskrit word meaning “non-violence.”237  The Dalai Lama set out his 
proposal in his 1989 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech:  
This included the conversion of the entire Tibetan plateau into a Zone of 
Ahimsa, a sanctuary of peace and nonviolence where human beings and 
nature can live in peace and harmony. … Any relationship between Tibet 
and China will have to be based on the principle of equality, respect, trust 
and mutual benefit.238  
  
Maintaining the health of Tibet’s water resources is vital to the future of Asia as a whole.  
Moreover, Tibetans rely upon Tsangpo and their natural environment for their spiritual 
and cultural continuity.   
In addition to the very high-profile plight of the Tibetan struggle for self-
determination, there are hundreds of lesser-known Indigenous communities that live 
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along the Brahmaputra in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Bangladesh.  Approximately 
65% of the Arunachalis belong to 20 major-collective tribes and 82 smaller tribes, many 
of which are either of Tibetan or Thai-Burmese origin.  The other 35% of the population 
are immigrants.  Similarly, Assam is characterized as “multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-
religious, multi-caste, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual”.239  This region is beset with 
ongoing internal conflicts throughout the river valley.240    
In September 2010, fifty-one organizations representing Indigenous peoples and 
local communities in India’s Northeast signed on to a letter to India and China in an 
appeal to stop the damming of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra: 
We submit this memorandum to the leaders of two of the largest economies 
on this earth, India and China, hoping that there will be sanity and boldness 
in dealing with the proposed dams in upper and lower reaches of Yarlung 
Sangpo/Siang/Brahmaputra Rivers. Several communities in this stretch of 
river identify it by several names and [attach] spiritual, cultural and 
economic importance to Nature, and they are first users and in fact the 
defender and protector of the river and its ecosystem. We fear that this being 
not only one of the finest rivers but also the finest ecosystems on earth, the 
communities surviving on this ecosystem will be destroyed by the politics of 
water and energy and the game of one-upmanship of these great nations. 241  
 
The signatories perceive the growing conflict between China and India for dominance 
over the river basin as a growing threat. They further state: 
We have witnessed painful conflict between India and China in the sixties 
and we do not want to see the conflict continue or escalate as ultimately it is 
the people [who] suffer (like those who live in Arunachal, in particular). We 
see that there is already an additional conflict brewing due to the dams 
proposed both by China and India. For this reason both [countries] must 
refrain from building any dams in the whole stretch of this river. This will 
help build peace and trust between the two countries. Building dams on 
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Siang or in Yarlung Sangpo will therefore be considered as seeking 
conflict.242 
The groups make two proposals: 
1. Stop all existing and proposed dam construction activities on Siang River 
both in China and India. 
2. Collectively agree to hold these river(s) as Heritage Rivers for all future 
generations to come.243 
The signatories include several organizations representing Indigenous interests including: 
Nefa Indigenous Human Right Organisation, Arunachal Pradesh; Forum for Indigenous 
Perspectives and Action, Manipur; Dialogue on Indigenous Culture and Environment, 
Nagaland; United Tribal Development Project, Manipur; Indigenous People Foundation, 
Arunachal; World Mountain Peoples Forum, Meghalaya; All Tribal Student Union, 
Manipur; and the Sinlung Indigenous Peoples Human Rights Organization. 
c)  Discussion 
The Tsangpo-Brahmaputra is a potential flashpoint for conflict in Asia.  Both 
China’s Tsangpo Project and India’s River-Linking Project threaten the water supply to 
downstream riparians affecting millions of people and threatening the environment for 
future generations. The situation is complicated by unique geopolitical dynamics that 
include two regional superpowers on the one hand and extremely vulnerable Indigenous 
populations on the other.  The impact of the proposed projects must also be considered 
within the context of climate change, flooding, deforestation, erosion and seismic 
activity, which will require joint study and information sharing. 
The geo-political dimensions surrounding the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River Basin 
are unique in the world.  Unlike most transboundary disputes that involve one regional 
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power, the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra is shared by two regional superpowers, which are also 
emerging global powers. Between them, China and India have 40% of the world’s 
population.244  Both China and India are experiencing massive population growth, 
unprecedented economic development and an unsustainable demand for natural 
resources. While China and India have incentives to cooperate in the development of the 
Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, they also have a recent history of armed conflict in this Basin.   In 
addition, China’s claim to Tibet is still contested by human rights and Indigenous 
activists. The development of the Tsangpo by China has the potential to further politicize 
and polarize these issues within the international community and lead to further violent 
conflict. Any approach to facilitating transboundary governance in this region must allow 
all peoples to engage in cooperation without requiring any group to accede its position 
regarding sovereignty and rights to self-determination. 
In particular, the stakeholders will be challenged to overcome unique power 
inequities, disputes regarding sovereignty, and the current lack of capacity for 
transboundary and participatory approaches to decision-making. In addition to a myriad 
of issues confronting this region, ongoing disputes regarding sovereignty in the region 
make the application of international water law principles problematic in this region.  
Any attempt to enforce the rights and obligations of sovereign nations regarding this river 
triggers issues regarding sovereignty and potentially exacerbates tensions regarding 
China’s controversial domination over Tibet and ongoing conflict between China and 
India regarding disputed territories.  China has expressly rejected the principles of 
customary international water law as an infringement on its absolute territorial 
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sovereignty.245 China might be persuaded to see the merits of a bilateral agreement with 
India but historically, China has simply acted with impunity as an upstream riparian.  
While the potential for a ‘mutual gains’ approach to negotiations might persuade China 
and India to strike a mutually beneficial deal which is compatible with international water 
law principles, it would pose considerable risk to the Indigenous peoples along the river 
who will be adversely impacted by such joint development.  Indigenous peoples have no 
protection under international water law.   
The ‘reasonable and equitable use’ doctrine and the ‘no harm’ rule codified in the 
UN Watercourse Convention do not provide any protection to Tibetans or the local tribes 
of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. It is simply assumed that riparian states will represent 
the best interests of the people and environment within their territory. The current 
structure, “excludes minority political or ethnic groups, as well as a whole range of 
political, environmental and special interest groups who may have a stake in an 
international agreement.”246   The current focus on sovereignty is inconsistent with the 
preservation of the internationally affirmed rights of Indigenous peoples and 
environmental protection and must be revisited.247   The key may be to reframe the issue.  
Green Cross International proposed that. 
…instead of grappling for a restrictive middle ground between upstream 
and downstream riparian claims, and mutually unsatisfactory compromise, 
the problem should be reformulated and directed away from questions of 
different degrees of sovereignty towards a vision of cooperation.248 
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The focus on sovereignty as the organizing principle of international water law and 
governance fails to adequately address the complexity of transboundary cooperation in 
the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River basin.249   
In addition, advocates of participatory models of water governance will encounter 
unique issues in the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River basin given the unresolved issues 
regarding sovereignty. Any encouragement or requirement for a state to adopt 
participatory approaches in a region implicitly assumes that the state has the legitimate 
right to govern and develop the resources in that region. There may be unintended 
consequences to advocating China or India’s adoption of participatory governance in 
regions that are in dispute such as Tibet or Arunachal Pradesh.  For example, if the World 
Bank or United Nations encourages China to adopt participatory approaches or other 
specific governance strategies in Tibet, are they inadvertently legitimizing China’s claim 
to sovereignty over Tibet?  Could Tibetan peoples meaningfully participate in local 
governance initiatives without formerly acceding to China’s claims to absolute 
sovereignty? To borrow from Professor Christie’s characterization of Indigenous 
peoples’ struggles in Canada, “…Aboriginal nations find themselves forced to welcome 
the opportunity to be consulted about how their own lands will be exploited.”250   Even if 
one accepts that China’s claim to Tibet as settled, the people of Tibet possess rights under 
the international law of Indigenous peoples.251  The challenge to the international 
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community is therefore how to create international laws regarding transboundary river 
governance in a manner that ensures meaningful cooperation and dialogue without 
inadvertently legitimizing and encouraging further colonial domination.   
2.4. Conclusions: The Problem With Sovereignty 
 
The focus on territorial sovereignty leads to a domination of rich states over 
poor, of today’s interests over tomorrow’s and of human needs over 
environmental needs. This ‘logic of self-extermination’ is bound to fail and 
must be replaced by a different logic. 252 
 
Klaus Bosselmann 
The doctrine of sovereignty is an obstacle against, rather than a vehicle for the 
peaceful governance of transboundary rivers.253 A critical analysis of the UN 
Watercourse Convention, related mainstream discourse and two case examples 
demonstrates the inability of international water law to recognize the international rights 
of Indigenous peoples.    
The prevailing theory of international watercourse rights and obligations today is 
“limited territorial sovereignty,” which dictates that “the sovereignty of a state over its 
territory is said to be ‘limited’ by the obligation not to use that territory in such a way as 
to cause significant harm to other states”.254 This principle is codified in the UN 
Watercourse Convention and has been supported in international courts and tribunals in 
cases involving international watercourses.  It is generally accepted that customary 
international law imposes limitations on a state’s freedom with respect to the portion of 
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an international watercourse within its territory.255   This limitation upon absolute 
territorial sovereignty has been heralded as an indicator of international cooperation and 
sharing of resources signalling a new era of transboundary governance.  However, a 
closer examination of the discourse surrounding international water law reveals that 
“territorial sovereignty remains the dominant limiting factor in defining the scope of 
international water law.”256   
The UN Watercourse Convention has been hailed by both its supporters and 
detractors alike as a landmark departure from the doctrine of historical sovereignty.257 
However its reliance upon sovereign status continues to operate as a barrier to Indigenous 
peoples’ participation in the development and application of transboundary water law.  
Indigenous peoples’ rights are not mentioned in the UN Watercourse Convention; 
accordingly, they have no access to dispute resolution mechanisms under the Convention.  
The equitable principles codified in the Convention simply do not apply to Indigenous 
peoples.  The Convention does not require states to recognize Indigenous rights ratified in 
other international agreements or to obtain Indigenous peoples’ informed consent for 
decisions that might impact them.258  Likewise bilateral and multilateral state agreements 
that drive the evolution of customary international law principles simply do not 
acknowledge or mention Indigenous rights and instead focus on maximizing mutual gains 
through state cooperation.  In this paradigm, Indigenous peoples’ rights are reduced to a 
cost of development.   The mainstream discourse and texts regarding international water 
law often neglect to acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ interests in transboundary 
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disputes.  While transboundary water governance theories such as IWRM and IWI are 
more conducive to Indigenous peoples’ participation in environmental decision-making, 
Indigenous peoples are still often lumped together with other “stakeholders” such as 
industry and NGOs, thereby undermining their international status and collective rights. 
The issues confronting Indigenous peoples are further revealed in the two 
transboundary case examples cited above. In the context of the Columbia River, 
Indigenous peoples are relatively empowered with strong national legal rights.  However, 
their transboundary claims for compensation for past harms are routinely dismissed as a 
domestic issue.  While both the United States and Canada have sophisticated legal 
regimes protecting Indigenous rights, both nations have been slow to acknowledge 
Indigenous peoples’ international rights under UNDRIP and Canada continues to assert 
that, despite its endorsement of UNDRIP, it is not customary international law.259  In this 
context, Indigenous peoples’ international rights to participate in environmental decision-
making in transboundary rivers are only realized to the extent that states agree to 
recognize them. International water law does not require states to recognize or even 
acknowledge Indigenous rights.   Under the UN Watercourse Convention, two states 
could reach a mutually beneficial agreement and proceed to develop a transboundary 
river without ensuring Indigenous peoples’ participation and informed consent.   They 
could be well within the parameters of customary international water law while violating 
a number of other ratified international conventions.  Indigenous peoples are left to seek 
compensation after-the-fact reinforcing the notion that their legal interests can be reduced 
to a cost of development. 
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In the context of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River, extremely vulnerable 
Indigenous populations are at the mercy of two major superpowers with disputed borders, 
both of which are pursuing mega-dam developments.  While an agreement between 
China and India would be consistent with the objectives of the UN Watercourse 
Convention, a bilateral agreement emphasizing a mutual gains approach would likely be 
disastrous for Indigenous populations.  Even participatory approaches to governance 
could have the effect of undermining long-standing claims to sovereignty asserted by 
Indigenous peoples by presuming state responsibility to manage consultation processes.   
One of the most glaring omissions in international water law today is the lack of a 
dispute mechanism for transboundary water disputes that can be accessed by Indigenous 
peoples and which integrates international environmental laws. Wolf states: 
One of the greatest gaps in international water dispute resolution is the lack 
of just such recognized authority.  Wescoat (1992) describes the elaborate 
process by which the International Law Commission, the United Nations 
legal body, has taken to design a draft code of international waters. The 24-
year effort, only recently approved by the General Assembly, includes terms 
defined by politics rather than science, vague and contradictory doctrines, 
and no enforcement mechanism. Even approved, international law applies 
only to States, and therefore ignores many of the ethnic minorities who 
might claim water rights.  Furthermore, the International Court of Justice 
requires not only that both parties to a dispute agree to the Court’s 
jurisdiction, but also that they agree to the specific point of law to be 
decided.260  
This deconstruction of the Convention, the discourse and the case examples, illustrates a 
disturbing lack of acknowledgement for the international status and rights of Indigenous 
peoples.261  The roots of this inequity can be traced to the emphasis on sovereignty as the 
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organizing principle of international water law. The emphasis placed upon sovereign 
status may operate to adversely impact upon Indigenous peoples in the following ways: 
(1) It excludes Indigenous peoples from international negotiations regarding 
transboundary rivers and from participating in the development of international 
water law principles; 
 
(2) It presumes that Indigenous peoples’ interests in transboundary rivers are a 
domestic issue, thereby reinforcing Indigenous peoples as subordinate to the states 
oppress them and perpetuating ongoing colonization of Indigenous peoples by 
states; 
 
(3) It undermines international conventions and declarations that have affirmed the 
rights of Indigenous peoples to fully participate in environmental decision-making; 
and 
 
(4) It may exacerbate conflict over disputed territories and unintentionally encourage 
states to expand their territories.   
 
In addition to the impacts discussed above, the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from 
participating in international governance has led to the exclusion of Indigenous values 
from the development of customary international law of transboundary watercourses.  
Customary international water law has been, and continues to be, largely distilled from 
the bilateral and multilateral agreements between states.  The Convention and discourse 
are predicated upon Western perspectives of sovereignty and ownership of resources, 
which perceives rivers primarily as a resource for economic exploitation.262 State 
agreements are largely agreements to mutually develop and govern the river in an effort 
to maximize states’ economic interests.  The presumption of gains, development and 
utilization dominates the discourse and negates the notion of valuing the river in its 
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undeveloped state or the inherent value of conservation and protection of the watershed.  
The spiritual or cultural importance of rivers throughout the world is largely absent from 
the discourse.263  By relying solely upon states’ interests and a Western classical notion 
of sovereignty, international water law is predicated upon values that contradict and 
exclude an understanding of Indigenous peoples’ experience of sovereignty and 
relationship with water.    
Wouters & Tremblay caution that a critical analysis of international water law 
aimed at identifying its failure to address human rights must also recognize the historical 
context of both areas of law. The authors state that the UN Watercourse Convention: 
… hails from the UN Charter’s higher-level objectives of maintaining 
‘international peace and security’, and achieving ‘international co-
operation’.  Thus through treaty and state practice, rules evolved that came 
to govern trans-boundary waters traversing national borders.  The core focus 
in this area of public international law has been the peaceful management of 
shared resources – as complementary to other rules that might evolve under 
the law of nations, such as ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights’.  Thus the origins of the discourse for each of these areas of public 
international law were quite distinct and must be understood more deeply 
within this context.264 
While I duly acknowledge that, to date, international water law has evolved 
independently from the discourse on human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights, this 
purpose of this thesis is to consider how it might be improved upon in the future from an 
Indigenous perspective.  The first step in such an analysis must involve identifying its 
shortcomings in this regard. 
Critical Race Theory has informed my analysis and deconstruction of 
transboundary water law to identify how the UN Watercourse Convention and the 
                                                 
263
 Ibid. 
264
 Patricia Wouters & Hugo Tremblay, Book Review of Freshwater Access from a Human Rights 
Perspective by Knut Bourquain (2009) 10:2 Melbourne J Int’l L 705. 
  
81
doctrine of sovereignty have operated to subordinate Indigenous peoples.  The next 
chapter explores several perspectives regarding Indigenous peoples’ relationship with the 
concept of sovereignty.  A review of the literature reveals how sovereignty has been 
intentionally constructed to exclude Indigenous peoples from the dominant social 
contract.  It considers not only how the concept of sovereignty was manipulated and 
developed by Western lawmakers to dominate Indigenous peoples and exploit natural 
resources but also acknowledges the multiplicity of ways that Indigenous peoples 
understand and experience sovereignty.  These alternate narratives show that sovereignty 
is a “social creation”265 that is both culturally and historically dependent.   Once we 
appreciate our role in creating and defining sovereignty, we can acknowledge our ability 
to transform it and consider alternatives to transboundary governance that are premised 
on mutual respect for all peoples and a vision of cooperation.
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Chapter 3:  Sovereignty as a Social Construct: Indigenous Perspectives 
 
Sovereignty, then, is a social creation.266 
Taiaiake Alfred, Mohawk 
 
 From an Indigenous perspective, the inequity that exists in transboundary water 
law is rooted in the operation of the historical doctrine of sovereignty.  This doctrine has 
evolved to unilaterally exclude Indigenous peoples from the international legal order and 
subordinate Indigenous peoples’ interests to state interests.  Within the context of current 
international law, the doctrine of sovereignty refers to a nation’s territorial integrity, 
exclusive jurisdiction and authority over a geographic area.267   The doctrine has become 
so embedded in our understanding of the modern world that it may at first seem absurd to 
challenge its foundational position as a pillar of international law. However, Barker 
contends that the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ can only be understood within its cultural and 
historical context:   
… sovereignty is historically contingent.  There is no fixed meaning for 
what sovereignty is – what it means by definition, what it implies in public 
debate, or how it has been conceptualized in international, national or 
indigenous law.  Sovereignty – its related histories, perspectives, and 
identities – is embedded within the specific social relations in which it is 
invoked and given meaning.  How and when it emerges and functions are 
determined by the “located” political agendas and cultural perspectives of 
those who rearticulate it into public debate or political document to do a 
specific work of opposition, invitation, or accommodation.268 
At its essence, the doctrine of sovereignty is a social construct designed and defined by 
humans to reflect cultural values and achieve political gains.   There is ample evidence 
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that the doctrine of sovereignty has evolved within the Western legal system as a tool of 
colonialism to intentionally negate Indigenous rights and gain control over land and 
resources.269   In the process, the dominant discourse on sovereignty has also greatly 
diminished and endangered Indigenous epistemologies, culture and identity.270  By 
engaging and articulating the varied and diverse Indigenous perspectives on sovereignty 
and exploring other potential modalities of sovereignty,271 a process of epistemological 
and cultural reclamation is also occurring.   
How we understand sovereignty is ultimately a reflection of deeply held personal 
and cultural beliefs about one’s place in the world and our relationship to others.   Alfred 
asserts that “[t]he reification of sovereignty in politics today is the result of a triumph of a 
particular set of ideas over others – no more natural to the world than any other man-
made project.”272  The term is socially constructed and historically dependent.273  It is 
both amorphous and unassailable.  It is personal, spiritual and political.  It is derived from 
harmonious relations and exploited for domination and oppression.   A review of the 
literature reveals that Indigenous views of sovereignty are as varied and complex as 
Indigenous cultures.    
In this chapter, I review some of the varied understandings of sovereignty within 
Indigenous scholarship. Taken together, the resulting narratives provide a counterpoint to 
the dominant legal discourse and demonstrate that sovereignty is a human-made 
construct, which is neither objective nor neutral.   Once we understand that sovereignty is 
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a “social creation”,274 we can begin to recognize our collective ability and responsibility 
to create new laws that are inclusive of Indigenous perspectives.  Historical context is 
particularly relevant to a critical Indigenous analysis of the doctrine of sovereignty and 
the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights.   Richardson, Imai & McNeil observe: 
We should nonetheless be vigilant of the historical context of Indigenous 
rights, as failure to make the connection between the continuing impact of 
past government policies and the contemporary plight of Indigenous peoples 
can foster antagonism in wider society towards necessary remedial and 
special measures. Moreover, some people wrongly regard the Indigenous 
struggle for rights as a recent phenomenon … In fact, Indigenous resistance 
to colonialism and its legal machinery has been waged for centuries, and 
continues today…275 
 
A brief review of historical Western understandings of sovereignty provides context for 
exploring Indigenous peoples’ experience and understanding of sovereignty.     
 
3.1 Providing Context: Sovereignty in Western Traditions  
 
By art is created that great Leviathan, 
 called a commonwealth or state, (in Latin civitas)  
which is but an artificial man …  
in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul.276 
 
Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651) 
 
 
Today, the doctrine of sovereignty is deeply entrenched in international law and is 
correlated with territorial integrity, exclusive jurisdiction and authority to control a 
geographical area.277   However, the notion of sovereignty is an ancient one.278   Aristotle 
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meditated on who should be entitled to wield moral authority over a city in his chapter on 
Justice & Sovereignty in The Politics as early as 4th century BCE.279  In different 
historical contexts, sovereignty has been invoked to describe an individual’s authority 
over oneself, to refer to the power of God or other deities over humanity and to affirm the 
inherent power of feudal lords and monarchs over their citizens.  Over time, the notion of 
state sovereignty evolved as a pillar of the law of nations.   Barker summarizes the early 
theoretical debates over sovereignty: 
In some early debates, it was argued that sovereignty emanated from 
individuals (citizens). Individuals possessed rights to personal freedoms that 
informed their collective rights to rule themselves as nations.  
… 
In other debates, sovereignty was linked to the “law of nations.”  Therein 
nations were based on the collective rights of individuals to civil society, 
life, happiness, property, justice, and defense; nations held rights to be free, 
independent and respected as equals in the pursuit of securing the collective 
rights of their citizens. 
… 
In both kinds of debates, sovereignty was about figuring out the relationship 
between the rights and the obligations of individuals (citizens) and the rights 
and obligations of nations (states).  Sovereignty seemed to belong to nations 
but was then understood to originate either from the people who made up 
those nations or as a character of the nation itself (nationhood).280  
 
Ultimately, sovereignty is about power; where it is located and why.  Far from being 
fixed, the concept of sovereignty is both culturally and historically dependent even within 
Western classical traditions.281  This section does not endeavour to provide a 
comprehensive review of Western classical traditions regarding the notion of 
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sovereignty.282  Rather, it is intended as a brief overview of the evolution of Western 
legal tradition of sovereignty to provide context for considering indigenous perspectives.    
3.1.1 Feudal Europe 
 
Prior to the “law of nations”,283 sovereignty was typically considered the domain 
of the church as mediator of God’s will as the only “true sovereign”.284  Monarchs and 
feudal lords exploited its religious associations and claimed that their right to rule was 
derived from God’s will.285  In feudal Europe, individual rulers claimed sovereignty over 
peasants and lesser feudal lords as a form of “absolute power over everyone and 
everything” within their claimed territory.286   According to Anaya:  
In the Europe of the high Middle Ages, sovereignty and political loyalties 
were fragmented, resulting in shifting and overlapping political 
communities. Against this backdrop of evolving political interdependencies 
and the perception of a normative order applying throughout humanity, 
theorists discerned rights and duties as applying beyond limited 
denominations of human association such as “nation,” “state,” or 
“kingdom.”287  
 
Citizens were perceived to consent to the sovereign authority of their lords and monarchs 
in return for their armies’ protection. 
3.1.2 European Conquest and the New World 
 
The discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus radically shifted the 
way Europeans conceived of sovereignty.  European theorists such as Dominican clerics 
Bartolomé de las Casa (1474-1566) and Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1547) raised moral 
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and legal issues regarding the legitimacy of conquest of the New World.288  As a Roman 
Catholic missionary who had spent years living among the Indigenous peoples of the 
New World, de las Casas defended the “essential humanity of the Indians”.  He was 
outspoken in his condemnation of the brutality of Spanish conquest and questioned the 
moral limits of the politics of conquest.289   De Vitoria, a theology professor who had 
never traveled off the continent, took a more theoretical interest in colonization and set 
about defining the rules of conquest.  Anaya summarizes his contributions as follows: 
Vitoria held that the Indians possessed certain original autonomous powers 
and entitlements to land, which the Europeans were bound to respect. At the 
same time, he methodically set forth the grounds on which Europeans could 
be said validly to acquire Indian lands or assert authority over them.290   
 
Vitoria is credited with developing “a theory of just war” to justify Spanish claims which 
became pivotal to the European legitimization of conquest.291  Anaya describes how the 
contributions of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) further developed this European view of 
conquest. 
 
… Grotius affirmed that the ability to enter into treaty relationships is a 
necessary consequence of the natural rights of all peoples, including 
“strangers to the true religion”: … Grotius likewise endorsed the concept of 
just war, …  Grotius identified three broad “justifiable causes” for war or 
conquest: “defence, recovery of property, and punishment”.292  
 
Grotius’ affirmation of the rights of Indigenous peoples’ to enter into treaties was a 
precursor to the European tendency towards establishing treaties with Indigenous 
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peoples.293  Likewise, his elaboration of the theory of just war formed the rationalization 
for colonization and domination of Indigenous peoples.294  
3.1.3 Post-Westphalian Era 1658 
 The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is perceived by many to signal the beginning of 
the “era of the independent territorial state”295 marking as it did not only the end of the 
Thirty Years War but also the political domination of the Roman Catholic Church.  
Harris describes the impact of the Peace of Westphalia on our current Western 
understanding of sovereignty: 
The acquisition of sovereignty involved establishing and defending a 
territorial claim within which the state held supreme law-making authority.  
The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which established a temporary reprieve 
from decades of conflict in Europe, is widely considered the moment when 
emerging nation-states established the principle that each was sovereign. 
The basis of political authority had shifted away from a set of personal 
relationships between the sovereign and subject, and towards a notion of 
exclusive jurisdiction within defined territories.296 
Anaya observes that the post-Westphalian period signalled a new era in theorizing about 
the state as a dichotomy emerged between individual rights and state rights.297   Anaya 
identifies philosopher Thomas Hobbes and diplomat Emmerich de Vattel as key 
contributors to the emerging theory of statehood.   
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), in his major work, 
Leviathan (1651), posited that individuals lived in a warlike state of nature 
prior to joining civil society, represented by the state. Prominent theorists … 
accepted Hobbes’s vision of humanity as a dichotomy of individuals and 
states, and they began developing a body of law focused exclusively on states 
under the rubric of “the law of nations”.298  
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According to Hobbes, individuals lived naturally in a state of anarchic self-interest 
without any natural tendency towards peace and order.  Individuals were therefore drawn 
towards association and entered into a “social contract” whereby a state was formed to 
protect the accumulated wealth of the individuals.  States derived their rights to govern 
through the consent of those being governed. 
 In the mid-18th century, Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1769) 
published The Law of Nations, or The Principles of Natural Law (1758).299  According to 
Anaya:  
… he defined the “Law of Nations” as “the science of the rights which exist 
between Nations or States, and the obligations corresponding to these rights.  
… The individual/state dichotomy underlying Vattel’s construct has 
powerfully affected the tradition of Western liberal thought.  In contrast to 
the views of earlier naturalist theorists, the individual/state framework 
acknowledges the rights of the individual on the one hand and the 
sovereignty of the total social collective on the other. But it is not alive to 
the rich variety of intermediate or alternative associational groupings 
actually found in human cultures, nor is it prepared to ascribe to such 
groupings any rights not reducible either to the liberties of the citizen or to 
the prerogatives of the state.300  
Anaya attributes Vattel with establishing “the foundation for the doctrine of state 
sovereignty, with its corollaries of exclusive jurisdiction, territorial integrity, and non-
intervention in domestic affairs”.301   Based as it was on European models of governance, 
Indigenous peoples were by definition excluded from statehood.302   Anaya observes the 
exclusive nature of Vattel’s definition of statehood: 
The concept of the nation-state in the post-Westphalian sense is based upon 
European models of political and social organization whose dominant 
defining characteristics are exclusivity of territorial domain and hierarchical, 
centralized authority. By contrast, indigenous peoples of the Western 
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Hemisphere and elsewhere, at least prior to European contact, typically have 
been organized primarily by tribal or kinship ties, have had decentralized 
political structures often linked in confederation, and have enjoyed shared or 
overlapping spheres of territorial control.303  
Europeans thereby constructed the self-affirming theoretical underpinnings of 
sovereignty in a manner that, from the outset, excluded Indigenous peoples from 
participating in the development of international law.  
3.1.4 The Marshall Trilogy 
 
 Theory was transformed into law by a trilogy of cases that came before Chief 
Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in the mid-19th century.   These 
three cases shaped American and European notions of sovereignty while providing legal 
justification of their rights to colonial conquest.304  In Johnson v M’Intosh (1823), Chief 
Justice Marshall concluded that the colonists obtained title to the land simply through its 
“discovery” and that the “Indians” were left with only a right of occupancy.305 Barker 
describes the impact of the case as follows: 
 
… the doctrine [of discovery] established that American Indians were not 
the full sovereigns of the lands that they possessed but were rather the users 
of the lands that they roamed and wandered over for purpose of shelter and 
sustenance. … While it was accepted that Indians maintained particular 
rights associated with their status as the original inhabitants of the land, the 
exclusive rights of property in the land belonged to the nation who 
discovered the lands. Discovery was demonstrated by the appropriation for 
agriculture.306 
 
Barker observes how this self-affirming rationalization of colonialism became legal 
precedent as  “Marshall invoked [the doctrine of discovery] as though it were a well-
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founded legal principle of international law.”307  It was then integrated into American and 
European policy as if it were an unassailable fact.  
 In Cherokee Nation v Georgia (1831), Marshall characterized Indigenous 
populations as “domestic dependent nations” and likened their relationship with the 
United States government as that of ward and guardian.308   The decision had the effect of 
making “Indian tribes” a domestic concern and severed the link between Indigenous 
peoples and international law along with any presupposed or theoretical rights Indigenous 
peoples may have had to “treaties, nationhood, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
jurisdiction”.309   
In Worcester v Georgia (1832), Chief Justice Marshall further elaborated upon the 
doctrine of discovery to establish that the United States government had full authority 
over the lands and the people within its territory.310  Notably, Chief Justice Marshall 
pointed to the Cherokee’s treaties with the United States as evidence that the Cherokee 
recognized the sovereign authority of the United States.311 
 This trilogy of cases marked the first legal treatment of sovereignty and was 
quickly incorporated into European policy in Canada, New Zealand and Australia.312  
Barker observes: 
The entire self-fulfilling narrative of legal, moral and social superiority 
offered in such claims to doctrine as Marshall’s discovery reinvented a 
sovereignty for indigenous peoples that was void of any of the associated 
rights to self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy that 
would have been affiliated with it in international law at the time.313 
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The Marshall trilogy therefore marked the end of any consideration of Indigenous 
peoples as nations under international law.  Anaya points to several assumptions of the 
positivist school of thought that contributed to the legitimization of colonialism as a legal 
right.  
The first premise … that international law is concerned only with the rights 
and duties of states. … A second and related premise … that international law 
upholds the exclusive sovereignty of states, which are presumed to be equal 
and independent, and thus guards the exercise of that sovereignty from outside 
interference. … a third premise at the core of the positivist school was that 
international law is law between and not above states, finding its theoretical 
basis in their consent. And a fourth premise ... was that states that make 
international law and possess rights and duties under it make up a limited 
universe that excludes a priori indigenous peoples outside the mold of 
European civilization.314  
 
International law quickly evolved to reinforce European entitlement to conquest and 
negate Indigenous rights to sovereignty.315  Harris observes that “[c]onflict over territory 
lies at the heart of colonialism.”316 By extension, conflict over territory also lies at the 
heart of Western notions of sovereignty. 
3.1.5 Limits of Sovereignty 
 
 Today the doctrine of sovereignty remains a foundational pillar of international 
law.317 However, there is also increasing recognition of the limits of sovereignty in light 
of human rights offences.  Robert Odawi Porter points to the atrocities of the first and 
second World Wars as marking a new era in international commitment to protect human 
rights.318  
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Global consensus began to emerge that there was a limit to state 
sovereignty.  To the extent that individual human rights might be violated by 
the actions of a particular state, there evolved a belief that it was appropriate 
and necessary as a matter of international law that other nations be allowed 
to interfere in a state’s internal affairs.319   
 
Porter also points to globalism as operating to erode a nation’s territorial integrity and 
authority. He observes that  “[i]n an era of modern commerce, communications, and 
technology, the notion that there is a “sovereign” territory impervious to influence by 
other nations has become increasingly absurd.”320  However, Alfred & Corntassel caution 
that globalization is also another form of empire building that operates to limit 
indigenous autonomy.321 
3.2 Indigenous Sovereignty  
 
We must begin to say the ‘S’ word.322 
Dr. Harold Cardinal, Cree writer, 
political leader, teacher, and lawyer 
 
 The concept of  ‘Indigenous sovereignty’ is still in its infancy.  As an emerging 
and dynamic social construct, it is bound to evolve over time. Indigenous sovereignty is 
referred to loosely as “self-sufficiency”323, “autonomy”324, “the most basic right of people 
to govern themselves without undue influence” 325 or the right to “self-determination”326, 
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although the latter term is mired in complexity given its association with Western legal 
rhetoric.327   According to McCue, “[t]he meaning of sovereignty has yet to undergo 
significant Indigenous and political treatment, definition and elaboration…”.328   Yet, 
there is also a growing recognition that the development of a unified strategy regarding 
sovereignty is critical to Indigenous peoples’ survival.329  
 According to Mohawk, there are currently two dominant views of thought 
regarding Indigenous sovereignty. One holds that “Indian sovereignty”330 was created by 
US Chief Justice John Marshall about 150 years ago.  The other holds that Indigenous 
sovereignty existed long before colonisation.  Mohawk characterizes the viewpoints as 
follows: 
These two approaches, or points of view, have tended to divide people into 
two camps.  In one camp, the U.S. legal definition is what is important.  As 
these people see it, the pragmatic thing is to approach the subject as a topic 
(or subtopic) of U.S. law, and to seek answers for a definition of Indian 
nation sovereignty in court decisions and statute laws. 
… 
On the other side of the coin, there are Indian nationalists of many 
persuasions who feel that U.S. law or Canadian law do not define 
Indian sovereignty, that this sovereignty existed previously and under 
its own definitions.331 
 
RO Porter observes that, at its core, there is general consensus that Indigenous 
sovereignty “rests upon the right of Indigenous peoples to define and carry out an 
existence separate and apart from other peoples.”332  Beyond that, however, Indigenous 
interpretations of sovereignty diverge and cover the whole range of political perspectives 
from ultra-nationalists asserting absolute autonomy to neo-colonists promoting 
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assimilation.333 Some scholars have suggested that discussion of Indigenous sovereignty 
has lost its meaning within the sea of disparate opinions on the subject.334  However, 
Barker observes that within the diversity of Indigenous interpretations of sovereignty 
there are valuable insights to be learned about the nature of Indigenous identity.  She 
states: 
In the historical complexities and cultural richness and diversity of these and 
all indigenous communities is the truth of the heterogeneity of indigenous 
identity, not only in how indigenous peoples identify themselves and their 
cultures but in how their self-definitions inform the character of their unique 
political perspectives, agendas and strategies for sovereignty.335  
 
Plurality emerges as a theme and key insight into Indigenous understandings of 
sovereignty and becomes a counterpoint to the “narrow fiction of a single sovereignty”336 
which has historically operated to negate Indigenous identity. 
The spectrum of perspectives on sovereignty poses unique challenges to a literature 
review of the subject.   I have attempted to present these perspectives thematically while 
also remaining conscious of the potential of an unintended colonising effect that might 
result by over-simplifying these perspectives or trying to categorize them.  With that in 
mind, I have loosely divided my literature review into three broad sections: 
1. Sovereignty, Identity & Indigenous Epistemologies – In this section, I review 
perspectives on Indigenous ways of knowing and explore the inextricable link 
between identity and sovereignty. 
2. Asserting Sovereignty – In this section, I review some Indigenous perspectives of 
sovereignty within the Western legal framework both in terms of defining and 
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asserting sovereignty as well as considering Indigenous concerns about the 
potential for ”auto-colonization”.337  
3. Transcending Sovereignty – In this section, I review several Indigenous scholars 
who assert that discussions of sovereignty are no longer useful to Indigenous 
struggles and that Indigenous scholarship and action must transcend current 
Western legal frameworks. 
Ultimately, these three sections are illustrative of key strategies in the struggle for 
Indigenous peoples’ emancipation and survival.  At their root, all of these intellectual 
approaches are aimed at the common purpose of redefining Indigenous-settler 
relations.338   
RO Porter observes that the term sovereignty can be utilized for both offensive 
and defensive purposes.339  Internationally recognized states regularly assert sovereignty 
to enforce their territorial integrity, dominance and control over their land and resources. 
However, RO Porter asserts that, “as used by Indigenous peoples, the term serves instead 
as a basis for promoting the establishment of consensual, rather than unilateral, assertions 
of state authority within their territories.”340 
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3.2.1 Sovereignty, Identity and Indigenous Epistemologies 
 
Our creation stories are one of our sources of sovereignty. 
June McCue, Ned'u'ten341 
 
Indigenous perspectives regarding sovereignty and self-determination are 
inherently different from those arising from within the Western classical tradition.342  
Rather than accept the Western legal definition of the term, many Indigenous scholars 
have started to explore what Indigenous sovereignty means within Indigenous culture and 
epistemology.  There are inherent barriers to trying to articulate Indigenous ways of 
understanding in an English literature review.  As McCue notes, “Indigenous 
understandings of sovereignty are best articulated and transmitted in the languages of the 
Indigenous peoples.”343    Fairbanks also emphasizes the link between language and 
sovereignty and asserts that the loss of language is ultimately a loss of sovereignty.344   
The importance of language to understanding epistemology is well respected in Western 
classical traditions. Students of philosophy have for centuries undertaken to learn Latin or 
Greek in order to better understand the teachings of great Western philosophers with the 
recognition that meaning is inevitably lost in translation.  Likewise, the nuances of 
Indigenous notions of sovereignty are inextricably linked to the language of the elders 
who still carry ancient wisdom in the form of stories.  As a non-Indigenous person who 
does not know any Indigenous languages, I readily concede that this review of 
Indigenous scholarship can only skim the surface of Indigenous understandings of the 
subject.   
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Sovereignty, as a social construct, is ultimately a reflection of a group’s values 
regarding their place within the world and their relationship with others.  As a culturally 
derived construct, an understanding of sovereignty must begin with a respect for the 
values and epistemologies underlying Indigenous culture and identity.  Different 
perspectives of sovereignty can ultimately be traced to divergent cultural and 
philosophical approaches to power. Alfred contends: 
Nowhere is the contrast between indigenous and (dominant) Western 
traditions sharper than in their philosophical approaches to the fundamental 
issues of power and nature.  In indigenous philosophies, power flows from 
respect for nature and the natural order. In the dominant Western 
philosophy, power derives from coercion and artiface – in effect, alienation 
from nature.345 
 
McCue echoes this sentiment and draw a distinction between power and force: 
From an indigenous perspective, sovereignty is not just human-centred and 
hierarchical; it is not solely born or sustained through brute force. Indigenous 
sovereignty must be birthed through a genuine effort to establish peace, 
respect and balance in this world.346 
 
Indigenous notions of sovereignty, then, are not based in authority or domination over 
land but rather derived through balance and harmony with the natural environment.   
Cheyfitz observes that a wide range of Indigenous cultures emphasize the importance of 
kinship with the natural world.   
… the fundamental Western opposition of nature/culture is not a category of 
Native thinking because extended kinship incorporates the universe into the 
social and thus conserves it with the same care that one practices with all 
one’s relatives.347 
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Groenfeldt notes that Western worldviews tend to characterize the environment purely as 
a resource, a form of property, which can and should be valued within an economic 
perspective of the world.348  Christie asserts that an appreciation of Indigenous 
relationships with the natural world is central to understanding the nature of conflict 
between Indigenous and Western modes of thought. 
Aboriginal visions of land are often, however, of a different order. The vision 
of land as a partner in a relationship – if the land is treated properly, with 
appropriate respect, it provides for people. People accommodate their 
behaviour to the social fabric built into the land and its spirits, with the 
understanding that humans are a part of this land and the larger social fabric 
and are thereby obligated to live according to the principles and rules that 
maintain the societal order and harmony.349  
 
Alfred also emphasizes the central importance of this “partnership principle”350 to 
understanding indigenous sovereignty: 
Indigenous philosophies are premised on the belief that the human 
relationship to the earth is primarily one of partnership. … The partnership 
principle, reflecting a spiritual connection with the land established by the 
Creator, gives human beings special responsibilities within the areas they 
occupy, linking them in a natural and sacred way to their territories.351  
 
This ‘partnership principle’ can be characterized as a pillar of Indigenous philosophical 
thought, which informs traditional Indigenous ideals about the markers of successful 
nationhood.  Mezey asserts “… ancient teachings inform Indians that the true mark of a 
civilization is its ability to live in a location with a minimum disruption to its features.”352   
The conflict between the Western settler states and Indigenous nations then, is therefore 
not a competition over resources as many Westerners perceive it to be but rather a 
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conflict of ideals stemming from divergent beliefs about humanity’s relationship to the 
land and what it means to be ‘civilized’.   
Christie cites Joy Harjo of the Creek people, for her insights into Indigenous 
relationships with the natural world. 
All landscapes have a history, much the same as people exist within cultures, 
even tribes. There are distinct voices, languages that belong to particular 
areas.  There are voices inside rocks, shallow washes, shifting skies; they are 
not silent.  And there is unseen swirl through the heavens, but other motion, 
subtle, unseen, like breathing. A motion, a sound, that if you allow your inner 
workings to stop long enough, moves into the places inside you that mirror a 
similar landscape; you too can see it, feel it, hear it, know it.353 
 
The primacy of the ‘inner world’ is a central theme in Indigenous philosophy.  In 
“Aboriginal Epistemology” (1995), Ermine explores the notion that the larger community 
is a physical manifestation of inner space and the wisdom gained from introspection. In 
this context, “inner space is that universe of being within each person that is synonymous 
with the soul, the spirit, the self or the being.”354  Ermine recognizes the role of language 
and culture to transmit the wisdom and teachings derived from explorations of the inner 
space:  
The Old Ones had experienced totality, a wholeness, in inwardness, and 
effectively created a physical manifestation of the life force by creating 
community.  In doing so, they empowered the people to become the ‘culture’ 
of accumulated knowledge.  The community became paramount by virtue of 
its role as repository and incubator of total tribal knowledge in the form of 
custom and culture.355 
 
 Ermine states that a key insight to these teaching has been the interconnectedness of all 
of creation.  This wisdom permeates language, culture, identity and understandings of 
sovereignty. Ermine contends that the pervasiveness of Western epistemology 
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undermines and adversely impacts Indigenous epistemology, culture and identity by 
introducing a ‘fragmentary self-world view’.  Arguably, Western assumptions of 
sovereignty not only negate Indigenous peoples’ access to land and resources in the outer 
world but also promote “the dogma of fragmentation” in the inner world, indelibly 
harming Indigenous peoples’ “capacity for holism”, which is central to Indigenous 
epistemology.356  Ermine concludes that the teaching of holism is embedded within 
Indigenous languages and that it is only by engaging Indigenous languages that 
Indigenous epistemologies can be reclaimed.357  King clearly illustrates this point as he 
observes, “[t]here really is no word for sovereign in our Lakota language.  The closest we 
have is Oyate or Nation which is closer to unity.”358  
Deeply embedded cultural values such as the “partnership principle”,359 
interconnectedness and the relevance of the “inner space”360 inform Indigenous relations 
with the environment and with other peoples.   The notion of Indigenous sovereignty 
emerges from, and is inextricably linked to, Indigenous values, languages and identities.   
From this perspective, sovereignty is “inherent” or derived “from within a people or 
culture”.361   Horse & Lassiter define inherent sovereignty as follows: 
Inherent sovereignty means having those rights like language and buffalo 
medicine, rights that form the very foundation of who we are as Kiowa 
people. Kiowas like myself hold these rights to be as self-evident and 
unalienable as those rights upon which the United States was originally 
founded.  These are our rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.362 
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Similarly, Harjo asserts, “… sovereignty is about our histories, our languages, our 
religions, our elders, our ancestors, our children, our future, nationhood.”363   
 As with Western classical traditions, Indigenous ideas about sovereignty are often 
understood in religious or spiritual terms.  The Nuxalk Nation declares that their 
sovereign powers are derived from the Creator. 
Their Aboriginal Title and Right to self-determination are confirmed and 
strengthened by their understanding that sovereign powers [are] vested in 
them by the Creator. The Nuxalk territorial lands, waters, air and all its natural 
resources were given to the Nuxalk people by the Creator to provide for their 
essential needs.364   
Indigenous creation stories and mythology are important to understanding Indigenous 
sovereignty.365  Davis points to the many Indigenous traditions that believe that the earth 
itself exists only because “it is breathed into being by human consciousness”366 and that 
many Indigenous peoples believe that it is their sacred responsibility to act as guardians 
to the natural world.  Sovereignty is defined in terms of one’s duties to the land rather 
than rights to exploit the land.367  Indigenous rituals, sacrifice and rites of passage then 
reinforce this sacred relationship between the human, spiritual and natural worlds.368  
Indigenous scholar, teacher and poet, Peter Cole illustrates this interconnectedness (best 
read aloud): 
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 as first peoples of this land our responsibilities include 
to take into accountability not just measurability 
our relationships with the rest of creation 
we follow our original instructions   as orally passed on 
as well   as continually relearned    in our ceremonies   rituals   daily protocols 
we work to regenerate mutual relationships interpenetrating considerations 
ethics is not an add-on   or a form to fill in 
it is intimate integration with the deep structure of our understanding 
of creation  including its ongoingness  its pre- co- and post-emptiveness . . .  
do we dare move a stone knowing that it has a spirit 
knowing   it has been t/here a thousand millennia 
do we dare dig into our mother the earth   our earth   the mother 
even with our hands   even with our thoughts our metaphors 
and not remember we are all related369   
 
Groenfeldt contends that many of the conflicts between Indigenous peoples and Western 
forces can be traced back to the Western world’s negation of Indigenous spirituality 
through its preoccupation with economic development.   In this way, conflict is borne out 
of the domination of Western values over Indigenous values.    
McCue cautions that European-derived notions of power, sovereignty and 
colonialism operate at the “expense of human and ecological diversity.”370  Groenfeldt 
argues that Indigenous value systems must be preserved to ensure “value diversity” and 
provide alternatives to Western culture as it becomes increasingly apparent that the 
Western economic value system is unable to cope with the growing litany of problems 
that confront the world.371     Davis similarly calls for the protection and preservation of 
the world’s “ethnosphere”, the cultural equivalent to the biosphere which he defines as 
“the sum total of all thought and dreams, myths, ideas, inspirations, intuitions, brought 
into being by the human imagination since the dawn of consciousness”.  Davis asserts, “it 
is not change or technology that threatens the integrity of the ethnosphere.  It is power: 
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the crude face of domination.”372   As Alfred observes,  “Indigenous perspectives offer 
alternatives, beginning with the restoration of a regime of respect.”373   
The intellectual struggle to develop a unified strategy around sovereignty can be 
seen as a key part of a larger battle for Indigenous emancipation; to be free from 
domination – from a political perspective but also from an intellectual and cultural 
perspective.   RO Porter contends that the battle being fought over sovereignty is 
essential to the survival of Indigenous peoples: 
From my perspective, sovereignty is the fundamental basis for the existence 
of Indigenous societies. This perspective is rooted in the view that without 
such autonomy, there is no long term ability to shape one’s own destiny, and 
thus no way to live a distinct existence.374   
 
To the extent that institutions built upon Western notions of sovereignty continue to 
propagate the domination, control and exploitation of land, resources and people, then 
Western classical sovereignty is arguably a weapon in an ongoing “ethnocide”375 and 
assimilation of peoples through its implicit negation of Indigenous values and culture.   
A review of the literature suggests that inherent Indigenous sovereignty is derived 
from culture, language, religion, values and identity.  Vine Deloria asserts that 
Indigenous sovereignty consists “more of continued cultural integrity than of political 
powers and to the degree that a nation loses its sense of cultural identity, to that degree it 
suffers a loss of sovereignty”376 However, Corntassel & Primeau argue that expanding 
the concept of sovereignty to include cultural integrity simply complicates the debate and 
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“serves to dilute the meaning of sovereignty in international law.”377   They also note 
Indigenous peoples’ right to preserve their cultural integrity is already enshrined in 
international law.  The debate may therefore be reduced to one of semantics.    
Regardless, of how inherent Indigenous sovereignty ultimately informs strategies 
within international legal discourse, valuing the plurality of unique expressions of 
Indigenous sovereignty is nevertheless an important step in reclaiming Indigenous 
epistemology and preserving Indigenous values.378  Barker observes that Shawnee 
scholar, Glenn T. Morris, Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred and other Indigenous theorists 
are calling for the advancement of “intellectual sovereignty” as an emerging field of 
inquiry aimed at de-colonizing Indigenous epistemologies of law and methodological 
perspectives by moving beyond “the colonial legacies of concepts like sovereignty and 
nationhood.”379  This can best be achieved by returning to Indigenous epistemologies and 
languages and disengaging completely from the dominant legal discourse regarding 
sovereignty. In stark contrast to this intellectual approach, other Indigenous activists and 
scholars continue to pursue their autonomy and assert their claims for sovereignty within 
the dominant Western framework. 
3.2.2 Asserting Sovereignty 
 
The majority of Indigenous scholars and activists to date have engaged sovereignty 
from a political and legal struggle rather than an epistemological one.  This section 
reviews Indigenous perspectives regarding the quest for autonomy by asserting the 
existence of sovereignty in a manner consistent with Western colonial rhetoric.   Anaya 
identifies two primary arguments for claims to Indigenous sovereignty. One he calls the 
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“historical sovereignty approach” while the other involves pursuing rights of self-
determination within the lexicon of human rights law (human rights approach).380   This 
section will consider only the former approach.   Anaya characterizes the “historical 
sovereignty approach” as follows: 
Under this approach, self-determination is invoked to restore the asserted 
“sovereignty” of an historical community that roughly corresponds to the 
contemporary claimant group. This approach generally accepts the premise 
of Western theoretical origins of a world divided into territorially defined, 
independent or “sovereign” states. However, this approach perceives an 
alternative and competing political geography based on an assessment of 
historically based communities.381  
 
The aspiration of most of the world’s Indigenous peoples has been to establish their 
autonomy “within the framework of existing states.”382   
Western conceptions of sovereignty are most often correlated with autonomy383, 
power,384 control,385 authority,386 and self-governance387.  RO Porter defines sovereignty 
with reference to European norms regarding the law of nations. 
“Sovereignty” is, after all, an English word referring to the power of a 
particular nation to exercise governmental authority over a particular territory.  
It is a classic term of European international law referring to the absolute and 
inviolate power of a nation to manage generally its own affairs and, in 
particular, its internal affairs.388  
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Ultimately, sovereignty refers to decision-making authority regarding a 
discrete geographic area.  Christie defines Indigenous sovereignty as 
follows: 
The appropriate definition of Aboriginal sovereignty, then, must aspire to 
capture the essential notion of linkages between political (i.e. decision-
making) communities and discrete tracts of land.  For the purposes of this 
project Aboriginal sovereignty can describe (a) the ability of an Aboriginal 
nation to control and exercise the processes that go into the ongoing project of 
establishing and maintaining a collective identity and (b) the ability of this 
nation to use this collective self-identity to make decisions regarding how its 
people, collectively and individually, relate to its territory.389   
 
Within international law, the test of sovereignty is evidenced, in part, by a 
nation’s ability to enter into agreements with other nation states.  Gourd sets 
out the internationally accepted criteria for sovereignty as follows:  
Sovereignty, at a minimum, is the right to self-government. In addition, a 
group must meet a set of internationally accepted criteria to possess all the 
attributes of sovereignty: 
(1) A group must have citizens 
(2) The group must have territory over which the government has civil 
and criminal jurisdictional authority; 
(3) The group must have a process to establish public policy (…) 
(4) The capacity to enter into foreign relations. That government, then, 
must have relationships with other “recognized governments”.390   
  
Many Indigenous scholars point to treaties and the treaty making process as evidence that 
settler states expressly recognized Indigenous peoples’ pre-existing sovereignty.    
Foreign relations and the existence or lack of existence of treaties between settlers 
and Indigenous peoples has become central in assertions of Indigenous sovereignty.  On 
the one hand, scholars assert that settlers expressly recognized Indigenous peoples’ pre-
existing sovereignty through extensive treaties, complex trading agreements and express 
recognition of Indigenous rights to occupancy. 391  On the other hand, other Indigenous 
peoples have pointed to the lack of treaties in many cases to demonstrate that there has 
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never been any cessation of land or implied forfeit of sovereignty.  Both of these 
approaches to asserting historical sovereignty face legal limitations and practical 
challenges. 
a)  Prior Sovereignty as Evidenced by Treaty Making Process 
 
The treaty making process is taken as de facto evidence that colonial powers 
recognized the existing sovereignty of Indigenous nations.  Corntassel & Primeau 
consider the strategy of using the treaty-making process as a means to assert “prior” 
sovereignty392.   
“Prior sovereignty” refers to the argument that antecedent to the invasion of 
the North American continent by the European powers, Indian communities 
exercised sovereignty over themselves and that, at least in the initial stages 
of contact, this sovereignty was formally recognized by the colonial powers 
via the treaty-making process.393  
 
Barker notes that the issues of territorial boundaries and jurisdiction were the primary 
subjects of such treaties.394  Oneida argues that Europeans recognized sovereignty of 
Indigenous populations within their own legal framework when they entered into treaties, 
established trading relationships and recognized “Indian right of occupancy”.395    This 
approach can utilize the vast and documented history of Indigenous-colonist relations to 
support an argument for pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty.   
 However, Corntassel & Primeau caution that there are problems with this 
approach.   First, they note that the argument is flawed to the extent that it relies upon 
treaty making as evidence of the international community’s collective acknowledgement 
of Indigenous peoples’ prior sovereignty.  The authors cite the maxim pacta sunt 
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servanda,396 which underlies all treaty law and refers to the obligation of parties to a 
treaty to carry out the terms of the treaty as binding and perform their obligations in good 
faith.397   If the international community sincerely recognized the legal force of treaty 
making and the prior sovereignty of Indigenous peoples, then there should have been 
some outrage or consequence in light of the settlers’ repeated failure to honour those 
treaties.  There was not. 
The lack of response on the part of the international community to the 
abrogation of these treaties should speak volumes as to the status of 
indigenous populations within the Community of “civilized” nations at that 
time.  
… 
The fact that pacta sunt servanda was not adhered to by the colonial powers in 
their dealings with indigenous groups does much to undermine the central 
premise of the strategy advocating the “trail of broken treaties” as a means of 
reclaiming “prior sovereignty”. 398   
 
Secondly, Corntassel & Primeau note that the prior sovereignty argument is not an 
inclusive one as there are a vast number of Indigenous groups that were not invited to 
participate in the treaty-making process.399   For many other Indigenous peoples’, the 
process of treaty making became nothing more than a process of rubber-stamping their 
relocation to reserves.400   The authors conclude:  
A treaty-based approach is legally questionable and ultimately has limited 
applicability – it addresses the situation of a small minority of the world’s 
indigenous populations, and could only exacerbate an already nearly 
intractable state-centric system.401 
 
Even where treaties do exist, there continues to be on-going disputes regarding their 
interpretation and enforceability.  
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b)  Prior Sovereignty As Evidenced by Lack of Treaty 
There are also some Indigenous nations who can point to a long trail of historical 
documents asserting their nationhood and their legal right to sovereign control over their 
territories.   In 1997, the Lil’wat Nation (also known as the Lillooet Tribe) sought 
membership into the United Nations asserting that “we have not signed any treaties or 
have not been conquered in warfare thus our title and rights to the land have not been 
extinguished.”402  They also assert that the Canadian government does not represent their 
people nor is it able to speak on their behalf.  In support of their application, the Lil’wat 
Nation attached “The Declaration of the Lillooet Tribe”, signed by their Ancestral Chiefs 
on May 10th, 1911 which read: 
STATEMENT OF REAFFIRMATION OF THE 1911 LILLOOET TRIBAL 
DECLATION403 
WE, THE SOVEREIGN STL’ATL’IMX NATION do in our name and the 
name of our fore-bearers affirm and reaffirm the May 10, 1911 Lillooet 
Declaration. We speak the truth, and we speak for our whole people from 
ancient time to the times yet uncounted. 
WE, REAFFIRM that as a People we are the Rightful owners of our land 
which has been our home since time immemorial.  It is our duty as a people 
to respect and live with our brothers the fish, bear, deer, wolf, raven, eagle, 
and the others among our brothers. We are bound by our Stl’atl’imx laws, 
to respect and live with the trees and other plants of our land. We are bound 
to protect and use well those things in nature which have been given in our 
trust. 
WE REAFFIRM that as a People we have a duty to ourselves to protect, 
defend, comfort and care for the well-being of all our generations past, 
present and future. We declare that we are and intend to remain 
economically, culturally, socially, linguistically, spiritually, self-
determined. 
WE REAFFIRM that as a sovereign people, we are obligated to ensure only 
one system of government in our original title to Stl’atl’imx territory waters 
and resources. As a People, we accept the duty to ensure the common well 
being of our Nation and reaffirm our inherent right to govern ourselves in 
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accordance with our traditional institutions and customs and law in so 
doing, to promote and defend our right to survive as a People. 
WE REAFFIRM that as a People we seek peaceful and friendly relations 
with our neighbours and peoples throughout the world. It is our duty to 
perfect all of our relations on the basis of sovereign equality. 
IN THE NAME OF OUR GRANDFATHERS AND GENERATIONS OF 
STL’ATL’IMX YET UNBORN, WE DECLARE OUR SOLEMN 
COMMITMENT TO THESE PRINCIPLES AND TO WHATEVER 
COLLECTIVE ACTION MAY BE NEEDED TO DEFEND THEM.404 
 
Notably, the Lil’wat Nation’s declaration not only asserts sovereignty but also includes a 
corresponding description of the duties that a sovereign nation must abide by under 
Stl’atl’imx laws.   Explicit in this declaration is the assertion that sovereignty is 
correlated with duties and obligations to the environment and peaceful relations with all 
people and all species.   
In a letter dated August 25, 1910 to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, then Prime Minister of 
Canada, the Chiefs of the Shushwap, Okanagan and Couteau Tribes of British Columbia 
outlined the history of their relations with the white settlers and demanded justice be 
done. 
[The whites] say there are no lines, except what they make. They have taken 
possession of all the Indian country and claim it as their own. Just the same 
as taking the “house” or “ranch” and, therefore, the life of every Indian tribe 
into their possession. They have never consulted us in any of these matters, 
nor made any agreement, “nor” signed “any” papers with us.  They ‘have 
stolen our lands and everything on them’ and continue to use ‘same’ for 
their ‘own’ purposes.  They treat us as less than children and allow us ‘no 
say’ in anything.  They say the Indians know nothing, and own nothing, yet 
their power and wealth has come from our belongings.  The queen’s law 
which we believed guaranteed us our rights, the B.C. government has 
trampled underfoot.  This is how our guests have treated us – the brothers 
we received hospitably in our house.405 
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The Declaration of the Tahltan Tribe (October 18, 1910) also claims “the sovereign right 
to all the country of our tribes” on the basis that no agreement or treaty was ever made 
with their peoples.406  One hundred years later and there are still no treaties with these 
peoples.  Instead, Indigenous peoples in British Columbia and elsewhere have endured 
and survived aggressive assimilation policies, which included forcibly removing children 
from their families and placing them in residential schools and prohibiting Indigenous 
languages and cultural practices.407  In this context, the evolution of Western sovereignty 
took place as one part of a comprehensive policy of ethnocide despite repeated and 
sophisticated appeals to justice.  
c)  Limitations & Challenges of the Historical Sovereignty Approach 
Despite the historical documentary evidence and appeals to justice, claims to 
sovereignty by Indigenous groups face major limitations to these arguments in 
international law.  The doctrine of sovereignty is deeply embedded in international law 
and, even in an era of post-colonialism, recognition of new states is rare.  Anaya asserts 
that claims for Indigenous autonomy within the historical sovereignty approach are 
limited by three principles of international law. 408    First, the doctrine of intertemporal 
law requires that historical events be judged according to the law in effect at the time of 
their occurrence.  This is problematic to the extent that the doctrines of conquest and 
effective occupation were accepted legal tools during the perpetuation of colonialism.  
Second, the principle of recognition in international law assumes a state’s entitlement to 
sovereignty “when a preponderance of states, international organizations, and other 
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relevant international actors recognize a state’s boundaries and corresponding 
sovereignty over territory”.409  To the extent that the sovereignty of settler states is 
already recognized internationally there is no tendency to question whether the territory 
was lawfully acquired.  Third, Anaya cites the “normative trend within international legal 
process toward stability through pragmatism over instability.”410   Anaya asserts that 
together, these three limitations pose a potentially insurmountable barrier to claims for 
Indigenous sovereignty within international law. 
In addition to the limitations set out be Anaya above, there are practical barriers in 
the pursuit of sovereignty, including (i) a peoples’ capacity to govern themselves and (ii) 
the ever-present potential for assimilation. 
i) Capacity for Governance 
Indigenous sovereignty requires not only an assertion of sovereignty, but also the 
ability to act effectively in the capacity of a sovereign nation.   RB Porter contends that 
Indigenous sovereignty is comprised of three facets:  “(i) the degree to which Indians 
believe in the right to define their own future, (ii) the degree to which Indians have the 
ability to carry out those beliefs, and (iii) the degree to which tribal sovereign acts are 
recognized both within the tribe and by the outside world.”411  RB Porter contends that 
the quest for sovereignty is limited by rampant tribal government dysfunction including 
“poor administration, dependence and infighting”.412  Each of these factors impacts upon 
Indigenous peoples’ ability to act with authority as a sovereign nation.  The current 
challenges faced by Indigenous peoples to govern themselves are a direct result of years 
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of cultural oppression living under colonial rule.  Modern-day tribal governments have 
little resemblance to traditional Indigenous institutions and face the onerous task of 
uniting fragmented communities, which have endured years of aggressive assimilation:   
Quite literally, if a tribal community is comprised of people who were raised 
in traditional way, speak the native language, and practice the traditional 
religion, then the tribal members who were educated in the missionary 
school, know little of the traditional culture, and live an assimilated lifestyle 
might as well be from another planet.  It is hard to imagine a greater chasm 
of identity between people all professing to be living together in the same 
community.  It is against this backdrop that tribal government must function.  
The mechanism set in place to channel the passion and power of our 
increasingly diverse communities – our governments – is wholly inadequate 
to meet the challenges of our modern tribal nations.413  
 
Claims for Indigenous sovereignty can be undermined if effective and unified tribal 
governments do not accompany them.  RB Porter contends that effective internal 
governance structures are a critical part of a strategic claim for sovereignty.  This does 
not mean that Indigenous peoples need to agree all the time in order to be seen as 
effective, but he asserts that “we should be able to find a way for all of our members to 
agree as to the process by which we govern ourselves.  Only when we have all of our 
people working together will be able to maximize our sovereign potential, and thus allow 
our future generations to survive.”414   RB Porter places particular importance on the role 
of tribal laws and dispute resolution mechanisms to the realization of sovereignty:   
… sovereignty means that the Indians themselves must resolve their own 
problems and manage their own affairs.  The first step in that process is for 
Indian nations to realize that the tribal dispute resolution mechanism has 
everything to do with how tribal members interact with one another, how 
capable they are of working with each other on common endeavors, and 
thus, how strong their families, clans, communities, and nations will be.415 
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 Throughout this literature review, there has been surprisingly little attention paid 
to what sovereignty would actually look like given that Indigenous nations are situated 
within internationally recognized sovereign states.  Christie provides several examples of 
what state-to-state relations sharing geographic territory could look like416 and several 
scholars provide insight into strategies for obtaining sovereignty but overall, there is very 
little attention paid to the pragmatics of governance when sovereignty is actually 
obtained. An emerging issue is whether the citizens of sovereign Indigenous nations 
would lose the protection of civil liberties embedded within the settler state’s 
constitutions.417 The loss of constitutional rights such as the freedom of expression would 
be particularly threatening in communities divided by tribal family politics. 
ii) Sovereignty and Auto-colonization 
 
 Perhaps the most provocative challenge to sovereignty claims predicated upon 
international law is the vocal criticism from Indigenous scholars and leaders that the 
perpetuation of Western legal concepts and institutions is a dangerous form of self-
assimilation.    RO Porter describes “auto-colonization” as “the process by which 
colonized people may adopt and engage in behaviors that are rooted in the policies of the 
colonizing nation but which are rationalized as one’s own.”418  Indigenous political 
leaders are also susceptible to corruption and neo-colonialism.  According to Adams, 
neo-colonialism occurs when the privileged governing elite within an Indigenous nation 
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are given benefits by the settler state “in return for their help in pacifying the 
majority.”419  
Alfred contends that the quest for sovereignty is a red herring that merely leads to 
further integration with the colonial agenda. He argues that the state has created 
“incentives for integration” by offering token financial contributions and inconsequential 
measures of self-administration.420 Alfred asserts that Western concepts of power are 
ultimately incompatible with Indigenous epistemology and values, and cites Boldt & 
Long for the proposition that the “endorsement of hierarchical authority and a ruling 
entity constitutes a complete rupture with traditional indigenous principles.” 421  Alfred 
observes: 
Traditional indigenous nationhood stands in sharp contrast to the dominant 
understanding of “the state”: there is no absolute authority, no coercive 
enforcement of decisions, no hierarchy, and no separate ruling entity. In 
accepting the idea that progress is attainable within the framework of the 
state, therefore, indigenous people are moving towards acceptance of forms 
of government that more closely resemble the state than traditional 
systems.422    
 
Alfred contends that a claim to sovereignty can unintentionally lead to Indigenous 
peoples framing their political goals with reference to Western ideals and “the common 
criteria of statehood – coercive force, control of territory, population numbers, 
international recognition – come to dominate discussion of Indigenous peoples’ political 
goals as well.”423  The state readily exploits these  “theoretical inconsistencies”.424   
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Alfred concludes that up till recently, sovereignty has been an effective vehicle for 
critiques of colonialism but that ultimately Indigenous emancipation is best served by 
undermining the “myth of state sovereignty”.425   
 
3.2.3 Transcending/Reclaiming Sovereignty 
 
Sovereignty carries the horrible stench of colonialism.426 
Joanne Barker, Lenape 
 
Alfred, Corntassel, Barker and others have strongly argued that the quest for 
sovereignty is not only inconsistent with Indigenous values but also a major obstacle in 
the struggle for decolonisation.427  These scholars contend that once you engage the 
epistemological roots of sovereignty it becomes apparent that there is no way to engage 
sovereignty without perpetuating the colonial machine.  Correlated as it is with 
assumptions of entitlement, domination, hierarchical authority and control over territory, 
Western sovereignty undermines and effectively oppresses Indigenous epistemologies 
and traditional Indigenous relationships with the natural world.428  It operates to limit the 
way Indigenous peoples are able to think about themselves.429  Barker explains: 
… translating indigenous epistemologies about law, governance, and culture 
through the discursive rubric of sovereignty was and is problematic. 
Sovereignty as a discourse is unable to capture fully the indigenous 
meanings, perspectives, and identities about law, governance, and culture, 
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and thus over time it impacts how those epistemologies and perspectives are 
represented and understood.”430  
 Indigenous identity then becomes defined in reaction to colonialism and the quest for 
sovereignty becomes a quest to be accommodated “within a ‘legitimate’ framework of 
settler state governance.”431   
Alfred cautions that it is dangerous to assume that sovereignty is an appropriate 
political objective or model for governance for Indigenous peoples.432   
… sovereignty is an exclusionary concept rooted in an adversarial and 
coercive Western notion of power. Indigenous peoples can never match the 
awesome coercive force of the state; so long as sovereignty remains the goal 
of indigenous politics, therefore, Native communities will occupy a dependent 
and reactionary position relative to the state. Acceptance of “Aboriginal 
rights” in the context of state sovereignty represents the culmination of the 
white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples.433 
 
Alfred calls for a rejection of the concept of “indigenous sovereignty” and argues that 
“[t]he next phase of scholarship and activism … will need to transcend the mentality that 
supports the colonization of indigenous nations…”.434  He also calls upon people 
committed to transcending colonialism “to de-think the concept of sovereignty and 
replace it with a notion of power that has as its root a more appropriate premise.”435 
Alfred & Corntassel assert that: 
As Indigenous peoples, the way to recovering freedom and power and 
happiness is clear: it is time for each one of us to make the commitment to 
transcend colonialism as people, and for us to work together as peoples to 
become forces of Indigenous truth against the lie of colonialism. We do not 
need to wait for the colonizer to provide us with money or validate our 
vision of a free future; we only need to start to use our Indigenous languages 
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to frame our thoughts, the ethical framework of our philosophies to make 
the decision to use our laws and institutions to govern ourselves.436 
 
At the same time, RO Porter asserts that there is also an imperative to protect and defend 
Indigenous sovereignty as the loss of sovereignty can lead to the extinction of distinct 
Indigenous peoples.437  Porter cautions that the stakes are high and that how Indigenous 
groups strategically engage sovereignty requires careful consideration to overcome to 
challenges posed by “auto-colonization” and limited resources.438   The challenge then is 
to continue to defend Indigenous sovereignty while simultaneously disengaging from 
European-derived notions of sovereignty and power.  
There are two clear voices in Indigenous scholarships: one that calls for a 
rejection of sovereignty while the other demands that Indigenous peoples engage the “S 
word”439 as a matter of survival and cultural integrity.  Semantics becomes critical to 
reconciling these two voices.  As Corntassel & Primeau assert, Indigenous discourse 
regarding sovereignty may actually already captured by the notion of “cultural integrity” 
as that is already well-defined within international law.440  Anaya observes that the 
international right to “self-determination” is a distinct concept from statehood and a more 
appropriate objective for Indigenous peoples: 
… a U.N. study has concluded … “ … Self-determination, in its many 
forms, is thus a basic pre-condition if indigenous peoples are to be able to 
enjoy their fundamental rights and determining their future, while at the 
same time preserving, developing and passing on their specific ethnic 
identity to future generations.”  
… 
In my view, self-determination should not be equated with a right to 
independent statehood. Under a human rights approach, the concept of self-
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determination is capable of embracing much more nuanced interpretations 
and applications, particularly in an increasingly interdependent world in 
which the formal attributes of statehood mean less and less.  Self-
determination may be understood as a right of cultural groupings to the 
political institutions necessary to allow them to exist and develop according 
to their distinctive characteristics.441  
 
Corntassel & Primeau cite Anaya for the proposition that Indigenous peoples can 
strategically achieve cultural integrity by invoking the existing international human rights 
treaties.442    However, Corntassel & Primeau also contend that “calls for self-
determination, for an absolute right to self-identification, and for sovereignty only 
exacerbate tensions between indigenous groups and states.”443   In this context, it would 
appear that Anaya and Corntassel & Primeau have diverging understandings of self-
determination but all agree upon adopting a human rights approach to ensuring cultural 
integrity.  It becomes increasingly necessary to define these terms clearly to ensure a 
unified and consistent approach.  
A human rights approach to ensuring cultural integrity is more palatable than 
sovereignty claims for several reasons: (i) it allows Indigenous peoples to disengage from 
colonial values associated with sovereignty, which undermine Indigenous epistemologies 
and identity; (ii) it will be more successful than asserting sovereignty through a treaty-
based approach which must contend with the constraints enumerated by Anaya, namely, 
intertemporality of international law, the lack of recognition and international tendencies 
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towards stability;444 and (ii) it allows for a radically inclusive strategy “which is 
accessible to all indigenous populations”445 
It is difficult to imagine a rational justification for a Western tradition of 
sovereignty in a truly post-colonial world.   The global community has repeatedly 
affirmed its commitment to the elimination of colonialism in all its forms.446 However, all 
indications are that the doctrine of sovereignty is still deeply entrenched in international 
law.447   Alfred suggests that the challenge “in building appropriate postcolonial 
governing systems is to disconnect the notion of sovereignty from its Western legal roots 
and transform it.”448   
3.3 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have undertaken a literature review of Indigenous peoples’ 
experiences and perspectives of sovereignty in order to identify some of the alternate 
narratives and strategies that exist regarding sovereignty.  At its core, sovereignty has 
evolved within the Western legal tradition as an instrument of power over Indigenous 
peoples, territories and resources.  Indigenous peoples have found themselves defined by 
this narrow and often-violent conception of power, which, at its heart, is contrary to 
Indigenous peoples’ values and epistemologies.   This has made it difficult for Indigenous 
peoples to engage or assert Western sovereignty without also experiencing a form of 
epistemological assimilation.  By engaging with the full spectrum of Indigenous 
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discourse regarding sovereignty, a process of cultural and epistemological reclamation 
can also occur.  An articulated vision of Indigenous sovereignty can ultimately allow for 
the possibility of genuine social and legal reconciliation. 
Applying Critical Race Theory, the alternate narratives provided by Indigenous 
leaders, activists and scholars challenge “the myths of neutrality and objectivity” that 
surround the doctrine of sovereignty in international law. 449  It also demonstrates how its 
use within international water law invokes conflict and confrontation between states and 
Indigenous peoples on several levels: politically, culturally and philosophically.   The 
conflict found in sovereignty discourse is ultimately a conflict of values about power and 
how to live and relate to others.  A review of Indigenous scholarship reveals key values 
within Indigenous epistemology, such as the “partnership principle”,450 the 
interconnectedness of all living things, the importance of mutual respect and the value of 
cultivating  “inner space”451 to achieve harmony and balance. 
While themes emerge regarding core Indigenous values that provide insights 
regarding Indigenous sovereignty, the literature review also reveals a plurality of 
Indigenous perspectives regarding strategies for engaging Western legal sovereignty.  
Arguably, this observation is in itself part of the process of decolonizing the debate by 
shattering assumptions that Indigenous peoples share a universal or homogenous 
relationship with sovereignty.  There is considerable debate about how Indigenous 
peoples should go about emancipating themselves from the oppressive effects of Western 
legal sovereignty.  While some Indigenous scholars prefer to engage inherent sovereignty 
as a culturally derived phenomenon rooted in language, cultural identity and spirituality, 
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others strategize on how to achieve sovereign status within a transformed Western legal 
paradigm.  Some Indigenous leaders emphasize the importance of reclaiming sovereignty 
by redefining it at an intellectual level.  Others focus on the pragmatic political and legal 
challenges of reconciling state sovereignty with Indigenous sovereignty.  Some activists 
insist that engaging sovereignty discourse is essential to Indigenous peoples’ survival 
while others insist that emancipation is best achieved by disengaging entirely from 
imperialist values and the related sovereign discourse.   There is no clear consensus or 
strategy within Indigenous scholarship and there continues to be disagreement regarding 
the differences between key definitions such as sovereignty, cultural integrity and self-
determination.  This is not surprising given that the discourse on Indigenous sovereignty, 
while rich and diverse, is still an emerging and evolving field of inquiry.452     
At their root, all of these approaches and perspectives are aimed at reclaiming 
Indigenous sovereignty and redefining Indigenous-settler relations.  It is not within the 
scope of this paper to resolve or comment upon any of these competing and complex 
theories or strategies.  Rather the purpose of this chapter has been to allow the current 
narratives regarding Indigenous sovereignty to provide an emerging counterpoint to the 
dominant legal discourse in order to demonstrate that sovereignty is ultimately a man-
made construct. Once we acknowledge sovereignty as a “social creation” [Alfred], we 
can undertake to (re)construct new laws in a manner that no longer legitimizes the 
domination of imperialist values over Indigenous values.  
In this thesis, I have set out to examine the intersecting relationship between 
international water law, the doctrine of sovereignty and Indigenous peoples.  By 
understanding Indigenous perspectives regarding the doctrine of sovereignty, it becomes 
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apparent how the invocation of sovereign status in the UN Watercourse Convention, to 
the exclusion of Indigenous nations, only serves to perpetuate the domination of states 
over Indigenous peoples.   It also serves to reinforce and legitimize imperialist values and 
encourage states’ domination and exploitation of territories and resources at the expense 
of others.   In the next chapter, I contend that legal reform of the UN Watercourse 
Convention is required to create an international law of transboundary rivers that allows 
for the inclusion of Indigenous values.  I maintain that it is possible to envision an 
international water law that disengages from the politics of sovereignty – at least on a 
‘without prejudice’ basis – such that Indigenous peoples can engage in international 
water law discourse as full participants without any state or peoples being required to 
sacrifice their perspectives on sovereignty. 
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Chapter 4:  Transcending Sovereignty: Reconstructing the International Law of 
Transboundary Rivers 
 
The law is not a still pool merely to be tended and occasionally skimmed of 
accumulated debris, rather it should be looked upon as a running stream, 
carrying society’s hopes, and reflecting all its values, and hence requiring 
constant attention to its tributaries, the social and other sciences, to see that 
they feed in sustaining elements.453 
 
Former Chief Justice Bora Laskin, Supreme Court of Canada 
 
It is no longer possible to maintain the legitimacy of the premise that there 
is only one right way to see and do things.454 
 
Taiaiake Alfred, Mohawk 
 
A deconstruction of the historical doctrine of sovereignty and the UN 
Watercourse Convention from a critical Indigenous perspective reveals how sovereignty 
has evolved within Western legal thought to exclude Indigenous peoples and dominate 
the environment and its resources.   Indigenous perspectives regarding sovereignty weave 
an alternate narrative that challenges the myth of objectivity, neutrality and power that 
currently surround the doctrine of sovereignty and international law generally.    State 
interests tend to focus upon the extraction and optimal utilization of natural resources.  
Western notions of sovereignty have been historically aligned with conquest, domination 
and exploitation of the natural environment.  Given the growing scarcity of fresh water 
and its importance to all peoples, it is no longer reasonable to assume that states are 
willing or capable of managing such a precious resource over the long term for current 
and future generations.  Indeed, many scholars have suggested that the complexity of the 
issues confronting shared water security requires a radically inclusive approach to water 
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law and governance.455  Blanket acceptance of the supremacy of state sovereignty and 
state values over the experience and knowledge of Indigenous peoples no longer carries 
moral legitimacy.    
The application of Critical Race Theory to transboundary water laws involves a 
deconstruction of the legal principles involved and an account of how these laws have 
systemically excluded Indigenous peoples. It also requires a reconstruction of the law in a 
manner that remedies that injustice.  The question then is how to strategize towards the 
reform of international water law in such a way that it is inclusive of Indigenous peoples 
and their traditional laws regarding water governance. The first challenge is to overcome 
the assumption that international law is not flexible enough to recognize the pre-existing 
rights of Indigenous peoples. 
The UN Watercourse Convention is concerned only with state interests and 
governs the agreements between sovereigns.   On the surface, this appears reasonable 
given that international law was founded upon the premise that it is comprised of the 
rules that govern state relations.456  However, international law has evolved to recognize 
the international rights of non-state actors.457  Since World War II, there has been 
growing acceptance among states that the doctrine of sovereignty is not paramount where 
issues of human rights are concerned.458  International human rights law has evolved 
rapidly in recent decades to place checks upon unfettered state interests and to challenge 
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the limits of absolute territorial sovereignty.459   Likewise, the rights of Indigenous 
peoples in international law has been evolving over the last century to ensure the 
protection of the worlds’ most vulnerable and marginalized populations against 
exploitation by the state. Notably, international laws protecting human rights and 
Indigenous peoples are supported by the majority of sovereigns and reflect the evolving 
and emerging values of the global community.   I contend that the international law of 
transboundary rivers requires critical scrutiny and reconciliation with the affirmed rights 
of Indigenous peoples in international law. 
In this chapter, I consider the benefits and constraints of pursuing legal reform 
using a “human rights approach”460 to assert Indigenous peoples’ rights in international 
water law.  I will then provide a brief overview of international instruments that affirm 
Indigenous peoples’ rights and specifically their right to participate in decision-making 
regarding water.   I will then consider several potential avenues for the legal 
reconstruction of international water law. Ultimately, the process of reconstruction must 
include the meaningful participation and consensus of Indigenous peoples.   This chapter 
concludes with a call for further analysis and development of strategic approaches to 
reconstructing international water law in such a way that is inclusive of existing 
international Indigenous rights. 
4.1 Asserting International Indigenous Rights:  Methodology for Reform 
How does one transcend the historical doctrine of sovereignty in international 
water law and thereby recognize the rights Indigenous peoples’ who have traditionally 
been excluded from the evolution of international water law?  Arguably, the key to 
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shifting the discourse away from the doctrine of sovereignty in international water law 
lies within international Indigenous legal theory and methodology. Indigenous scholars 
have historically struggled with the entrenchment of the doctrine of sovereignty in 
international law and yet have succeeded in persuading the vast majority of sovereign 
states to support, at least in theory, their claims for Indigenous peoples’ rights within 
international law.  Over the last 90 years, numerous international instruments have 
integrated Indigenous values and affirmed Indigenous peoples’ rights to self-
determination, cultural integrity and the right to participate in environmental decision-
making.461 A review of international law of Indigenous peoples and international human 
rights law demonstrates that the international legal system is flexible enough to recognize 
the rights of non-state actors and provides a methodology for the legal reform of the 
international water law.    
Anaya is cautiously optimistic in his analysis of Indigenous peoples’ success in 
international law: 
Although the words, “all peoples have the right to self-determination” have 
made their way into the texts of major multilateral treaties, international law 
has yet to clearly embrace claims for political autonomy beyond the context 
of classical colonialism.  Still the affirmation of self-determination of 
peoples has provided a wedge for ethnic autonomy claims to make their way 
prominently into contemporary international legal and political discourse.462  
 
Anaya identifies two approaches to Indigenous claims for autonomy in international law: 
the historical sovereignty approach and the human rights approach.  Under the historical 
sovereignty approach, Indigenous peoples assert self-determination in an effort to 
reclaim “sovereignty” as it is understood within the Western legal paradigm (ie “a world 
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divided into territorially defined, independent or ‘sovereign’ states”).463 Anaya rejects 
this approach outright as imposing insurmountable “tensions upon the institutional 
framework of international law.”464 As previously discussed in Chapter 3 above, Anaya 
observes several practical constraints of such an approach, namely the doctrine of 
intertemporal law, the principle of recognition, and the tendency towards stability 
through pragmatism.465   
 The second approach is the human rights approach, which will be the subject of 
this chapter.  Under this approach, “self-determination is not linked fundamentally to 
historically derived ‘sovereign’ entities”.466  Instead, Indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination arises from international human rights law and is “derived from notions of 
freedom, equality, and peace.”467  Anaya contends that ethnic autonomy is more likely to 
be achieved on human rights grounds and concludes that claims for independent 
statehood should be avoided.468  He observes that: 
… international law has not much upheld sovereignty principles when they 
serve as an accomplice to the subjugation of human rights or act as a shield 
against international concern that coalesces to promote human values.469 
 
On this analysis, it will be more effective to approach the legal reform of international 
water law by identifying and reflecting upon the human values upon which transboundary 
water law is founded.  States’ interests will inevitably be constrained to the extent that 
they are contrary or inconsistent with the preservation of human life. 
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Corntassel & Primeau also advocate a departure from engaging traditionally 
Western ideas regarding sovereignty and instead promote the development of strategies 
based on human rights law.470  They argue that, “calls for self-determination, for an 
absolute right to self-identification, and for sovereignty only exacerbate tensions between 
indigenous groups and states.”471    Instead they call for strategies that do “not threaten 
the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of a majority of states in the international 
system.”472  The authors contend that international human rights law has already been 
sufficiently developed to protect the autonomy of Indigenous peoples.473  Basic reforms 
are required to recognize these rights. 
In a joint statement to the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples regarding a study on Indigenous peoples’ right to participate in decision-making, 
Indigenous representatives made the following recommendation: 
Human rights-based approach. It is essential to incorporate a human rights 
based approach in such forums and processes, consistent with international 
human rights law. In this context, many processes addressing environment 
and development issues are in need of basic reforms.474 
 
While sufficient rights may already exist within human rights law to protect Indigenous 
peoples’ interests, at issue in this paper is how to ensure that international water law is 
reconciled with the existing body of human rights laws.  Is it possible to reconstruct 
international water law in a manner that recognizes Indigenous peoples’ rights? 
In The Individual in the International Legal System (2011), Kate Parlett 
undertakes an expansive historical review of the international legal system, including the 
                                                 
470
 Corntassel & Primeau, supra note 10. 
471
 Ibid at 55. 
472
 Ibid at 53. 
473
 Ibid at 54.  
474
 Gabriel, supra note 14.  
  
131
evolution of international human rights laws, with the objective of dispelling “myths 
about state-centrism” 475 and understanding the mechanics of how the international legal 
system has evolved to recognize the rights of non-state actors. While her research focuses 
upon individuals rather than Indigenous peoples, her observations regarding the 
flexibility of the international legal system to affirm the international rights of non-state 
actors is informative. Specifically, she offers three reflections regarding the potential for 
“structural transition in the international legal system”, 476 which can provide guidance in 
developing a methodology for pursuing rights for Indigenous peoples. She comments 
upon the following themes: (a) the “relative openness and flexibility of the system” (b) 
the “forces for structural change: solutions above theories”; and (c) “states in the 
international legal system”.477  Each of these observations is summarized briefly below.  
Relative openness and flexibility of the system478 
Upon tracing the history and mechanics of the emergence of individual rights in the 
international legal system, Parlett concludes, “[s]tructurally the international legal system 
is now open to any entity on whom rights, obligations and capacities to function and 
participate are conferred.”479  Parlett provides several historical examples of the 
recognition of the rights of non-state actors within the international system and observes:  
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The particular solutions were creative at the time, given that they were not 
consistent with the traditional conception of international law as the law 
applicable to inter-state relations.  These examples and others demonstrate 
that the international legal system has been used to serve changing needs 
without being constrained by the established understanding of the limits of the 
international legal framework.480 
 
Parlett concludes that it is not contrary to international law to pursue international rights 
for non-state actors. 
Forces for structural change: solutions above theories481 
Parlett’s second observation is that change to the international legal system has 
not been brought about through reference to theoretical frameworks or historical 
injustices.  She observes that: 
… the international legal system has experienced structural transition as a 
result of the need to manage and address practical problems rather than 
resulting from any deliberate attempt to effect a structural transformation. The 
international legal system does not appear to be developing along a smooth 
trajectory from a state-centric international law to a more inclusive 
international legal system.  The picture which emerges is rather that states 
manage practical questions as they arise by adaptation of the international 
legal system, and as a result of those practical solutions the international legal 
system may be transformed.482  
 
While theorizing is useful for making arguments that the international system 
should change, Parlett’s analysis suggests that change to the international system is 
more likely to occur by confronting states with the practical issues complicating 
transboundary water governance and by demanding creative and collaborative 
solutions to complex problems. 
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States in the international legal system483 
Finally, Parlett observes that, despite the emergence of rights for non-state actors, 
the international legal system continues to remain dominated by sovereign states.  From 
this state-centric perspective, rights are “conferred” onto individuals and other non-state 
entities by state agreement and there continue to be systemic limits that ensure that the 
international legal system remains within the control of sovereigns.484  The post-1945 
international legal system is therefore flexible enough to allow for the creation of rights 
for non-state actors but it is ultimately constrained by the process of agreement and the 
granting of such rights by sovereign states.  Parlett concludes,  
While it is increasingly common for individuals to be given rights and 
obligations … the conferral of rights and obligations has been exclusively 
dependent on the consent of states. … Where rights are conferred by treaty, 
they are created by the state parties to the treaty. Where rights are created by 
customary international law, that custom is the consequence of state practice – 
or at least failure of states to persistently object to the formation of a 
customary rule.  And while certain rules in the field of human rights have 
claim to jus cogens status, they have originated in a rule agreed to or 
acquiesced in by states.485 
 
Parlett further cautions: 
The conferral of rights and obligations on individuals might, on one view, be 
seen as a move away from a state-dominated international legal system. But 
another view might be that the conferral of rights and obligations on 
individuals –which is exclusively controlled by states – actually reinforces the 
dominant position of states in the international legal system, to an extent 
which might not have been possible without some concessions or participatory 
rights granted to individuals.486 
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The ability to affect reform of and access to international water law therefore remains 
dependent upon state consent within a state-dominated system and to that extent, 
Indigenous peoples remain subordinated by the doctrine of sovereignty.487   
 In “Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations”, 
Patrick Macklem reviews the evolution of Indigenous peoples rights in international law 
over the last 100 years and the relationship between international Indigenous rights and 
the doctrine of sovereignty.488  He offers his observations regarding “the legal 
requirements of indigenous recognition in international law, the relation between legal 
recognition of States and legal recognition of indigenous peoples, and the nature and 
purpose of international indigenous rights.”489  Macklem observes that, unlike recognition 
of individuals in international law, recognition of Indigenous peoples and tribal 
communities has evolved in direct response to their historic exclusion from imperialist 
definitions of sovereignty that have formed the basis of the international legal order.   He 
notes that: 
… the process of sovereign exclusion and inclusion is not a one-shot affair, 
occurring some time in the distant past when international law accepted the 
proposition that indigenous territory constituted terra nullius.  It is an ongoing 
process of exclusion and inclusion to the extent that it continues to subsume 
indigenous populations under the sovereign power of States not of their 
making.490 
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Upon reviewing the evolution of Indigenous rights over the last century, Macklem 
contends that “[d]etermining the criteria for legal recognition of Indigenous peoples 
requires taking an interpretive stand on the nature and purpose of international indigenous 
rights themselves.”491  One interpretation is that the purpose of international Indigenous 
rights is to remove the existing barriers that prevent Indigenous peoples from enjoying 
the same human rights that all people enjoy, including the right to self-determination.  
Macklem concludes that we should resist the tendency to simply apply a universal human 
rights approach to Indigenous peoples’ rights. He states: 
What the legal history of international indigenous protection reveals is that 
indigenous rights in international law are differentiated rights that recognize 
differences, partly denied and partly produced by the international distribution 
of territorial sovereignty initiated by colonization, that exist between 
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.  International indigenous rights speak 
to the consequences of organizing international political reality, including 
indigenous political reality, into a legal system that vests sovereign power in 
certain collectivities and not others.  Not only does this mode of legal 
organization exclude indigenous peoples from participating in the distribution 
of sovereign power that it performs, it authorizes legal actors to whom it 
distributes sovereign power – States – to exercise such power over indigenous 
peoples and territory to their detriment.  The morally suspect foundations of 
these baseline legal entitlements are why indigenous rights merit recognition 
on the international legal register.  A failure to respect international 
indigenous rights in the words of Michael Reisman, “re-enacts the tragedy of 
colonialism”.492 
 
International Indigenous rights are not significant simply because of their appeal to 
universal human rights but also because Indigenous peoples are defined by an 
institutional legal system that was predicated upon their exclusion. Indigenous rights 
evolved to mitigate the adverse consequences of colonialism. Therefore, a failure to 
implement and recognize those rights perpetuates colonial domination and exploitation of 
Indigenous peoples.  Indigenous rights embody more than just an appeal to the 
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universality of human rights but also a commitment to “post-imperial values”.493 
Macklem describes the purpose of international Indigenous rights as follows:  
The twentieth-century legal history of international indigenous rights from 
their origins in international protection of indigenous workers in colonies to 
their contemporary expression in the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, demonstrates that their purpose is to mitigate injustices 
produced by the way in which the international legal order conceives of 
sovereignty as a legal entitlement that it distributes among collectivities that 
it recognizes as States.  The criteria by which indigenous peoples can be 
said to exist in international law relate to their historic exclusion from the 
distribution of sovereignty initiated by colonization that lies at the heart of 
the international legal order.494 
 
While Indigenous rights may be characterized as mitigating the adverse impacts of the 
distribution of sovereignty, they do not challenge the existing international legal system 
or strengthen Indigenous claims for sovereignty. If anything, the assertion of Indigenous 
rights requires the on-going recognition of the dominance and authority of states within 
international law.495   
Macklem’s and Partlett’s observations regarding the flexibility and constraints of 
the international legal system provide support for the argument that the best approach to 
affect reform is by invoking the current body of human rights and international 
Indigenous rights.  Rather than asserting sovereignty, the rights of non-state actors are 
more likely to be recognized by appealing to human values and by providing creative 
solutions to complex issues.  Parlett’s and Macklem’s historical analyses and 
                                                 
493
 See Alfred (2005), supra note 40 at 38 where Alfred states that the three post-imperial values include 
“consent, mutual recognition, and cultural continuity.”  
494
 Macklem, supra note 461 at 210 [emphasis added]. 
495
 However, if there are circumstances of colonizaion and oppression by the state, there is still a remedy of 
self-determination.  See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, (16 October 1975) ICJ 12, online: ICJ 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=69&case=61&code=sa&p3=4>. 
  
137
observations also point to the requirement of Indigenous peoples to acknowledge the 
continued dominance of states as “the crucial actors” in the international legal system.496 
The systemic constraints of the state-centred international legal system are not 
insurmountable.  There is ample precedent both within human rights law and the 
international law of Indigenous peoples that exemplify states’ willingness to 
acknowledge the international rights of Indigenous peoples.  Furthermore, international 
agencies are increasingly committed to the implementation of Indigenous peoples rights 
across the international legal system. The next section provides a brief overview of these 
precedents. 
 
4.2 Recognizing International Indigenous Rights: Precedents for Reform 
 
 
Over the last century, the majority of states have repeatedly affirmed Indigenous 
peoples’ rights in international law.  Macklem traces the emergence of international legal 
protection of Indigenous peoples back to the 1884 Berlin Conference on Africa at which 
imperial powers divided up Africa in an effort to reduce the tensions of competing claims 
of sovereignty.497  While simultaneously excluding Indigenous peoples from exercising 
sovereignty, there was also a parallel recognition that the sovereigns had a legal duty to 
protect the colonies under their control.   In 1919, this duty to protect Indigenous peoples 
was codified in the Covenant of the League of Nations as sovereigns undertook “to 
secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control”.498   The 
International Labour Organization undertook to establish guidelines regarding the 
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working conditions of Indigenous peoples as early as 1921.499  More recently, the United 
Nations recognized “discrimination against indigenous populations” when the U.N. Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
commissioned a study through Resolution 1589, to report upon the situation of 
Indigenous peoples globally.500  The study which resulted from Resolution 1589, the 
Martínez Cobo Report (1983), made several proposals and recommendations regarding 
the future of international Indigenous rights.501  Macklem identifies three 
recommendations of the report that are of particular significance: 
First, it proposed distinguishing between indigenous and non-indigenous 
communities on the basis of historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial times. … 
Second … [i]t noted “the widespread and open rejection by indigenous 
peoples of the concept of integration,” and argued that “[s]elf-determination, 
in its many forms, must be recognized as the basic precondition for the 
enjoyment by indigenous peoples of their fundamental rights and the 
determination of their own future.” 
Third, it recommended the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on indigenous 
rights as an interim step to the adoption of an international convention on the 
topic.502 
 
As a result of the Report’s recommendations, the Sub-Commission established the 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which began work on a draft declaration on 
the rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1985. Approximately 22 years later, UNDRIP was 
ratified by the UN General Assembly in 2007.  It is relevant to provide these historical 
milestones to help situate the ratification of UNDRIP and the other international 
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instruments discussed below within the century-long evolution of Indigenous rights and 
also as part of the longer term vision of an international convention on Indigenous 
peoples’ rights.   
While a thorough historical review of all international instruments that 
acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ rights is beyond the scope of this paper, I will briefly 
review several of the more prominent instruments below with particular attention paid to 
Indigenous peoples’ rights regarding water.503 Specifically, this section will consider 
Indigenous peoples’ right to water within the context of International Labour 
Organisation Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989 [ILO No 
169]504, UNDRIP, customary international law and norms, and the UN Declaration on the 
Human Right to Water.505 
4.2.1 ILO No 169 
 
ILO No 169 is a legally binding international instrument, which specifically 
addresses the rights of Indigenous and tribal peoples. As of January 2012, 22 countries 
had ratified it.506  While ILO No 169 does not expressly reference water, it contains 
several provisions that recognize Indigenous peoples’ right to cultural integrity as well as 
land and resource rights.507  
Article 7 states: 
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1. The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the 
process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual 
well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, 
to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural 
development.  In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and 
regional development which may affect them directly. 
… 
4. Governments shall take measures, in co-operation with the peoples concerned, 
to protect and preserve the environment of the territories they inhabit. 
 
Article 15 reads: 
1. The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to 
their lands shall be specifically safeguarded. These rights include the right 
of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of 
these resources. 
 
Article 32 is particularly relevant within the context of transboundary water governance:  
Governments shall take appropriate measures, including by means of 
international agreements, to facilitate contacts and co-operation between 
indigenous and tribal peoples across borders, including activities in the 
economic, social, cultural, spiritual and environmental fields.   
 
Underlying all of the provisions of ILO No 169 is an emphasis on consultation with and 
participation by Indigenous peoples in an effort to “stimulate dialogue between 
governments and indigenous and tribal peoples”.508    While the Convention has only 
been ratified by 22 countries, the adoption of UNDRIP is perceived as exemplifying the 
broader acceptance of the principles underlying ILO No 169.509 Getches observes that 
there is an argument for the extension of ILO No 169 to all states as it reflects emerging 
“customary international law’s recognition of indigenous peoples’ property rights in 
natural resources that they have traditionally used”.510   
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4.2.2 UNDRIP  
 
UNDRIP was initially adopted on September 13, 2007 with 144 countries in favour, 
4 countries voting against and 11 countries abstaining.511  While numerous provisions of 
the Declaration affirm an indirect right to water incidental to Indigenous peoples’ rights 
to cultural integrity and economic development, Articles 25 and 32(2) expressly affirm 
Indigenous Peoples’ rights to water.512 
 
Article 25 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other 
resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this 
regard. 
 
Article 32 (2) States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in 
order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any 
project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water 
or other resources.513 
 
In addition, Articles 26 and 29 specifically invoke States’ obligations regarding 
“protection of these lands, territories and resources” (art. 26) and “protection of the 
environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories or resources” (art. 
29).   Article 38 provides that “States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous 
peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve 
the ends of this Declaration.” 
 As a General Assembly resolution, adoption of UNDRIP does not generally 
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impose legally binding obligations upon states.514  However, through the process of 
implementation of UNDRIP, international agencies and states are strengthening the 
argument that the general principles set out in UNDRIP represent customary international 
law.  In addition, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has relied upon UNDRIP as 
persuasive evidence of state legal obligations to Indigenous peoples.515  Arguably, an 
argument for Indigenous peoples’ right to water can be made with reference to UNDRIP 
and many other international conventions. 
4.2.3 Customary International Law 
 
 In addition to these major instruments, Getches contends that Indigenous peoples’ 
rights may be derived from international customs found in both human rights laws and 
environmental laws. Getches observes: 
Based largely on the content of international human rights conventions and 
customs apart from domestic laws, John Alan Cohan argues that “the 
international community now regards indigenous peoples as having 
environmental rights that rise to the status of international norms” and that 
“because indigenous peoples’ way of life and very existence depends on their 
relationship with the land, their human rights are inextricable from 
environmental rights”.516 
 
Getches contends that customary international law can be invoked to support Indigenous 
peoples’ rights to water on several grounds, including (i) protection for Indigenous lands 
and resources; (iii) environmental protection; (iii) subsistence rights; (iv) cultural 
identity; (v) freedom from racial discrimination; and (vi) right to self-determination.517  
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For example, Getches points to Agenda 21 adopted at the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro as one example of 
international adoption of environmental standards that expressly includes the full 
engagement and participation of Indigenous peoples.518     
 The United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR)519 does not expressly refer to the right to water but it is reasonably 
inferred from affirmed cultural, economic and social rights. Article 1 states:  
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.  
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence.  
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, 
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Article 11 articulates “the right to share in efficient agrarian systems”, while Article 12 
includes “a right to a secure, healthy, and ecologically sound environment.”520  Arguably, 
all of these rights are contingent upon healthy water sources. 
 Principle 20 of the Vienna Declaration adopted by the 1993 United Nations World 
Conference on Human Rights specifically calls for the protection of the cultural integrity 
of Indigenous peoples.  Given the interconnectedness between Indigenous peoples’ 
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cultural and spiritual identities and their surrounding environment, states’ obligations to 
protect Indigenous peoples’ cultural integrity would include a prohibition against the 
depletion or contamination of Indigenous water sources.521 
 Getches also points to the rules and policies of international development 
agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank, to further argue that 
Indigenous rights have become accepted as international norms.522   Institutional support 
for the principles of UNDRIP exists throughout the UN system of government. The Inter-
Agency Support Group on Indigenous Peoples (IASG) was established to support the 
recommendations of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.523  
IASG’s 31 members include the I.L.O, the World Bank, the European Union, the World 
Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(SCBD).524  Its mandate has been expanded to support the implementation of Indigenous 
rights throughout the international system.   In 2007, the IASG adopted the following 
statement regarding UNDRIP: 
The Inter Agency Support Group on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues hails the 
adoption of the Declaration on the Rights on Indigenous Peoples by the 
General Assembly on 13 September 2007.  The Declaration sends out a clear 
message to the entire international community, reaffirming the human rights 
of the world’s indigenous peoples.  This landmark action of the United 
Nations bears political, legal, symbolic and moral significance, as well as 
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constituting a crucial opportunity for the UN System and other inter-
governmental organizations to critically reflect upon their engagement with 
indigenous peoples’ issues and, according to Article 42 of the Declaration, to 
promote respect for and full application of its provisions and follow-up its 
effectiveness.  The IASG pledges to advance the spirit and letter of the 
Declaration within our agencies’ mandates and to ensure that the Declaration 
becomes a living document throughout our work.525 
 
The vast majority of sovereigns and international agencies have indicated their 
commitment to the principles of UNDRIP and to their support of Indigenous peoples’ 
rights generally.    
While there are only a few express references to water in these international 
instruments, an Indigenous right to water can be reasonably inferred from several other 
rights that are contingent upon water. The United Nation’s recent affirmation of the 
human right to water provides further support for a reconstruction of international water 
law with reference to Indigenous peoples’ rights.526 
 
4.2.4 The Human Right to Water 
 
The UN General Assembly’s affirmation of a human right to water provides 
further legitimacy to a proposal for reconstructing transboundary water law with 
reference to human rights and in a manner that is inclusive of Indigenous peoples.527   On 
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July 28, 2010, the United Nations passed a general resolution, which declared that water 
is a human right; with 122 countries voting in its favour while 41 countries abstained.528   
Specifically, the resolution:   “[d]eclares the right to safe and clean drinking water and 
sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human 
rights.”  On October 1, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights Council (“HRC”) 
confirmed that the human right to water is legally binding and “justiciable”.529  The HRC 
confirmed that the right to water and sanitation is inextricably linked to the right to an 
adequate standard of living, which is already codified in many international human rights 
treaties, including the ICESCR.530  In doing so, the HRC clarified “the foundation for 
recognition of the right and the legal standards which apply.”531    
While some states have argued that the right to water is still ambiguous for the 
purposes of state implementation,532 General Comment No. 15 to the ICESCR (Nov. 
2002) provides substantive guidelines outlining state obligations and the steps to 
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implementing water rights.533 Specifically, General Comment No. 15 sets out the 
guidelines for state parties regarding the interpretation of the right to water under Article 
11 (the right to an adequate standard of living) and Article 12 (the right to health).534   As 
with all human rights, state parties have three obligations under the ICESCR:  
i)  Respect: “The obligation to respect requires that States parties 
refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to 
water.”535 
ii) Protect: “The obligation to protect requires State parties to prevent 
third parties from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to 
water. … The obligation includes, inter alia, adopting the necessary and 
effective legislative and other measures to restrain, for example, third parties 
from denying equal access to adequate water; and polluting and inequitably 
extracting from water resources, including natural sources, wells and other 
water distribution systems.”536  
iii) Fulfil: “The obligation to fulfil can be disaggregated into the 
obligations to facilitate, promote and provide. The obligation to facilitate 
requires the State to take positive measures to assist individuals and 
communities to enjoy the right. The obligation to promote obliges the State 
party to take steps to ensure that there is appropriate education concerning the 
hygienic use of water, protection of water sources and methods to minimize 
water wastage. States parties are also obliged to fulfil (provide) the right when 
individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize 
that right themselves by the means at their disposal.”537 
 
In addition, Article 16 of General Comment 15 provides specific guidance to states 
regarding their obligations to Indigenous peoples: “… State parties should take steps to 
ensure that: … (d) Indigenous peoples’ access to water resources on their ancestral lands 
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is protected from encroachment and unlawful pollution. States should provide resources 
for indigenous peoples to design, deliver and control their access to water.”538    
Most of the scholarship regarding an Indigenous right to water focuses on 
establishing remedies under international law for violations of international Indigenous 
rights that can not be remedied at the national level.  I contend that the international 
instruments that recognize Indigenous rights may also be relied upon to support a call for 
the reform and/or reconstruction of the existing body of international water law in a 
manner that recognizes Indigenous peoples’ rights.  While state consensus is required for 
the creation of new international instruments that recognize the inherent rights of 
Indigenous peoples, the evidence demonstrates that the vast majority of states and 
international agencies are ready to recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights within the 
context of transboundary water law.  
 
4.3 Implications for International Water Law: Proposals for Reconstruction  
 
Based on the methodology and precedents reviewed above, this chapter 
promulgates possible strategies for the reconstruction of transboundary water law in a 
manner that recognizes and implements the rights of Indigenous peoples in international 
law.  While theoretical arguments abound for challenging the moral legitimacy behind 
the doctrine of sovereignty, the practicalities of the international legal order call for a 
pragmatic approach to reform that does not directly challenge state sovereignty at this 
time.   
In my view, the reconstruction of international water law requires a legal 
reconciliation between two co-existing bodies of international law: transboundary water 
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law and international Indigenous rights.   Such reconciliation necessarily requires the full 
engagement of Indigenous peoples through internationally recognized agencies such as 
the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.539  I briefly propose some avenues for reform that may warrant 
further exploration and analysis. 
First, the UN Watercourse Convention could be amended to require state 
recognition of UNDRIP.540  For example, a provision could be inserted to protect 
Indigenous peoples rights as follows:  
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, in 
cooperation with other States, take all measures with respect to an 
international watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the 
rights of Indigenous peoples, taking into account generally accepted 
international rules and standards, including but not limited to the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.541 
 
The implementation of such a provision would require states to ensure that they obtain 
the free and prior informed consent of Indigenous peoples in the development of their 
bilateral or multilateral state development agreements as well as recognition of 
Indigenous peoples’ legal systems and customs.542  The limitations of such an approach 
to reform is obvious.  Even if reference to UNDRIP were included in the UN 
Watercourse Convention, the ability to enforce the provision on behalf of Indigenous 
peoples would remain solely with states, as the only parties to the Convention.  Further, it 
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is highly unlikely that that the Convention would be ratified with this amendment.  Even 
without amendment, the UN Watercourse Convention has failed to obtain the requisite 
number of signatories required for ratification.543  While a call for reform of the 
Convention may be justified, it is unlikely to have a practical impact upon Indigenous 
rights. 
 A second and potentially more potent recommendation for reform could involve 
targeting bilateral and multi-lateral agreements themselves.  As discussed in Chapter 2 
above, the principles of customary international water law are largely obtained by 
reference to state agreements.  Indigenous peoples in some regions such as the Columbia 
River Basin have obtained sufficient domestic rights and political power to demand 
recognition of UNDRIP and the human right to water in the imminent re-negotiation of 
the Columbia River Treaty.  While Canada and the United States would likely resist any 
attempt to make the principles of UNDRIP contractually binding, the cooperation of 
Indigenous peoples on both sides of the border along with the pressure of international 
agencies could place such a proposal squarely on the negotiating table.  The recognition 
of UNDRIP and the human right to water in future bilateral and multilateral state 
agreements would also serve the dual purpose of (i) advancing UNDRIP as customary 
international law and (ii) advancing the protection of Indigenous rights as a principle of 
customary international water law.   This approach would provide a valuable precedent 
for Indigenous peoples in other river basins to advocate for state recognition of their 
rights in transboundary agreements.  However, as with a reform of the Convention, 
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recognition of Indigenous rights in transboundary agreements would be limited by the 
reality that Indigenous peoples would remain dependent upon states to enforce their 
rights.  Notwithstanding this limitation, lobbying for the inclusion of UNDRIP and the 
human right to water in transboundary river agreements deserves merit for its potential to 
aid in global efforts to recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 Arguably, neither of the first two proposals goes far enough to mitigate the 
adverse impacts of Indigenous peoples’ exclusion from the sovereign community or 
address the complexity of the current challenges regarding transboundary river 
governance.  Simply demanding that states recognize Indigenous rights does not 
necessarily translate into practical reforms to current practices especially without 
effective enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms. In my view, effective legal and 
social reconciliation calls for deep systemic reforms that promote collaboration and 
cooperative dialogue between Indigenous peoples and states. Given the historical and 
ongoing transgressions against Indigenous peoples, it is not enough to simply rely upon 
existing structures and legal systems to achieve these ends.  Moreover, the scope and 
complexity of the issues confronting transboundary governance demands a more organic, 
dynamic and cooperative approach to governance and dispute resolution than is currently 
offered in international water law.  Karkkainen contends that “the problems are simply 
too complex and too dynamic” 544 to be addressed through state-based, top-down 
approaches to governance. Rather, effective transboundary water governance and the 
reconciliation of international water law and the international law of Indigenous peoples 
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require the creation of new institutions and equitable processes that promote mutual 
respect in transboundary water governance.   
River basin organizations  (RBOs) offer a template for the development of 
transboundary institutions and processes aimed at ensuring that Indigenous peoples are 
engaged in the governance of transboundary rivers.  Mock defines river basin 
organizations as, “forums where governments that share rivers can come together to 
coordinate activities, share information, and develop integrated management 
approaches”.545   I contend that future international water initiatives should be directed 
towards (a) ensuring that river basin organizations are established on every transboundary 
river and (b) articulating the values and principles that will guide the development of 
these organizations.  In this manner, new international institutions and principles could be 
co-created with Indigenous peoples in a manner that fully reflects their status as members 
of the international community. 
Transboundary river basin organizations (RBOs) already exist on transboundary 
basins throughout the world as a venue for multi-stakeholder dialogue, information 
sharing, knowledge transfer, coalition-building and dispute resolution. Existing river 
basin organizations created by state agreements include the Mekong River Commission 
(1957), the Indus River Commission (1960), and the Nile River Basin (1999).546  The 
latter provides a framework for the equitable sharing of water among 10 countries and 
160 million people.547 However, RBOs are not established on all transboundary rivers.  
While there are approximately 260 transboundary rivers in the world, the International 
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Network of Basin Organizations lists only 134 member organizations.548 Neither the 
Columbia River nor the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River has a dedicated transboundary river 
basin organization. 
RBOs offer the potential to create institutional capacity, which allows multiple 
communities and stakeholders to develop integrated basin-wide governance strategies.   
They also provide capacity to coordinate and disseminate the vast amount of information 
needed to address basin-wide issues such as the impacts of climate change, hydro-power, 
flooding, pollution, water scarcity and seismic activity.  Most importantly, they provide 
the neutral space required to facilitate cross-cultural dialogue, coalition building, and 
collaborative problem solving that transcend the sovereign discourse.549   
RBOs are a well-documented subject of international water governance, but 
further research is required to assess their potential to recognize the rights of Indigenous 
peoples.  The effectiveness of RBOs varies widely and their success is dependent to a 
large extent on the amount of authority vested in them by states and the establishment of 
adequate enforcement mechanisms.550  Success is also dependent upon the level of 
cooperation and participation by the states in the region.  For example, the Mekong 
Commission has been weakened by China’s refusal to participate in the Mekong 
Commission and by the “diverse political agendas” of the other states in the region.551  
Mock notes that “[e]xperience shows that when divisions among basin countries are 
likely to be a major obstacle, appointment of a neutral and independent chairperson to the 
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commission can facilitate decision-making.”552  Another key element of successful RBOs 
is the inclusion of mechanisms to promote public participation, transparency and 
accountability.553  Current comparative research on RBOs reveals the key elements of 
success.  Further comparative research of RBOs is required from an Indigenous 
perspective to establish criteria for an international declaration or convention regarding 
RBOs that recognizes the rights of Indigenous peoples. 
The idea of an international instrument to mandate regional watercourse 
organizations is not new.  Brown & Odeh propose a Global Transboundary Watercourse 
and Aquifer Agreement (GTWAA) to create a global watercourse agreement intended to 
establish a river basin organization for each international transboundary watercourse and 
aquifer.554  The authors contend that the creation of a GTWAA is required to address the 
following three shortcomings of current transboundary watercourse governance: 
(i) absence of watercourse and aquifer institutions and organizations for 
every international WAA [watercourses and aquifers]; 
(ii) limited knowledge transfer of WAA governance, particularly between 
states with established international watercourse agreements and those 
without prior relationships or agreements; and  
(iii) insufficient dialogue and research on potential benefits from cooperation 
around international WAA management, especially in light of the 
discussion to date that has focused almost exclusively on the economic 
costs of joint management.555 
 
The authors envision a GTWAA that mandates the creation of a regional watercourse 
agreement on every transboundary watercourse with reference to “fundamental 
principles, implementation activities, and soft law, or guiding principles, to which each 
signatory subscribes” as well as a basin-wide commission which then implements the 
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agreement. 556  Each agreement could then be adapted to regional values and 
considerations.  In support of their proposal, the authors provide a detailed analysis of the 
current literature and case examples to demonstrate how the creation of institutional 
space is critical to aid in cooperation and reduce conflict. They contend that the guiding 
principles of a GTWAA include the following: (i) capacity building; (ii) communication; 
and  (iii) balancing integrated water resource management with human needs.557  They 
also call for regional agreements that create effective mechanisms for dispute resolution 
and compliance.558   
 I agree with their central thesis that there is need for an international 
agreement that establishes a watercourse institution on every transboundary 
watercourse. However, their proposal fails to recognize the role that 
Indigenous peoples must play in the development of these agreements and 
organizations and to that extent it requires critical analysis from Indigenous 
perspectives to ensure that Indigenous rights are recognized at every level of 
development.  Further research of RBOs is required to demonstrate the 
extent to which existing organizations have engaged Indigenous peoples in 
transboundary river governance and Indigenous peoples’ experience of these 
organizations. Brown & Odeh’s proposal for a reconstruction of 
international water law merits consideration for its potential as a vehicle for 
implementing Indigenous rights and values in transboundary river basin 
agreements.  A comparative analysis of the role and degree of engagement 
with Indigenous peoples in current RBOs will provide valuable insight into 
future international developments in this regard. 
In my view, the codification of RBOs provide a natural forum for the legal 
reconciliation that is required between international water law and the existing body of 
Indigenous and human rights laws. Such an approach would not attempt to challenge 
sovereignty but would instead aim to create an additional inclusive dimension to current 
state strategies.  Dixon agrees, “practical coordination at the global level is needed” in the 
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form of a “global regime framework managed by a permanent and specified global 
organization or secretariat”.559  She concludes: 
All of this implies the need for a multi-level system of governance that 
works above, below and with states. The UNDP itself stresses this, building 
partnerships at all levels of governance, from local to NGO and state actors 
and creating “linkages between the political processes, development 
challenges, and environmental management in transboundary river basins.” 
This multi-level governance is becoming more common and more possible 
through globalization and the emergence of non-state actors as “states are 
too large to solve some local and regional problems, and too small to 
address some global challenges.” especially for “the economic, political or 
ecological issues linked to water resources.” This does not diminish the 
importance of national level governance, but the fact that “more and more 
actors are being included in policy formulation, in the implementation, as 
well as in monitoring and compliance” indicates that states are willing to 
share the responsibility of governance and recognize the legitimacy of actors 
working at different levels.560 
 
Dixon advocates for an international institution, such as UN-Water, or another newly 
created UN institution, to be responsible for the coordination, implementation and 
enforcement of principles for transboundary water management.  She further argues that 
it is possible to create general principles and dispute resolution mechanisms while still 
allowing for regional diversity.561   
The creation of a “multi-level system of governance”562 is consistent with Parlett’s 
analysis of how systemic changes to the international legal system evolve in response to 
particular problems.563  Parlett observes: 
… new developments in the international legal system can be seen to have 
resulted in a series of grafts onto the existing structure of the international 
legal system, rather than a replacement of the existing structure.  Thus, the 
international legal system has developed multiple structural devices which can 
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be used in a particular situation to address particular problems.  In any given 
situation, more than one structural device may offer possible answers to those 
problems.564 
 
In my view, there is considerable merit to the creation of new international instruments 
that articulate the guiding values and principles of international water law and call for the 
creation of RBOs on every transboundary river.  Even at the regional level, it would be 
advantageous for Indigenous peoples to demand that states’ enter into bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements for the creation of a river basin organization for the purposes of 
coalition building, information gathering and dispute resolution.   
The creation of such transboundary institutions would be consistent with the 
requirements of Article 32 of ILO No 169 regarding the requirement upon states “to 
facilitate contacts and co-operation between indigenous and tribal peoples across 
borders”,565 while also providing states with the institutional capacity to meet their 
domestic and international obligations to engage in genuine dialogue with Indigenous 
peoples to garner their “free and informed consent”. Well-crafted dispute resolution 
mechanisms could also alleviate lengthy and costly court actions at the national and 
international level.  Even in regions where one or more states refuses to participate in the 
RBO, which is likely where China is concerned, there would be distinct advantages in 
creating a transboundary institution to provide other states, international agencies and 
Indigenous peoples with an opportunity to work collectively to overcome the challenges 
of such non-cooperation.566  
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The creation of such an institution whether globally or regionally, requires the full 
participation of Indigenous peoples at every level of development if it is to achieve its 
full potential to further cooperation and reduce conflict over water.567   In the next 
section, I will consider how an international instrument mandating RBOs on every 
transboundary river could promote the reconciliation of international water law and 
international law of Indigenous peoples. 
4.4 River Basin Organizations as “Ethical Spaces” 
 
… the idea of the ethical space, produced by contrasting perspectives of the 
world, entertains the notion of a meeting place, or initial thinking about a 
neutral zone between entities or cultures. The space offers a venue to step 
out of our allegiances, to detach from the cages of our mental worlds and 
assume a position where human-to-human dialogue can occur.  The ethical 
space offers itself as the theatre for cross-cultural conversation in pursuit of 
ethically engaging diversity and disperses claims to the human order.568 
 
Willie Ermine, Cree Ethicist 
 
Space must be created, intellectually and socially – 
 for peace to be achieved.569 
 
Taiaiake Alfred, Kahnawá:ke, Mohawk Nation 
 
The creation of an international instrument that mandates the formation of a river 
basin organization on every transboundary river holds the most potential for promoting 
the genuine reconciliation of international water law and the international law of 
Indigenous peoples.  The creation of new basin-wide transboundary river institutions 
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built upon “post-imperial values” such as  “consent, mutual recognition, and cultural 
continuity”570 provides an opportunity for Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples to 
engage in addressing some of the complexities of shared water governance while 
simultaneously allowing for a departure from the sovereignty discourse, at least on a 
‘without prejudice’ basis.    
Cree ethicist, Willie Ermine, calls for the creation of “ethical spaces” as a critical 
first step in the reconciliation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.  In describing 
“ethical spaces”, he states: 
Engagement at the ethical space triggers a dialogue that begins to set the 
parameters for an agreement to interact modeled on appropriate, ethical and 
human principles. Dialogue is concerned with providing space for exploring 
fields of thought and attention is given to understanding how thought 
functions in governing our behaviours. It is a way of observing, collectively, 
how hidden values and intentions can control our behaviour, and how 
unnoticed cultural differences can clash without our realizing what is 
occurring.571  
 
If thoughtfully constructed in a manner consistent with the guiding principles set out in 
UNDRIP, river basin organizations could provide the neutral “ethical” meeting space 
necessary for coalition building to occur on the specific issues confronting shared 
transboundary water governance.  As Ermine states, “[t]he compelling legal task is to 
enable processes so that rights are justly named, described and understood.”572  
 The process of co-creating an international instrument to guide river basin 
organizations will require states and Indigenous groups to reach some consensus on the 
articulation of the underlying values and principles that should guide water governance.  
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Pradhan et al. consider the nexus between the identification of values and legal right to 
water: 
Rights to resources derive from law, which in turn has a dialectical 
relationship with underlying cultural values, such as those of justice, equity, 
solidarity, and hierarchy, on one hand, and cultural meanings and values of 
resources on the other.573  
 
The authors conclude,“[c]laims to and recognition of claims over resources are based not 
only on specific laws, principles, and rules, but also on wider cultural norms and 
values.”574   Increasingly, there is a call to articulate and implement international water 
ethics into international water laws. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) issued a report in 2011 entitled Water Ethics and 
Water Resource Management in which it concluded that “[g]iven the realities of the 
global water stress crisis, we need to adapt acceptable frameworks of environmental 
ethics to water resource management.” 575   The authors cite the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights [UDBHR]576 by all members of UNESCO in 
2005 as well as the World Commission on the Ethics of Science and Technology 
[COMEST] report entitled Best Ethical Practice in Water Use and identify several ethical 
principles that have evolved into internationally accepted norms including the principles 
of human dignity, human equality, equity, inclusiveness and participation among others.   
While the report does not mention the collective rights of Indigenous peoples, it 
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emphasizes the need to develop the field of water ethics in order to address the realities of 
the “global water stress crisis.”577  Arguably, reconciliation of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous values regarding water must start with recognition of Indigenous peoples’ 
laws, traditions and recommendations regarding a shared international water ethic.578 
While the UDBHR provides a declaration on water ethics from a state perspective, further 
analysis and synthesis of Indigenous declarations on water is required to identify water 
laws and ethics that may be unique to Indigenous peoples.579  Groenfeldt (2010) notes 
that the development of an international water ethic “would not fill a void, but would 
rather replace ethical systems already in effect.”580 Ethics are already implicit in 
international water law regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples, the doctrine of 
sovereignty and the factors that are deemed relevant to decisions regarding transboundary 
waters.  The process of co-creating an international declaration on water ethics that can 
be supported by both states and Indigenous peoples will make the discussion of ethics 
explicit and provide the foundation for new laws and legal systems.  
An international commitment to river basin organization could create the space 
and institutional capacity necessary for the exploration and reconciliation of state and 
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Indigenous values regarding water and stimulate the co-creation of a shared international 
water ethic.  This water ethic would then inform the principles that will guide 
institutional processes such as the mechanics of dispute resolution, participatory 
processes and information sharing.  
  Transboundary river basin organizations offer a regional forum for the 
development of basin-wide dispute resolution mechanisms.  One of the most common 
criticisms of the current UN Watercourse Convention is its failure to provide any dispute 
resolution mechanisms for non-state actors regarding transboundary development.   
While some Indigenous peoples may have recourse to domestic courts, many national 
systems are still inadequate to address Indigenous peoples’ claims and the rising level of 
domestic water conflicts.581  Courts are also often inadequate to address the extra-
territorial character of transboundary disputes. To the extent that court remedies are 
limited to compensation or reparation, they are arguably inadequate.582  Within the 
context of environmental degradation, McCaffrey notes that even the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) recognizes “that traditional remedies for the breach of international 
obligations are often of little use where the environment is concerned”.583  McCaffrey 
cites the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case as follows: 
The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental protection, 
vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible 
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character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in 
the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.584 
 
Given the interconnectedness and synergy between the environment and Indigenous 
rights, the recognition of Indigenous rights in transboundary disputes requires regional 
dispute resolution mechanisms that also addresses the “irreversible character” of damage 
to Indigenous communities.  Priority needs to be placed on collaboration and coalition 
building prior to development.  Established processes for coalition building would also 
provide sovereigns with an opportunity to meet their international and domestic 
obligations to consult with and obtain the “free and informed consent” of Indigenous 
populations prior to development on transboundary rivers.   
Participatory processes could also allow for recognition of the full spectrum of 
diverse Indigenous perspectives, thereby avoiding the tendency to assume that there is 
only one Indigenous perspective on any given issue.   Richardson states: 
… international environmental law affirms the need for effective participation 
of indigenous peoples in determining how to achieve sustainability.  Enduring 
solutions to this challenge are unlikely to be found if policy reform is framed 
solely in terms of enunciating indigenous rights over use of plants and 
animals.  Rather, the focus should be broadened to require the establishment 
of institutional processes that secure indigenous peoples’ involvement in 
environmental decision-making systems in an integrated and proactive 
manner.  This should be accompanied by a shift away from prevailing mono-
cultural approaches to resource management to the forging of new cross-
cultural strategies that allow for interaction rather than conflict between 
indigenous and non-indigenous interests.  … The environmental challenge is 
one that requires governments, communities, indigenous peoples and others to 
cooperate and employ new legal concepts and institutions.585 
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While critics will contend that it is not possible to allow everyone a seat at the table, 
major multi-stakeholder environmental agreements provide evidence that large multi-
party negotiations regarding the environment are possible.586   
 River basin organizations could also provide the institutional capacity to coordinate 
a vast amount of information regarding the entire river basin including scientific data on 
climate change, fluctuation levels, seismic activity, and flooding. Moreover, they provide 
the opportunity for knowledge transfers as well as the potential to learn from Indigenous 
peoples’ traditional knowledge regarding governance strategies in times of water 
scarcity.587   Wolf identifies the wealth of untapped traditional knowledge that exists 
regarding Indigenous strategies for shared water governance in arid regions throughout 
the world.588 His research considers lessons learned from the methods of conflict 
resolution adopted by the Berbers of the High Atlas Mountains and the Bedouin of the 
Negev Desert, in the face of water scarcity and fluctuation.589  Similarly Professor Alfred 
(2005) observes the potential for international law to learn from Indigenous traditions: 
Scholars of international law are now beginning to see the vast potential for 
peace represented in indigenous political philosophies. Attention focused on 
the principles of the Rotinohshonni Kaienerekowa (Great Law of Peace) in the 
international arena, for example, suggests the growing recognition of 
indigenous thought as a postcolonial alternative to the state sovereignty 
model.590   
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RBOs could become a natural forum for further understanding of Indigenous legal 
systems and customs regarding water governance.  
The preliminary research and drafting of an international agreement to guide river 
basin organizations demands the full participation and support of international Indigenous 
institutions such as the UN Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues or the Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in order to ensure that it is founded upon 
the basis of mutual respect and that its guiding principles are consistent with Indigenous 
peoples’ rights and values.   The sincerity of any attempt at collaboration between states 
and Indigenous peoples is likely to be questioned in light of states’ long colonial history 
and current practices. In “Rethinking Collaboration: Working the Indigene-Colonizer 
Hyphen” (2008), Jones interrogates “the logic of ([her] own) White/settler enthusiasm for 
dialogic collaboration” and considers the potential for exploitation in any collaborative 
undertaking between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples: 
The liberal injunction to listen to the Other can turn out to be access for 
dominant groups to the thoughts, cultures, and lives of others. … In 
attempting, in the name of justice and dialogue, to move the boundary pegs of 
power into the terrain of the margin-dwellers, the powerful require those on 
the margins not to be silent, or to talk alone, but to open up their territory and 
share what they know.  The imperialist resonances are uncomfortably apt.591 
 
If river basin organizations are to be the “ethical spaces” imagined by Willie Ermine, 
then they must be co-created with the critical engagement and full participation of 
Indigenous peoples. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
Water is a classic common property resource.  
No one really owns the problem.  
Therefore, no one really owns the solution.592 
 
Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General 
 In this chapter, I have argued for the reconstruction of international law of 
transboundary watercourses in a manner that is inclusive of Indigenous peoples’ affirmed 
rights.  To this end, I have set out to counter potential arguments that the international 
legal system is limited to state actors and not flexible enough to recognize the inherent 
rights of Indigenous peoples.   Historical analysis of the evolution of international 
Indigenous rights and the international legal system’s recognition of the rights onto non-
state actors illustrates the flexibility of the international system to allow for such rights.  
However, it also points to the system’s rigid adherence to the doctrine of sovereignty.  
From a state perspective, there exists a need for states’ agreement to “confer” new rights 
onto Indigenous peoples.  Arguably, from Indigenous perspective, it is not necessary to 
argue for the creation of new rights under international law but rather it is a matter of 
arguing for the recognition and implementation of pre-existing Indigenous rights within 
the context of international water law.  While historical and theoretical arguments for 
reform are evident, systemic change of the international system tends to occur within the 
context of complex problems that require creative solutions.  States continue to be the 
dominant actors in international law and state consent is required to recognize the rights 
of non-state actors, however, there is ample precedent that states and international 
agencies overwhelmingly support the implementation of Indigenous peoples’ rights 
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throughout the international legal system.  In addition to human rights instruments and 
declarations that affirm express or indirect individual rights to water, UNDRIP, ILO No 
169 and a multitude of other international instruments affirm Indigenous peoples’ 
collective rights to water. 
 I have offered several proposals for a reconstruction of the international law of 
transboundary rivers that is inclusive of these rights.  First, I consider the potential for an 
amendment to the current UN Watercourse Convention to reference the human right to 
water and UNDRIP in order to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ have the right to “free and 
informed consent” prior to developments that will impact their territories.  This approach 
has limited appeal given that the UN Watercourse Convention has not yet been ratified 
and that this limited reform perpetuates Indigenous peoples’ dependence upon states to 
enforce their rights.  Second, I consider the value of having states voluntarily insert 
provisions regarding the human right to water and Indigenous peoples’ rights in their 
state agreements.  This approach has merit as it would make such requirements 
contractually mandatory and help advance the argument that these principles have 
advanced into customary international law.  However, it fails to provide Indigenous 
peoples with access to compliance or dispute resolution mechanisms.  Third, I propose a 
radically inclusive approach to transboundary water law that envisions a new 
international instrument, which calls for the creation of river basin organizations on all 
transboundary rivers.  These organizations would provide the institutional capacity that is 
required to ensure that integrated, holistic, basin-wide approaches to river governance are 
implemented in a manner that is consistent with human rights and Indigenous rights. 
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Given that individual and collective rights to water are already set out under 
human rights laws and being addressed in human rights bodies,593 it is reasonable to 
question why reconstruction of international water law is necessary given that Indigenous 
peoples have access to dispute resolution mechanisms through established international 
human rights bodies.  Given the critical importance of water to human life and the 
complexity of the issues confronting water security in the 21st century, it is no longer 
legitimate to maintain an institutional separation between international water law and 
human rights laws.594  The reconstruction of international water law should not simply be 
a matter of addressing the appropriate venue for dispute resolution, but also about 
creating laws, institutions and processes that ensure the engagement of Indigenous 
peoples’ in the development of creative regional strategies towards basin-wide river 
governance.595 Moreover, human rights bodies are constrained in their ability to address 
transboundary claims.  Professor Dinah Shelton, President of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights identifies the “transboundary problem”596 within the 
context of Indigenous water rights: 
There is a transboundary problem with which human rights bodies have 
difficulty, because human rights instruments generally require states to protect 
and ensure rights to those within their territory and jurisdiction.  This limits 
the ability of human rights bodies to examine water problems that stem from 
activities outside the territory of the state, whose capacity to ensure 
guaranteed rights is thereby affected. ... Solutions to water needs of 
indigenous and local communities will require transboundary cooperation and 
better fact-finding.597 
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In addition to the constraints posed by the transboundary nature of many water claims, 
Indigenous peoples often lack the financial resources to engage in lengthy protracted 
litigation in domestic courts that is generally required prior to accessing international 
human rights bodies.598    
Shelton enumerates several measures that are needed to "address the water crises 
from a human rights perspective": 
1. Integrate human rights into development decisions - recognizing the 
indivisibility and equal importance of all human rights. 
2. Bring the targets of development into the decision-making process as active 
participants 
3. Adopt more democratic and transparent procedures consistent with human 
rights. 
4. Promote accountability and capacity-building. 
5. Harmonize practical and operational aspects of human rights and 
development without compromising the essential values of each domain. 
6. Recognize human rights as ends in themselves, even if evidence-based 
evaluation of progress is impossible. 
7. Include as a part of investment agreements and licenses for development 
projects the Voluntary Guidelines599 for the conduct of cultural, environmental 
and social impact assessments regarding developments proposed to take place 
on or which are likely to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters 
traditionally occupied or used by indigenous and local communities, thereby 
making them legally binding.600 
 
Richardson concurs that petitions to human rights bodies to establish Indigenous rights is 
not sufficient to safeguard the environment and concludes: 
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… reform must also address mechanisms by which Indigenous communities 
can collaborate with management institutions at other levels of economic 
policy-making and development planning.  If Indigenous livelihoods that 
respect the environment are to be sustained, an Indigenous voice in local 
environmental governance is not enough – it must also be heard in the 
institutions that shape the global economy, trade, finance and other 
fundamental causes of environmental pressure.601 
 
In my view, the concerns raised by Shelton and Richardson can be addressed by 
recognizing individual and collective rights to water in the creation of basin-wide 
institutions designed to increase participatory decision-making and coalition-building on 
transboundary rivers.   Water is at the foundation of all human enterprises including 
agriculture, hydropower, oil & gas, tourism, and other economic pursuits.602  As such, 
transboundary rivers are fertile ground for the creation of international institutions that 
promote inclusive decision-making and coalition building to reconcile the competing 
interests and values of globalization and local Indigenous communities. 
River basin organizations offer the potential for institutional capacity to allow 
multiple stakeholders to develop basin-wide governance strategies and coordinate the 
vast amount of information needed to address basin-wide issues such as the impacts of 
climate change, hydropower, flooding, pollution, water scarcity and seismic activity.  
RBOs could also serve as an “ethical space” to facilitate cross-cultural dialogue, 
coalition-building, dispute resolution and collaborative problem-solving that transcends 
the sovereign discourse.  River basin organizations already exist on hundreds of 
transboundary rivers throughout the world, but do not yet exist on all transboundary 
rivers.  Existing RBOs have been created by voluntary regional state agreements and as 
such vary widely in their guiding principles and processes.  A comparative study of 
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whether existing RBOs are adequately addressing Indigenous peoples’ rights could 
provide valuable insight into the development of international guidelines in this regard. 
 The process of drafting an international agreement to guide the operation of river 
basin organizations will require states and Indigenous peoples to collaborate on the 
declaration of an internationally accepted water ethic.  Writing within the context of 
environmental protection, Postel defines “water ethic” as “a guide to right conduct in the 
face of complex decisions about natural systems that we do not and cannot fully 
understand.”603  Given that water is at the foundation of all human enterprises and all life, 
laws regarding water by their very nature require a consideration of ethics.  Indeed, it is 
imperative for the international community to articulate and codify an international water 
ethic for the 21st century that will guide the future development of international water 
law. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion: A Return to Ethics 
 
The art and practice of equitable distribution of an access to fresh water for 
all people in the 21st century, as a fundamental human right and 
international obligation, is the mother of all ethical questions of all 
transboundary natural resources of a finite nature.604 
 
Thomas R. Odhiambo,  
Past President of the African Academy of Sciences 
 
 
 All peoples rely upon water for life.  Without it, they die. Competing interests 
over fresh water include drinking water, hydroelectric power, fishing, irrigation, 
environmental needs and industrial uses.  The availability of fresh water is further 
compromised by climate change, increasing global population, and large-scale 
development projects that dominate local communities and pollute freshwater supplies.  
The goal of water security is a matter of international importance that has political, 
human and environmental dimensions.  Indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable in 
the current global water crisis.   On May 16, 2001, UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki-moon 
observed, “[m]illions of indigenous peoples continue to lose their lands, their rights, and 
their resources.  They make up one third of the world’s 1 billion rural poor. And they are 
among the most vulnerable and marginalized of any group.”605  Within the context of 
international water law, the rights of Indigenous peoples are an issue of fundamental 
importance and international concern.  Yet, Indigenous peoples’ rights are conspicuously 
absent from international water laws and legal discourse. 
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 In this thesis, I have adopted Critical Race (Indigenous) Theory to confront the 
inequities inherent in the UN Watercourse Convention, the doctrine of sovereignty and 
related discourse from Indigenous peoples’ perspectives.  My methodology has involved: 
(i)  adopting a theoretical framework informed by Critical Race Theory; (ii) 
deconstructing the UN Watercourse Convention and the legal doctrine of sovereignty and 
providing two case studies to illuminate Indigenous perspectives in transboundary water 
law; (iii) presenting a literature review regarding Indigenous peoples’ relationship to the 
doctrine of sovereignty and alternative conceptions of sovereignty; and (iv) offering 
proposals for reconstructing international water law in a manner that is inclusive of 
Indigenous peoples and invites a return to ethics as the foundation for future reform. A 
discussion of ethics and the role of law in shaping the relationship between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous peoples is particularly apt in the context of transboundary water law.  
The very nature of rivers and the dependence of all living things upon the hydrological 
cycle forces us to acknowledge our interconnectedness at a global level, the fragility of 
human life and the relative arbitrariness of state boundaries.  Within this context, I have 
sought to engage Indigenous perspectives regarding the intersection of international water 
law, the doctrine of sovereignty and the international rights of Indigenous peoples.   
 The UN Watercourse Convention and related legal discourse is aimed solely at 
governing the relations between sovereigns.  It is premised upon “sovereign equality” 606 
and codifies equitable principles aimed at seeking optimal utilization of a shared resource 
in a manner that minimizes harm to downstream states.  From a state-perspective, the UN 
Watercourse Convention is perceived as a departure from the strict adherence to the 
doctrine of sovereignty in favour of cooperative state development agreements that 
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emphasize “mutual gains”.  However, when viewed from Indigenous perspectives, the 
primacy of sovereignty continues to dictate which peoples may avail themselves to the 
equitable principles of the Convention and operates to exclude Indigenous peoples from 
the legal discourse. 
A critical analysis of the UN Watercourse Convention and related legal discourse 
demonstrates that Indigenous peoples are conspicuously absent from both.  States are not 
held to any international standard with respect to Indigenous peoples when making 
agreements under the Convention. Indeed, the Convention appears to place the agreement 
and cooperation of states as its primary objective regardless of the agreement’s impact 
upon the rights of Indigenous peoples.  However, a review of two transboundary basins, 
the Columbia River and the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, demonstrate the devastating impact 
of past developments upon Indigenous peoples and the potential for violent conflict in 
future developments.  Applying Critical Race Theory to deconstruct international water 
law, I contend that the emphasis placed upon sovereign status in international water law 
may operate to adversely impact Indigenous peoples in the following ways: 
(i) It excludes Indigenous peoples from international negotiations regarding 
transboundary rivers and from participating in the development of 
international water law principles; 
(ii) It presumes that Indigenous peoples’ interests in transboundary rivers are a 
domestic issue, thereby reinforcing Indigenous peoples as subordinate to 
the states that oppress them and perpetuating ongoing colonization of 
Indigenous peoples by states; 
(iii) It undermines international conventions and declarations that have 
affirmed the rights of Indigenous peoples to fully participate in 
environmental decision-making; and 
(iv) It may exacerbate conflict over disputed territories and unintentionally 
encourage states to expand their territories. 
 
By relying solely upon states’ interests and a Western classical understanding of 
sovereignty, international water law is predicated upon values and assumptions that 
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contradict and exclude Indigenous peoples’ experience of sovereignty and relationship 
with water.  
 Locating Indigenous peoples in international water law necessitates an 
understanding of the historical context surrounding the doctrine of sovereignty and a 
consideration of how Indigenous peoples experience sovereignty.  By offering alternative 
narratives to the dominant discourse, it becomes apparent that one’s understanding of 
sovereignty is a reflection of political, cultural and spiritual values, and one’s place in the 
world. The following themes arose from the literature: 
(i) Indigenous perspectives challenge the myths of neutrality and objectivity 
that surround the doctrine of sovereignty. 
(ii) The conflicts surrounding sovereignty discourse are ultimately premised 
on a conflict of values. 
(iii) There is no one universal homogenous perspective regarding Indigenous 
sovereignty but rather a plurality of diverse perspectives. 
(iv) At their root, all the perspectives are aimed at reclaiming Indigenous 
sovereignty and inherent power as well as redefining Indigenous-state 
relations. 
 
Indigenous narratives regarding the meaning of sovereignty invoke values that accord 
with duties, balance, mutual respect and interconnectedness with nature.  In contrast, the 
Western legal concept of sovereignty evokes values of entitlement, conquest, domination 
over nature, territoriality, authority and power over some peoples to the benefit of other 
peoples. Once viewed in contrast with Indigenous ways of understanding power, the 
perceived neutrality and objectivity of the Western legal definition of sovereignty 
dissolves and it becomes apparent that the doctrine of sovereignty is a social construct 
designed to achieve the particular goals of colonization and exploitation of peoples and 
resources.607   To the extent that the doctrine of sovereignty is a cornerstone of our 
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current international legal systems, Indigenous peoples continue to suffer the adverse 
consequences of the domination of imperialist values over Indigenous values.   
According to Macklem, the international law of Indigenous peoples has emerged 
to specifically acknowledge and mitigate the adverse impacts of an international legal 
system founded upon Western sovereignty.608  A review of the history of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights over the last century has culminated in the codification of their rights to 
self-determination in ILO No 169 and UNDRIP, as well as a host of other international 
instruments.  Supported by the majority of sovereign states and international agencies, 
there is a concerted effort to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ rights are recognized 
throughout the international legal system.  I contend that reform of the UN Watercourse 
Convention is also necessary to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ rights are recognized 
within the context of international water law and legal discourse.  Arguably, a failure to 
implement Indigenous rights into all legal systems and institutions simply perpetuates the 
colonial agenda upon which they were founded.   
Given that international law has historically been concerned only with state-to-
state relations, some may challenge my proposed reconstruction of international water 
law on the basis that international law should not or cannot accommodate the recognition 
of non-state actors.  However, historical analysis of the evolution of international 
Indigenous rights and the international legal system’s recognition of the rights of non-
state actors demonstrates the flexibility of the international system to allow for such 
rights. From a state perspective, there exists a need for states’ agreement to “confer” new 
rights onto Indigenous peoples.  However, from an Indigenous perspective, it is not 
necessary to argue for the creation of new rights under international law but rather it is a 
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matter of arguing for the recognition and implementation of pre-existing Indigenous 
rights within the context of international water law. While states remain the dominant 
actors in international law, there is a demonstrated willingness by the majority of states 
and international agencies to recognize and implement Indigenous peoples’ rights.      
Others may challenge that a reconstruction of international water law is not 
necessary given that Indigenous peoples already have access to human rights laws and 
organizations and that these existing laws and institutions are sufficient to address any 
violation of their rights. However, human rights laws are intended to address the actions 
of states that violate the rights of their own citizens. As such, existing human rights 
bodies are not adequate to address transboundary claims.  I have also argued that it is not 
sufficient to simply establish recourse for violations of rights.  True legal reconciliation 
will require the creation of new processes and institutional capacity that emphasizes 
collaboration, participatory processes and information sharing.    
Reform of international water law is not likely to be achieved by challenging 
sovereignty directly but rather by emphasizing a return to ethics and values that have 
informed the emergence of human rights laws and the international rights of indigenous 
peoples.  Rather than challenge the doctrine of sovereignty, I propose the co-creation of 
new international instruments and institutions based on mutual respect and 
interconnectedness that operate in parallel with existing laws and institutions.  Such a 
multi-dimensional, multi-level approach to governance will create space for states and 
Indigenous peoples to work together to address the complexities of transboundary water 
governance.  In my view, existing river basin organizations provide a template for 
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creating the institutional capacity necessary to mitigate against the adverse impacts of our 
current international legal system upon Indigenous peoples.   
In this thesis, I have called for the reconciliation of transboundary water law and 
the international law of Indigenous peoples in a manner that transcends the conflict and 
violence inherent in the sovereignty discourse.  I contend that the conflicts within the 
sovereignty discourse and the emerging conflicts over water are ultimately conflicts over 
values.  The reconciliation of international water law with the international law of 
Indigenous peoples necessitates a reconciliation of values and a return to ethics.  In my 
view, reform of international water law requires two steps:  
(1) the articulation of an international water ethic with the critical engagement of 
Indigenous peoples; and  
(2) the creation of institutional capacity and processes consistent with this shared  
international water ethic that provide an ‘ethical space’609 for Indigenous 
peoples and states to engage each other on the complex issues surrounding 
water.   
As noted by Groenfeldt, this is not an issue of establishing ethics where none have 
existed before. Rather, it is a matter of making the current water ethic explicit.  The 
current ethic of “command and control”, “economically beneficial use” and “water as 
resources principle” is arguably incongruous with the values of Indigenous peoples and 
long-term environmental sustainability.610  The development of an international water 
ethic is intended to reveal, challenge and discuss the ethics currently informing 
international water law with the goal of reconciling them with the values currently 
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espoused by the international community as embodied in the laws regarding individual 
and collective rights.   
The development of an international water ethic will require further analysis of 
existing international declarations on ethics such as the Universal Declaration of Bioethics 
and Human Rights (UDBHR)611 as well as regional Indigenous declarations on water612 to 
identify shared values.  This process necessitates grassroots involvement by Indigenous 
peoples and critical engagement by agencies such as UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to 
ensure that the values of Indigenous peoples and their traditional laws are accurately 
represented.613   The articulation of an international water ethic can then form the 
foundation for the creation of a new convention on water that mandates regional river 
basin organizations on every transboundary river in accordance with established ethics.   
This convention could establish minimum criteria regarding membership, participation, 
dispute resolution, information sharing and enforcement mechanisms, while also 
allowing enough flexibility for regional diversity.  In this way, new “ethical space”614 can 
be created based upon a shared ethic of mutual respect, equality and interconnectedness. 
Further research is required to facilitate the reconstruction of international water 
law in a manner that recognizes Indigenous perspectives. My thesis has been limited to a 
                                                 
611
 UDBHR, supra note 576. 
612
 Indigenous values and laws are already enshrined in a number of regional and international water 
declarations.  For examples of Indigenous peoples’ statements on water, see Appendix A: Indigenous 
Water Declarations & Recommendations.    
613
 Indigenous organizations may wish to collaborate further with international agencies concerned with 
water that make recommendations to states and the United Nations including UN-Water (unwater.org) and 
the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation created in 2008.  See 
Officer of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe 
drinking water and sanitation”, online: OHCHR 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/WaterAndSanitation/SRWater/Pages/SRWaterIndex.aspx>. 
614
 Ermine (2007), supra note 45. 
  
180
Critical Race Theory analysis of the law concerning transboundary rivers only. 
Additional critical analysis is needed to assess the draft articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers615 as well as popular water governance theories (IWRM) from 
Indigenous perspectives.  In addition, comparative analysis of the structures and 
constraints of existing RBOs from Indigenous perspectives will provide insights into the 
existing or potential roles of Indigenous peoples in transboundary river institutions and 
provide guidance for drafting international instruments regarding the implementation of 
RBOs in a manner consistent with the principles of UNDRIP and ILO No 169.  On a 
more theoretical level, further consideration is warranted to consider how a “community 
of interests”616 approach to water governance might apply to an international community 
that is recognized to include Indigenous peoples as well as states.617   For example, can 
we develop the meaning of the concepts of “community” and “interests” in a manner that 
allows us to develop this theoretical approach within the context of an international water 
ethic?  
Finally, there is a pressing need for more research and recognition of traditional 
knowledge regarding water governance.  Indigenous knowledge, legal systems and 
ethics, especially in water-scarce regions, may provide key insights into how we address 
the current global water stress crisis.  How have Indigenous peoples developed 
governance for upstream and downstream issues? What is the traditional knowledge on 
keeping peaceful relations over water?  Traditional knowledge may provide us with 
                                                 
615
 Law of Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 43. 
616
 McCaffrey (2007), supra note 5. See discussion of “community of interests” approach to sovereignty at 
page 28-29 of this thesis. 
617
 McCaffrey (2007), ibid. 
  
181
practical tools in creating peaceful governance strategies. Moreover, Indigenous wisdom 
reminds us of our place in the world.  Nlaka’pamux lawyer, Ardith Walkem writes:  
Nlaka’pamux law is an exacting law.  A law that flows from the fact that we 
are owned by the land, by the water, that we owe our existence to the 
relationship of our peoples to the territories where our grandmothers, and 
their grandmothers before them, came into being.  The land and waters have 
given our people life, and we are not free to disregard that relationship 
because of the assertion of other laws.  This law is not diminished by 
licenses, certificates of title, or stacks of legal papers that array themselves 
in challenge.  It is the law of our heart, our memories, a law drawn of the 
physical fact that the very components of our bones and marrow are 
comprised of the sustenance that we have taken from the land. It is a law 
carried forward through stories, nourished and shared through the words we 
speak and the actions we take.  Indigenous laws are alive and not remnants 
from the past, and we have an obligation to follow them, and to reinvigorate 
them where they have become weakened.618  
While the challenging discourse on the future of sovereignty is likely to continue, the 
current global water stress crisis requires us to move beyond sovereignty, at least on a 
without prejudice basis, in order to engage in a reconciliation and articulation of the 
values that will guide our communities in the governance of shared water.    
  
The comforting message from history 
is that our values and paradigms can and do change over time.619 
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Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of the Columbia River Basin620 
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 Source: Watersheds of the World: North and Central America - Columbia Watershed  © 2006 World 
Resources Institute <http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-resources/map-383.html>. Content licensed under 
a Creative Commons License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/>. 
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Figure 2.2: Map of Tsangpo-Brahmaputra Basin621 
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 Source: Watersheds of the World: Asia and Oceania - Brahmaputra Watershed. © 2006 World 
Resources Institute. Online at: <http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-resources/map-347.html>. Content 
licensed under a Creative Commons License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/>. 
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